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REVIEW ESSAY:  JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME POWER:  FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT VS. 
THE SUPREME COURT, 2010 
Barry Cushman* 
It now has been seventy-five years since President Franklin Roose-
velt’s confrontation with the Supreme Court of the United States 
reached its crisis.  Throughout his first term, the President had 
looked on with increasing frustration as the Court invalidated one af-
ter another of the central elements of his New Deal.  The National 
Industrial Recovery Act (“NIRA”), the Agricultural Adjustment Act 
(“AAA”), farm debt relief legislation, railway pension legislation, and 
key components of the Administration’s energy policy had been de-
clared unconstitutional by aging justices whom Roosevelt regarded as 
reactionary and out of touch.  To Roosevelt and several of his advi-
sors, the prospects that such important Second New Deal measures as 
the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) and the Social Security 
Act (“SSA”) could successfully run this judicial gauntlet seemed dim.  
Yet during the first four years of his presidency, Roosevelt was stymied 
by the lack of any opportunities to make his own appointments to the 
Court and thereby to influence the course of American constitutional 
law. 
In 1936, however, Roosevelt won a resounding landslide re-
election victory, earning the electoral votes of every state other than 
Maine and Vermont.  Emboldened by this remarkable showing of 
public support, on February 5, 1937, the President urged Congress to 
enact legislation that would have authorized him to appoint to the 
Court a new justice for every sitting justice who had not retired within 
six months of reaching his seventieth birthday.  Because there were at 
the time six sitting justices answering that description, the bill would 
have enabled Roosevelt to appoint half a dozen new justices to the 
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Court immediately, thereby enlarging its membership to fifteen.  The 
bill would meet with stiff resistance in Congress, and ultimately it 
would not pass.  But that spring the Court did hand down decisions 
upholding a state minimum wage law for women, the NLRA, and the 
SSA. 
The story of the Court-packing fight and the associated “switch-in-
time that saved the Nine” has been told many times, but it continues 
to fascinate lawyers, historians, and political scientists, and is retold 
each year in countless high school, college, and law school courses.  
Jeff Shesol, a former speechwriter for President Clinton who earned a 
Master’s degree in history at Oxford, where he studied as a Rhodes 
Scholar, tenders a substantial contribution to that body of literature 
with his recent book, Supreme Power.  Though the book is written so as 
to be accessible to a general audience, and has been marketed ac-
cordingly, Mr. Shesol does engage with much of the academic litera-
ture on the subject, and seeks to position himself within that scholarly 
corpus. 
Any history of the Court-packing controversy sets out to answer 
three principal questions.  The first is how best to tell what I will call 
the political story:  how to understand the political trajectory of the 
Plan from its initial conceptualization to its ultimate failure.  The se-
cond is how best to tell what I will call the legal story:  how to under-
stand the constitutional landscape that confronted New Deal reform-
ers, how they negotiated it, and how and in what respects the 
Supreme Court transformed that body of constitutional law during 
the Great Depression.  The third is how to specify the relationship be-
tween these two stories.  What effect, if any, did the events recounted 
in the political story have on the legal story?1  Each of the three Parts 
of this Article offers an evaluation of Mr. Shesol’s efforts to address 
each of these questions.  Part I discusses Mr. Shesol’s treatment of the 
political story; Part II takes up his account of the legal story; and Part 
III explores his analysis of the relationship between the two.  I con-
clude that while Mr. Shesol does a very nice job with the first ques-
tion, his efforts to answer the second and the third are not nearly so 
successful. 
I.  THE POLITICAL STORY 
Mr. Shesol’s presentation of the political story is the strongest part 
of the book.  His research is industrious and extensive; his prose 
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composition is exceptionally skillful; and he has an admirable talent 
for spinning a yarn and moving a story along.  In the course of relat-
ing that story, he succeeds in identifying a number of its features that, 
taken together, cast doubt on the prospects for the Plan’s ultimate 
enactment, even in the very early days of the struggle.  “[F]rom its 
very first days,” Mr. Shesol reports, the fight “did not unfold as Roo-
sevelt had expected.  The actors in this national drama stubbornly re-
fused to get on script.”  (p. 307). 
First, Mr. Shesol underscores the lack of public backing for Roo-
sevelt’s proposal.  It was “far from clear,” he reports, that “the Ameri-
can people supported Roosevelt on the issue of the Supreme Court.”  
(p. 245).  Numerous state legislatures passed resolutions condemning 
the bill.  (p. 351).  A contemporary Gallup poll showed that 
[t]hough nearly 60 percent of the public wanted the Court to take a 
‘more liberal’ view of the New Deal, this did not equal a desire to curb 
the Court:  only 41 percent favored limits on judicial review . . . . And 
when Americans were asked to name the nation’s most pressing issue, 
neither the Court nor the Constitution even made the list.2 
(p. 246).  Mr. Shesol regards this as “the cost of avoiding the issue in 
1936.”  (p. 246).  Roosevelt had refrained from making the Court an 
issue in the campaign in order to deny “ammunition to his oppo-
nents,” but at the same time had “also denied himself a valuable 
chance to educate the public—to prepare it for what he might do 
and enlist it in what many believed would be a difficult fight.” (p. 
246) 
The print media quickly came out against the bill en masse.  As 
Mr. Shesol relates: 
A survey taken at the time showed that more than two thirds of the news-
papers that had backed Roosevelt’s re-election in 1936 now opposed him 
on the Court bill, and more than half of these did so “vigorously.”  More 
ominously, while pro-administration papers supporting the plan had a 
 
 2 Curiously, however, in the book’s concluding chapter Mr. Shesol insists that there was a 
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ROOSEVELT VS. THE SUPREME COURT 508–09 (2010).  This would not appear to be sup-
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Opinion and Constitutional Change in the 1930s, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 7, 67–74 (2002) [hereinaf-
ter Cushman, Mr. Dooley and Mr. Gallup].  As will become clear in Parts II and III, such in-
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combined circulation of 3.1 million, pro-administration papers opposing 
it reached an audience that was four times larger. 
(p. 301).  The “prevailing opinion” on the nation’s editorial pages 
was that “Roosevelt had hidden his plans” during the 1936 election, 
that he had “‘been disingenuous with the people,’” and that he had 
“‘double-crossed the country.’”  (pp. 301–02).  Somewhere between 
60% and 80% of newspapers had opposed FDR’s re-election in 1936, 
but “they were now nearly unanimous in condemning his Court plan.  
The White House, in its ongoing survey of press reactions, did not 
even bother to track arguments in favor of the plan, because they 
were so few in number.”  (p. 305). 
Mr. Shesol explains that people were not persuaded by Roosevelt’s 
initial attempt to explain the bill as necessary to enable the Court to 
hear more cases than the aging justices could presently handle.  (p. 
302).  They were put off by the plan’s “‘cleverness’” and its “whiff of 
‘political trickery.’”  They saw it as an attempt to make the Court a 
“‘rubber stamp,’” and denounced it as a “con” and a “putsch,” a “dis-
honest” power grab, a “‘bloodless coup d’etat,’” an effort to create a 
“dictatorship” like those of Hitler, Mussolini, and Stalin.  It didn’t 
help that the Plan was actually cheered by Il Duce and the Nazi press.  
(pp. 302–03). 
Congressional offices quickly found themselves overwhelmed, not only by 
the volume of correspondence (Henry Ashurst received a thousand tele-
grams in a single day) but by the intensity of public opposition to the 
plan.  Only the merest handful of telegrams urged Congress to pass the 
bill.  Meanwhile, at the White House, the wires were distressingly qui-
et. . . . When the newspapers hit the stands on the morning of February 
6, forecasting the bill’s fast track to passage, the prediction already felt 
out of date.  Clearly, now, there was going to be a fight.  Not a feeble, pro 
forma protest as the bill became law—as had often been the case since 
1933—but a genuine fight . . . . 
(pp. 305–06). 
It was also “far from clear,” in Mr. Shesol’s view, that Congress 
would support Roosevelt’s proposal.  The President “had made no at-
tempt to assess congressional attitudes toward any specific approach, 
or even toward court reform generally.”  (pp. 245–46).  In fact, he 
had kept congressional leaders in the dark about his plan, and he was 
“a bit startled” by the hostile reaction that the Plan’s announcement 
provoked in many of them.  He had “failed to anticipate the rage, 
hurt, humiliation, and betrayal that his Court-packing plan would un-
leash among his faithful—if often resentful—lieutenants,” many of 
whom had been naively proposing “their own pet solutions to the 
Court problem” in various public fora while Roosevelt was hatching 
his Plan behind their backs.  (pp. 307–08).  “By 1937, FDR and the 
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Democratic leadership were like an old, unhappily married couple, 
nursing innumerable grievances but unwilling, or unable, to sepa-
rate.”  (p. 309).  Within a week many of these disaffected Senate 
Democrats had joined with every Senate Republican to form a body 
of opposition to the Plan under the leadership of liberal Montana 
Democrat Burton K. Wheeler.  (pp. 323–24). 
The bill was introduced in the Senate, Mr. Shesol explains,  prin-
cipally because Hatton Sumners, the Chairman of the House Judici-
ary Committee, 
. . . had persuaded a majority of the Judiciary Committee to join him in 
opposing the Court bill.  Forecasts of a wide margin of support in the 
House would mean nothing if Sumners were able to block the bill in 
Committee.  The White House, in that event, would have two alterna-
tives:  abandon the bill or dislodge it by force, suspending the rules and 
forcing its way to the floor.  Speaker Bankhead and Sam Rayburn, the 
majority leader, pleaded with the president not to divide the House in 
this way; the acrimony, they said, would be so extreme that it would 
doom Court reform and a whole lot else. 
(pp. 344–45).  Shortly after the plan was announced, Sumners “called 
a press conference and denounced the Court-packing plan as ‘infa-
mous.’  Steve Early reported to Roosevelt that Sumners had been 
‘savage in attack’ and gave the proposal ‘hell, specifically and general-
ly.’”  (pp. 343–44).  James Roosevelt responded that Sumners “‘needs 
to be straightened out,’” and on the morning of February 10, “FDR 
met with Sumners in an attempt to do just that.  ‘Didn’t make an aw-
ful lot of headway,’ James observed afterward.”  (p. 344).  Before 
James met with Sumners, White House advisors were divided over 
whether to “steamroll” the House Judiciary Committee Chairman—
the course favored by Keenan and Corcoran—or to “forgo standard 
procedure” and instead introduce the bill in the Senate rather than 
the House—the course preferred by Charlie West and House leaders.  
James Roosevelt emerged from the meeting “inclined to avoid 
Sumners altogether.”  (p. 345). 
Meanwhile, Sumners attempted “to weaken, modify, or possibly 
supplant” the bill by pressing for enactment of his own bill permitting 
justices to retire at full pay.  (p. 342).  The justices had been made 
anxious by the Economy Bill of 1932, which had slashed Oliver Wen-
dell Holmes’ pension in half; but for this concern, as Mr. Shesol 
points out, “both Van Devanter and Sutherland would almost certain-
ly have retired at the start of FDR’s presidency—and spared the na-
tion the struggle that followed between its branches of government.”  
(p. 342).  Sumners had introduced such a judicial retirement bill in 
1935 but the House perversely had rejected it.  He reintroduced the 
bill in January of 1937, “seeing it as an incentive for justices to retire 
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and thereby end the crisis.”  (p. 343).  Within days of Roosevelt’s an-
nouncement of his plan, members of Congress would seize on 
Sumners’ retirement bill “as an alternative to Court-packing and a 
way out of the whole mess.”  (p. 343).  By February 10 the retirement 
bill had passed the House by a vote of 315-75, and the Justices were 
immediately notified of the House passage of the bill even as they 
were hearing argument in the Wagner Act cases.  Sumners immedi-
ately went to James Roosevelt and proposed that the retirement bill 
be rushed to passage through the Senate, and that FDR then give him 
six weeks to persuade at least two justices—presumably Van Devanter 
and Sutherland—to retire. (pp. 343–44). 
But throughout the Court fight, as Mr. Shesol so ably documents, 
Roosevelt stubbornly refused to compromise with the opposition.  In 
mid-February, as FDR was approached with proposals for compro-
mise, many observers were predicting that the bill would pass.  (p. 
329).  The President remained optimistic that support for the plan 
would grow as people came to understand it better.  Congressmen 
were now receiving more mail in support of the plan; internal polling 
in the House revealed a solid majority in favor; the Senate was equally 
divided, and of the third of Senators yet to commit one way or the 
other, nearly all were Democrats.  “Little wonder, then, that when 
congressional leaders approached the president about seeking a 
compromise, they found him unyielding.”  (p. 331). 
But Mr. Shesol insists that these early predictions that the bill 
would pass were “all a bit premature.”  Polls of the public showed that 
the opposition had “a slight advantage.” (p. 330).  By February 15, 
Roosevelt’s Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau gave the bill at 
best a 50-50 chance of passage.3  Accordingly, many in Congress were 
engaged in a “frantic search” for some middle ground.  (p. 345).  
“Nearly every faction—the bill’s reluctant supporters, its nervous op-
ponents, and those too afraid to take a stand either way—was eager to 
avert an all-out fight.”  (p. 345).  Perhaps the Sumners bill would 
solve the problem; if not, perhaps some form of constitutional 
amendment might do the trick.  But FDR “showed no interest in 
making concessions to Sumners, or anyone else, for that matter.”  (p. 
345).  James Roosevelt doubted that Sumners could deliver the prom-
ised retirements, and thought it better political strategy in any event 
“to have the President put through his own plan.”  And FDR was “un-
 
 3 Henry S. Morgenthau, Jr., Diaries (microfilm), The Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde 
Park, New York, Book 55, p. 95, quoted in LEONARD BAKER, BACK TO BACK:  THE DUEL 
BETWEEN FDR AND THE SUPREME COURT 47 (1967). 
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impressed by any of the alternatives being discussed in Congress.”  (p. 
345).  He “had already considered—and rejected—all these possibili-
ties. . . . Having spent two years examining almost every conceivable 
amendment to the Constitution, Roosevelt was well-armed (and in-
clined) to shoot down each proposal.”  (pp. 345–46).4 
For example, Mr. Shesol reports that Roosevelt’s “friend Charles 
C. Burlingham, the reform-minded grand old man of the New York 
bar,” had been “outspoken” in favor of a constitutional amendment.  
(p. 347).  “On February 19, dismayed by the Court plan, Burlingham 
wrote and urged the president to change course.”  “Dear Franklin,” 
he wrote, 
I haven’t bothered you for quite a spell. 
You can’t feel more strongly than I about the majority opinions, es-
pecially AAA, Minimum Wage and Roberts J.’s silly talk about railroad 
pensions.  BUT I don’t like your method.  I suppose you are in a hurry 
and this is your Congress.  It’s all very well to refer to previous changes in 
the size of the Court . . . the appointment of Bradley and Strong by Pres-
ident Grant . . . [but] the episode . . . has always been regarded as more 
or less scandalous and discreditable to Grant. 
Let me give you a plan that would work: 
1. Pass the retirement bill so that no justice can be treated as scurvily 
as Holmes was. 
2. Pass a joint resolution . . . for an Amendment making retirement at 
75 compulsory.  This, however, should not apply to the present sitting 
justices.  I am confident that if such a joint resolution is passed, all the 
justices over 75—Brandeis, Hughes, Van Devanter and McReynolds—
 
 4 FDR also faced resistance from several of the most liberal members of his party, some of 
whom thought that his plan did not get at the root of the problem.  “When Roosevelt 
launched his Court plan, he had expected liberals to see it as moderate, practical, achiev-
able—and preferable, therefore, to amending the Constitution.  Many did view it that 
way.  But two weeks into the fight, the president could see that the plan left some liberals 
cold, whether because they were concerned about the possible threat it posed to the sys-
tem of checks and balances, or because they believed that the real problem was not this 
particular group of justices but judicial power per se.  Hence the continuing appeal, on 
the left, of a constitutional amendment. . . . [S]ome on the left—inclined, as a general 
matter, toward moral or political absolutes—insisted on “an amendment or nothing.”  In 
their view the time had come, after decades of judicial arrogance, for a storming of the 
citadel.  To “the more ardent New Dealers,” as the New Republic explained, Roosevelt’s 
plan was “deeply disappointing.”  They “had dug in their heels for a great constitutional 
tug-of-war”—a “glorious” struggle to subdue the Court permanently by limiting or per-
haps eliminating judicial review.  They had no patience for an approach that they saw as a 
mere expedient and, worse, as a substitute for real reform.  “They are opposing the Presi-
dent’s plan,” complained Robert H. Jackson, “because they want to get an amendment 
that will end judicial power.”  Though they constituted no more than a small minority, 
even among liberals, their numbers were great enough—and their volume high 
enough—to provide cover for conservatives whose real agenda was to defeat any kind of 
judicial reform.”  SHESOL, supra note 2, at 346. 
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would retire without waiting for the adoption of the Amendment it-
self. . . . It would not be decent for them to hang on after Congress had 
adopted such a resolution. 
(p. 347).  But Roosevelt resisted the Amendment proposal on the 
ground that it would be difficult to get agreement on the language, it 
would be next to impossible to get the requisite two-thirds majorities 
in both houses of Congress, and it would be equally challenging to 
secure ratification by the requisite number of states—a point he 
made both to Burlingham and to Senators pressing for an amend-
ment strategy.  (p. 348).  The bottom line was that there would be 
“no deals, no compromises.”  (p. 345). 
Instead, Mr. Shesol informs us, FDR hoped to use the levers of 
patronage to sway wavering or opposing Senators.  (pp. 353–54).  But 
this strategy proved unsuccessful.  For example, Republican Senator 
Gerald Nye of North Dakota gave a speech condemning the plan 
even after FDR called him to the White House and made veiled 
threats to withhold federal funds.  (p. 354).  There were several rea-
sons for the ineffectiveness of this strategy.  First, many Senators har-
bored hopes of becoming judges eventually, and were therefore pro-
tective of the judiciary. 
Few wished to serve on a neutered court; and few doubted that this 
would be the effect of the Court bill.  For this and other reasons—among 
them, Roosevelt’s wish for a balanced budget, which would necessarily 
curtail the number of government projects—the lure of patronage and 
federal largess was neither as strong nor as enticing as it once had been.  
“The [Supreme Court] issue was too big,” noted Alsop and Catledge; 
“the senators were too much excited by it to be affected by the petty po-
litical bullying and legal bribery which are ordinarily so useful to all ad-
ministrations.” 
And Roosevelt was not an especially good bully.  Though willing to 
play the patronage game, there were limits to how far he would go.  
Veiled threats were one thing; following through another.  When Tom 
Corcoran urged him to “play rough” with Henry Ashurst—the Judiciary 
Committee chairman whose support for the bill, despite his public state-
ments, was in doubt—Roosevelt refused.  Like Nye’s North Dakota, 
Ashurst’s home state of Arizona was at that time essentially a piece of 
federal property; its economy was highly dependent on government sub-
sidies.  Tom Corcoran advised Roosevelt to shut off the spigots.  “I never 
quite understood how the President failed . . . to use his power in this in-
stance,” Corcoran said later.  But Roosevelt had little taste for this brand 
of politics.  He knew that when the Court fight was over, he would need 
to rely on Ashurst again.  “I don’t devour them in the end,” Roosevelt 
told a close Senate ally. 
(pp. 354–55). 
Meanwhile, as Mr. Shesol makes clear, the Senate opposition was 
not playing beanbag. 
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Every day, in a hidden corner of the Capitol, the opposition forces met to 
compare notes, make adjustments in strategy, and get their latest orders 
from Wheeler.  Roosevelt might have the powers of the presidency, but 
Wheeler and his men had experience, ability, and the significant ad-
vantage of fighting a battle on their own terrain.  With ruthless, remorse-
less efficiency, they waged a campaign of what Wheeler called “intensive 
lobbying.”  What this meant was that each member of the “steering 
committee” was assigned to the uncommitted senators he knew best and 
then stalked them like quarry—in the Capitol, the cloakroom, the Senate 
Office Building, at cocktail parties, at stag dinners.  Committee members 
made the usual arguments about the Court and the Constitution but al-
so—perhaps with greater force—stoked their colleagues’ fears of domi-
nance by an all-powerful president and of the next wave of New Deal leg-
islation, more radical than the last, and unchecked by the Court. 
(p. 355). 
It was not clear, by contrast, that the Senate leaders supporting 
the plan really had their hearts in the fight.  As Mr. Shesol reports, 
“the best intelligence” that Wheeler and his colleagues obtained 
“came from the other side.  Leslie Biffle, an assistant to Joe Robinson, 
called Wheeler every night to share his knowledge of which senator 
was leaning which way.”  Wheeler “‘never knew for certain’” why Bif-
fle would have done this, but speculated that Robinson “himself had 
been behind it—perhaps in an attempt to strengthen the opposition 
and force Roosevelt to compromise.  ‘Robinson,’ said Wheeler, ‘had 
no more stomach for the Court-packing fight than we did.’”  (p. 356).  
But as Mr. Shesol points out, “Wheeler, of course, had plenty of 
stomach for the fight.”  (p. 356). 
Mr. Shesol observes that supporters were also burdened by the 
weakness of the case for the plan set out in Roosevelt’s initial mes-
sage.  (p. 367).  In a February 22 message to the President, Robert 
Jackson warned that public support for the proposal was declining in 
part due to the manner in which it had been framed.  He urged Roo-
sevelt to make the argument in favor of the bill in simpler and more 
candid terms.  Roosevelt agreed with this critique in a meeting a few 
days later, but he had taken “three weeks to admit this mistake—
three crucial, costly weeks—ample time for his credibility to be bat-
tered, enemies emboldened, and goals put at risk.”  (p. 368).  By early 
March, little progress had been made.  As “Democrats slashed at 
Democrats” in this “family quarrel,” there was “stalemate, reflecting 
the frustration and futility of ‘trench warfare.’”  (p. 371).  A March 1 
Gallup poll showed sentiment against the plan running 48-41.  “But 
mail to members of Congress seemed to point in the other direction.  
Neither side, in short, had much to show for a month’s worth of mak-
ing speeches.”  (pp. 371–72). 
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A few days after the President had unveiled his proposal, Ray-
mond Clapper had “typed a note to himself on Scripps-Howard let-
terhead:  ‘If Rvt does go to country on this, will know he really wor-
ried.’” (p. 307)  Now, a month into the fight, Roosevelt took his 
revised case to the public with renewed vigor.  At a March 4 Demo-
cratic Victory Dinner, Roosevelt criticized the Court for invalidating 
numerous New Deal measures and indulging its “‘personal economic 
predilections’ . . . that we live in a nation where there is no legal pow-
er anywhere to deal with its most difficult practical problems—a No 
Man’s Land of final futility.”  (p. 375).  The President concluded by 
calling on his feuding fellow Democrats to take the steps necessary to 
“‘make democracy succeed . . . now!’”  (p. 376).  Mr. Shesol reports 
that the Plan’s supporters were “overjoyed” by this “fighting speech,” 
but most editorial reaction “was negative, and harshly so.”  And Dem-
ocratic opponents of the plan were alienated by FDR’s insistence on 
party loyalty and his implication that they were “essentially one and 
the same with the Republicans, Liberty Leaguers, economic royalists, 
and ‘defeatist lawyers’ who had aligned against him in 1936.  Out-
raged, these Democrats resolved to work even harder to expose the 
‘innate wickedness’ of packing the Court.  If the president kept 
fighting for his plan, they said, they might well bolt the party.” (pp. 
376–77). 
The President followed this performance with a Fireside Chat 
broadcast five days later, in which he forcefully argued that the Court 
had been “‘acting not as a judicial body, but as a policy-making 
body. . . . —a super-legislature.’”  (p. 380).  The present Court was 
suffering from “hardening of the judicial arteries.”  It was necessary, 
he insisted, to “‘take action to save the Constitution from the Court 
and the Court from itself.’”  (p. 380).  He rejected proposals for a 
constitutional amendment giving Congress greater regulatory power, 
Mr. Shesol notes, because of “the difficulties of drafting an amend-
ment, building consensus for it, ratifying it, and getting it to survive 
the justices’ scrutiny.”  (pp. 381–82).  Enactment of the Court-
packing bill was the only viable solution. 
In the immediate wake of these two speeches, Mr. Shesol main-
tains, 
[S]upport for the plan had begun to climb!only marginally, but for the 
White House, the trend was encouraging.  Senators’ mail, too, showed 
the shift. . . .  
The Senate opposition was getting nervous . . . . Hiram Johnson 
wrote his son that “they are picking off occasional men from the opposi-
tion,” enough, he believed, to pass the bill by a comfortable margin. 
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(p. 386).  “Momentum was building; events were conspiring to help 
pass the bill.  Even a growing domestic crisis—the gathering storm of 
labor unrest” manifested in a wave of sit-down strikes at factories 
around the country—“appeared to strengthen the case for Court-
packing.”  (p. 387).  “Roosevelt’s opponents, despite steadily length-
ening odds, kept fighting.”  (p. 388).  But the Administration was in-
creasingly optimistic, believing that the tide had turned and that the 
opposition was breaking down and losing ground.  (p. 390).5 
This optimism led the Administration to conclude its testimony in 
the hearings on the bill being held before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee on March 20, after only two weeks.  Mr. Shesol relates 
that “Corcoran and Keenan had come to a strongly held view that 
opposition senators were, in effect, filibustering—asking long-winded, 
elliptical questions, repeating themselves and one another (even 
more than usual), on and on, day after day.”  (p. 391).  The Admin-
istration therefore rejected the opposition’s offer to allow them to 
put on more witnesses, viewing it as an effort to trick the bill’s propo-
nents into assisting the opposition in drawing out the hearings.  But 
Judiciary Committee chairman Henry Ashurst, who was privately op-
posed to the bill, was perfectly content to allow the opposition to put 
on as many witnesses as it cared to (pp. 383–84), and this enabled 
opposition forces to dominate the headlines for the following 
month.6 
The first witness to testify for the opposition was its leader, Sena-
tor Burton Wheeler.  Over the preceding weekend, Wheeler had in-
duced Chief Justice Hughes to prepare a letter, approved by Justices 
Van Devanter and Brandeis, which rebutted point by point each of 
the arguments Roosevelt had made in support of the bill in his initial 
message.7  After some preliminary niceties, as Mr. Shesol recounts, 
Wheeler dramatically removed the document from his suit pocket 
and began to read from it.  (pp. 393–97).  “There is no congestion of 
cases upon our calendar,” wrote Hughes.  “This gratifying condition 
has obtained for several years.”8  To Roosevelt’s claim that the Court 
 
 5 Contra MARIAN C. MCKENNA, FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT AND THE GREAT CONSTITUTIONAL 
WAR:  THE COURT-PACKING CRISIS OF 1937, at 356 (2002) (“There was little indication that 
the two March addresses changed anything.  Robert Jackson later claimed that none of 
the speeches during the court fight did much to convince people to change their minds 
about the proposal. . . . Instead of making decisive gains, the administration was losing 
the battle for public opinion and majorities in Congress.”). 
 6 JOSEPH ALSOP & TURNER CATLEDGE, THE 168 DAYS, at 124 (1938). 
 7 ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 6, at 124–26; BAKER, supra note 3, at 153–56. 
 8  Reorganization of the Federal Judiciary:  Hearings before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 1392, 
75th Cong. 488 (1937) (statement of Sen. Burton K. Wheeler). 
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had been denying certiorari in too many cases, Hughes replied that 
the Court had instead been too liberal in its grants.  Most of the peti-
tions that the Court had denied, Hughes maintained, were so utterly 
without merit that they never should have been presented for review.  
The addition of new justices, Hughes concluded, 
[A]part from any question of policy, which I do not discuss, would not 
promote the efficiency of the Court.  It is believed that it would impair 
that efficiency so long as the Court acts as a unit.  There would be more 
judges to hear, more judges to confer, more judges to discuss, more 
judges to be convinced and to decide.  The present number of justices is 
thought to be large enough so far as the prompt, adequate, and efficient 
conduct of the work of the Court is concerned.9 
To some, this critique of Roosevelt’s attack on the Court’s effi-
ciency was not unfamiliar.  Mr. Shesol reminds us that Hughes had 
given much of the information his letter contained to Washington Post 
columnist Franklyn Waltman in an off-the-record interview on Febru-
ary 5, the day that Roosevelt had unveiled the Plan.  (p. 394).  “Keep-
ing his source confidential, Waltman turned this research into a dev-
astating series of front-page articles debunking the central claim of 
FDR’s message.”  (pp. 395).  Justice Stone also “had sent factual ma-
terial to journalists to help them puncture the notion that the justices 
were overburdened.”  (p. 399).  Yet editorial comment in the next 
morning’s newspapers saw the Hughes letter as dealing the Admin-
istration a stunning, perhaps devastating blow.  (p. 397).  “When 
Wheeler finally rose from the witness chair, committee members who 
supported the Court plan furiously scribbled rebuttals, while oppo-
nents, for the first time in two weeks of hearings, smiled beatifically.”  
(p. 394).  Vice-President Garner reportedly telephoned FDR at Warm 
Springs, Georgia, and told him, “[w]e’re licked.”10 
Hughes himself later wrote that his letter “‘appears to have had a 
devastating effect.’”  (p. 400).  Others have shared this view.  Brandeis 
biographer Melvin Urofsky maintains that “[t]he reading of 
[Hughes’s] letter marked the end of the court-packing bill . . . .”11  
And contemporary observers later expressed their concurrence with 
Hughes’s assessment.  As Mr. Shesol reports:  “Rex Tugwell believed 
that the letter ‘so conclusively refuted the arguments Franklin had 
made in his message . . . that it ended any chance for passage the bill 
might have had.’”  (p. 400).  Similarly, “Robert Jackson judged that 
 
 9 Id. at 488–91 (1937) (statement of Sen. Burton K. Wheeler). 
 10 BAKER, supra note 3, at 159–60; BURTON K. WHEELER & PAUL F. HEALY, YANKEE FROM THE 
WEST 333 (1962). 
 11 MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE TRADITION 166 (Oscar 
Handlin ed., 1981). 
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the letter ‘pretty much turned the tide.’”  (p. 400).  But Mr. Shesol is 
inclined to discount those appraisals as coming “long after the fact.”  
(p. 400).  In what may have been some brave talk, Jackson wrote that 
even after Wheeler’s testimony there was “‘no question that the Pres-
ident’s plan will go through’—as well he might,” adds Mr. Shesol. 
As Ickes had seen, the Hughes letter had laid waste to an abandoned for-
tress.  It left untouched and perhaps even reinforced the argument Roo-
sevelt was now making with increasing force:  that the Supreme Court was 
a political body, and willing to cross the bounds of precedent and pro-
priety to oppose him at any cost.  That point, Hughes had made persua-
sively. 
(p. 401).12 
If Wheeler’s March 22 testimony dampened the Plan’s prospects, 
the effect of the Court’s March 29 decision in West Coast Hotel v. Par-
rish13 was arguably even more substantial.  “[I]t was obvious,” wrote 
Leonard Baker, “that the decision upholding the minimum wage 
would make it more difficult to push FDR’s Court plan through the 
Senate. . . . Particularly after the Roberts switch, there was no nation-
wide desire for altering the Court, and, as a result, no great desire in 
Congress either.”14  “By April,” concluded James MacGregor Burns, 
“the chances for the court plan were almost nil.”15  Yet in its immedi-
ate aftermath, some of the participants remained unsure which way 
the Parrish decision cut.  As Mr. Shesol reports, 
[B]oth sides claimed vindication:  to Robinson, the Parrish decision 
showed the importance of having the right men—and more of them—on 
the bench; to Wheeler, it revealed the Court’s capacity to correct it-
self. . . . Parrish had scrambled the pieces.  In the days after the Court’s 
reversal, no one could tell which side stood to gain politically.  The deci-
 
 12 Contra MCKENNA, supra note 5, at 376 (“The initial indirection that Hughes exposed may 
have been tacitly abandoned in the presidential addresses of March 4 and 9, but in the 
public mind it was still fresh.  The effect of the letter was ‘to show up for good and all as 
utterly hollow the smooth propositions with which the President had offered his bill.  The 
opposition’s gain in the debate was tremendous.’”).  As Harold Ickes put it, FDR had 
“‘abandoned this ground some time ago, but shrewdly Hughes chose to fight his skirmish 
where we were the weakest.’” Id. at 377.  The fortress had not been abandoned by Attor-
ney General Homer Cummings, who in his testimony before the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee “relied in the main on his original rationale for the plan as a managerial solution 
to the Court’s inefficiency . . . . [T]he first impression given the public of [FDR’s] reasons 
for the plan—the overburdened Court and its congested docket—was hard to erase, par-
ticularly when that impression was reinforced by Cummings’ testimony before the Judici-
ary Committee.”  ROBERT SHOGAN, BACKLASH:  THE KILLING OF THE NEW DEAL 170, 174 
(2006). 
 13 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
 14 BAKER, supra note 3, at 179, 191. 
 15 JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, ROOSEVELT:  THE LION AND THE FOX 303 (1956). 
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sion’s impact on the Court bill—and vice versa—was a matter of intense 
debate. 
(pp. 409"10). 
Cummings took the view that the Court had yielded to the pres-
sure of events, which vindicated FDR’s plan. 
[T]he Chicago Daily Tribune proclaimed that the Parrish ruling “Wrecks 
Argument for Packing Supreme Court.”  Both contentions were plausi-
ble.  It was certainly possible, as some claimed, that in the span of a single 
week, the Hughes letter and the Hughes opinion had blunted FDR’s 
momentum.  Unless they fueled it by reinforcing the argument that the 
Court was a political body.  As William Borah wrote to an associate on 
March 30, “the situation here is difficult to diagnose. . . . We do not know 
‘where we are at.’” 
(p. 410). 
It would not take long, however, to see which way the wind was 
blowing.  Shortly after the delivery of the Parrish opinion, the polls 
began to reveal a precipitous decline in the Plan’s already troubled 
popular reception.16  And as for the situation in the Senate, there was 
a telling event at the Gridiron Dinner held on April 10, two days be-
fore the announcement of the Court’s decisions upholding the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act.  “Late in the evening, just before the salad 
course,” Mr. Shesol reports, 
[A] chorus of journalists assembled on stage.  They pointed in unison to 
Chief Justice Hughes, who sat, smiling broadly, at the high table.  Then, 
in unison, they sang “Happy Birthday to You.”  The next day, Hughes 
would turn seventy-five.  When the song was through, the Gridiron Din-
ner guests—among them Wheeler, Connally, Ashurst, and Sumners—
rose in a standing ovation that lasted a very long time.  Long enough to 
make its point clear. 
(p. 428). 
Meanwhile, at the hearings, the leisurely Chairman Ashurst con-
tinued to preside 
. . . with relish over a variety performance of labor leaders and farm un-
ion officials,17 law school deans, columnists, historians, stockbrokers, 
 
 16 See Cushman, Mr. Dooley and Mr. Gallup, supra note 2, at 67–70. 
 17 At page 329, Mr. Shesol argues that labor and farm groups lined up solidly behind the 
plan, but this is inconsistent with the reports of other scholars, who have noted that not 
only the Grange, but also the Farmers’ Union, the National Cooperative Council, and the 
Farm Bureau all came out against the Plan.  SHESOL, supra note 2, at 329; see also ALSOP & 
CATLEDGE, supra note 6, at 59, 115–17, 164–76, 181; BAKER, supra note 3, at 86–88; 
MCKENNA, supra note 5, at 381–83; 2 MERLO J. PUSEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 753 (1951) 
[hereinafter PUSEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES].  Indeed, Mr. Shesol later notes that Roose-
velt’s acquiescence in the sit-down strikes “earned him little tangible support for his plan.  
Unions generally—not just the CIO—were making all the right noises and endorsing the 
bill, but their actions, to date, had been paltry.”  SHESOL, supra note 2, at 424. 
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presidents of patriotic societies, theologians, bishops, and rabbis—united 
only by their abhorrence of the Court-packing plan.  Roosevelt’s decision 
to cede the stage to this motley collection of antagonists had proven a 
mistake.  Opposition senators turned out to be shrewd in their selection 
and skillful in their coaching of witnesses—who provided, week after 
week, an earnest, instructive, and often entertaining filibuster against the 
president’s plan.  Ashurst, despite his pledge to support the bill, showed 
no inclination to hurry things along. 
(p. 417). 
Corcoran—who more than anyone had pressed for an early end to the 
administration’s testimony—still talked big about “breaking” the opposi-
tion, but as the weeks passed, the hearings, along with his other respon-
sibilities, took a toll on his confidence and his health.  His weight shot up 
twenty-five pounds.  He grew exasperated with Ashurst.  The chairman, in 
his view, “was deliberately extending the hearings until such time as the 
public could be whipped up to think of Roosevelt as a dictator.”  Or, 
more likely, until an event of some kind—a Court decision, a retire-
ment—tipped the balance in favor of the opposition.  Three times, Roo-
sevelt’s supporters on the committee tried—and failed —to shut down 
the hearings.  After the first attempt, at the end of March, opponents re-
sponded by scheduling fifty more witnesses. 
(p. 421).  The President, however, “appeared untroubled.  He wrote 
Frankfurter on April 5 that . . . ‘[i]t is quite clear that the utter confu-
sion of our opponents among themselves means success for us even 
though it may be deferred until June or July.’”  (p. 421). 
This “overconfidence” (p. 417) left Roosevelt unwilling to com-
promise even after the Court had upheld the NLRA on April 12.  
Opposition leaders now pronounced the Court bill “dead”—there 
was now, they argued, no reason for the president to seek additional 
justices.  In Mr. Shesol’s view, 
The moment was ripe for a compromise on the Court plan.  Supporters 
did not know if they had the votes to pass the bill, opponents were un-
sure whether they had the numbers to kill it,18 and both sides were ex-
hausted by their two-month-long siege.  Both were also anxious about the 
political consequences (of either crossing the president or standing by 
him) and eager to move on to other, pressing business, of which there 
was no shortage.  The Court fight had created a terrible bottleneck of ur-
gently needed legislation. . . . The 75th Congress was farther behind in 
the appropriations process than any Congress in a generation:  only one 
of eleven spending bills had been passed. 
 
 18 But see MCKENNA, supra note 5, at 430 (“The Wagner Act rulings . . . dealt a crushing blow 
to the court bill.”).  At about that time, “an informal poll of senators disclosed that a ma-
jority would vote against the court bill.”  Id. at 420.  “After the Wagner Act decisions, even 
FDR’s close White House aides began losing confidence in the bill’s chances for passage 
and counseled retreat.”  Id. at 441. 
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(p. 435).  But such “leaders of the revolt” as Wheeler, Edward Burke, 
and William Borah “fiercely regarded adding even ‘two [justices] as 
bad in principle as six’”; and though Senate Majority Leader Joe Rob-
inson and others urged FDR to seize the opportunity for compro-
mise, the President refused to do so.  (pp. 435–36). 
At this point, Mr. Shesol relates, “Roosevelt could see that in the 
Senate, the margin for the plan was narrow.  He had begun to worry 
that Robinson would agree to a compromise without consulting him.”  
(p. 439).  Support continued to deteriorate throughout the month of 
April.19  By April 23, when the Judiciary Committee concluded its 
hearings, it was clear that a majority of its members opposed the bill 
and was preparing to write a critical report.20  Roosevelt summoned 
Ashurst to the White House to try to persuade him to report the bill 
“without recommendation.”  Ashurst and Robinson looked into the 
matter, and determined that it was “not feasible.”21  By the beginning 
of May, the opposition’s steering committee had concluded that they 
commanded an absolute majority in the Senate.22  And the most re-
cent Gallup poll “showed declining support for the plan.”  (p. 441). 
But while the President responded by adjourning to the Gulf of 
Mexico for a fishing vacation, Mr. Shesol places Tommy Corcoran 
“back in Washington, having a case of nerves.  Since February, he had 
been swaggering around town, boasting that ‘the thing is in the bag.’  
In reality, the steady drone of the hearings and the drumbeat of 
gloom from Senate leaders had sapped his confidence.”  (pp. 441–
42). 
[Corcoran] huddled with Ben Cohen and Robert Jackson to devise a new 
strategy.  The three men agreed that Roosevelt should drop the bill for 
now and take it up next session, by which time he could line up sufficient 
support.  To save face, the White House could say that the Court’s switch 
had deferred—but not eliminated—the need for “new blood.”  Joseph 
Keenan and Charlie West, the two members of the strategy board in clos-
est contact with congressional leaders, both agreed that this was best. 
(p. 442). 
On May 3, before the Social Security Cases23 even had been argued, 
 
 19 ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 6, at 163; William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 
Supreme Court ‘Packing’ Plan, in WILMON H. DROZE, GEORGE WOLFSKILL & WILLIAM E. 
LEUCHTENBURG, ESSAYS ON THE NEW DEAL 97 (Harold M. Hollingsworth & William F. 
Holmes eds., 1969). 
 20 BAKER, supra note 3, at 193; Court Bill Faces a Committee Veto, Ashurst Concedes, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 24, 1937, at 1. 
 21 HENRY FOUNTAIN ASHURST, A MANY-COLORED TOGA:  THE DIARY OF HENRY FOUNTAIN 
ASHURST 374 (George Sparks ed., 1962). 
 22 ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 6, at 201. 
 23 Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937). 
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James Roosevelt found himself cornered by Joe Robinson, Alben Barkley, 
and Pat Harrison in a Capitol hideaway office.  The senators told him in 
no uncertain terms that the president had lost the fight for six additional 
justices, and that, by refusing to face the truth, he was tearing apart the 
Democratic Party.  “Mr. Roosevelt,” said Robinson, “you tell your poppa 
that he’d better leave this whole thing to us to get what we can out of it.  
We’ll do our best for him.” 
(p. 442).  But even against these increasingly formidable odds, FDR 
still rebuffed all overtures of compromise.  (pp. 442–43). 
Then, on May 18—nearly a week before the announcement of the 
Court’s decisions in the Social Security Cases—two events conspired to 
further dim the prospects for passage of a bill that Wheeler had al-
ready declared dead more than a month before.  The first event, 
timed to coincide with the second, was Justice Van Devanter’s an-
nouncement that he would retire at the end of the term.  (pp. 444–
48).  This timely intervention by the aging justice 
. . . had its intended effect.  A cartoon in the Washington Post pictured a 
grim-faced Van Devanter, pistol in hand, shooting an anthropomor-
phized Court bill in the head—to thumbs-up approval from the Senate 
opposition.  In Congress and the press (if not, it appeared, in the coun-
try), the calls for FDR either to make major concessions on the bill or 
give it up altogether reached a high and steady pitch. 
(pp. 447–48). 
That same day the Senate Judiciary Committee voted against rec-
ommending passage of the bill by a vote of 10-8.  “The Democrats 
split evenly, denying Roosevelt even a slight majority of members of 
his own party.”  (p. 446).  The Committee’s report was “caustic, con-
temptuous, and apocalyptic . . . . It laid waste to every premise, provi-
sion, and stated purpose of the bill, granting nothing to Roosevelt, 
not even the good faith of his intentions.”  (p. 467).  “‘[W]e would 
rather have an independent Court,’” the report declared, 
‘. . . a fearless Court, a Court that will dare to announce its honest opin-
ions in what it believes to be the defense of the liberties of the people, 
than a Court that, out of fear or sense of obligation to the appointing 
power, or factional passion, approves any measure we may enact. . . . We 
recommend the rejection of this bill as a needless, futile, and utterly 
dangerous abandonment of constitutional principle. . . . It is a measure 
which should be so emphatically rejected that its parallel will never again 
be presented to the free representatives of the free people of America.’ 
(pp. 468–69). 
In the immediate wake of this stern rebuke, Mr. Shesol reports 
that “the committee 
. . . then delivered a second blow to the proposal and Roosevelt’s pres-
tige.  Despite Roosevelt’s hard line against compromise, all but one of 
the bill’s supporters voted for a substitute measure, put forth by Marvel 
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Logan and backed by Joe Robinson, to allow a temporary increase in the 
number of justices at the rate of no more than one a year . . . . 
(p. 446).  Yet even this compromise proposal was defeated by a vote 
of 10-8, which cast doubt over Joe Robinson’s claim a month earlier 
that he could get the President “a couple of extra justices tomorrow,” 
(p. 436) and indeed over the possibility of any future compromise. 
Mr. Shesol recounts that in the days following the committee vote 
and Justice Van Devanter’s retirement announcement, the Presi-
dent’s aides came to see that the bill was in deep trouble.  (pp. 451–
53).  But after the Court handed down its decisions upholding the 
Social Security Act, the hopes for reaching any sort of compromise 
with the opposition seemed to be slipping away. 
Compromise in whatever form had appealed to both sides when it 
seemed to offer the only way out—that is, the only way short of giving the 
president exactly what he wanted.  But now that the original plan was 
dead, and goodwill toward Roosevelt was on the wane, the battle for half-
measures was distinctly uphill.  While public support for FDR’s six-judge 
plan now stood at 40%—the lowest level yet—only 42% favored a two-
judge substitute. 
(p. 464).  This did not incline opposition Senators “to abandon en-
trenched positions.”  (p. 464). 
Nor, it appears, did Roosevelt’s mishandling of the appointment 
of Van Devanter’s successor.  (pp. 448–51).  It was widely known that 
during the Hundred Days of 1933, as Joe Robinson “labored to pass 
programs in which he did not believe,” Roosevelt had promised his 
Senate Majority Leader the first vacant seat on the Supreme Court.  
(p. 309).  On May 18, when news of Van Devanter’s announcement 
reached the Capitol, the popular Senator’s colleagues had gathered 
around him in warm congratulation.  Yet to Robinson’s great con-
sternation, the White House remained distant and silent on the sub-
ject.  Roosevelt believed that Robinson would vote as a conservative 
on the Court, and his appointment therefore would not advance the 
President’s constitutional agenda.  Members of Roosevelt’s staff even 
began to circulate rumors that Robinson would not be the nominee.  
The Administration left the humiliated Robinson dangling for nearly 
two weeks before calling him to the White House and assuring him 
that the seat would be his once the Court legislation had been enact-
ed.24 
Roosevelt’s well-known promise to Robinson helps to explain why 
the President was so reluctant throughout the fight to agree to a 
compromise involving two or three additional justices, and why in-
 
 24 ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 6, at 209–15. 
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formed and thoughtful observers would have understood this.  To see 
the point, assume no retirements from among the justices comprising 
the Court in February of 1937.  Under these circumstances, if Robin-
son returned to his conservative roots once he enjoyed life tenure on 
the bench, a two-justice deal would offer FDR no net gain.  Even with 
the appointment of a New Dealer to offset Robinson’s vote, what had 
been 5-4 or 6-3 decisions against the New Deal might now be adverse 
votes of 6-5 or 7-4.  Even a three-judge compromise was not without 
its hazards.  “A 6-6 decision might well affirm by an equally divided 
Court an unfavorable decision of a lower federal or state court; and if 
Hughes, Roberts, and Robinson all voted with the Four Horsemen,25 
the Administration would be handed defeat by a vote of 7-5.”26  Thus, 
James Roosevelt was unpersuaded by Hatton Sumners’ February al-
ternative plan to enact his judicial pension bill and then convince at 
least two justices (presumably Van Devanter and Sutherland, both of 
whom were known to be anxious to leave the bench) to retire.  As the 
junior Roosevelt wrote of Sumners’ proposal in his diary, no doubt 
mindful of the promise to Robinson, “‘It wouldn’t really cure the sit-
uation even if he succeeds. . . .’” (p. 345)  Even after the President 
had replaced two of the Four Horsemen, the Administration would 
still be faced with the possibility of an adverse majority comprised by 
McReynolds, Butler, Hughes, Roberts, and Robinson.  As the Presi-
dent remarked, “‘If I had three vacancies, I might be able to sandwich 
in Joe Robinson.”  But it would be necessary that all of those vacan-
cies be created by the retirements of conservative justices in order to 
assure FDR of a working majority on a nine-member Court.27 
Indeed, the promise to Robinson is the key to understanding why, 
until Van Devanter retired in May, Roosevelt felt that he could not 
settle for fewer than six additional justices.  Again, let us take the per-
sonnel of the Court as Roosevelt found it in early 1937.  In Roose-
velt’s view, the Court’s decisions between 1934 and 1936 must have 
suggested that Van Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland, and Butler—
the Four Horsemen—were very likely to vote to invalidate New Deal 
legislation.  Decisions from that same period also suggested that both 
Hughes and Roberts were at best unreliable.  Add to their number 
 
 25 The Four Horsemen were Justices Willis Van Devanter, James Clark McReynolds, George 
Sutherland, and Pierce Butler.  See Barry Cushman, The Secret Lives of the Four Horsemen, 83 
VA. L. REV. 559 (1997). 
 26 BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT:  THE STRUCTURE OF A 
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 24 (1998) [hereinafter CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW 
DEAL COURT]. 
 27 MCKENNA, supra note 5, at 469–70. 
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Robinson, to whom FDR had promised his first appointment to the 
Court, and that made for an unacceptable probability of seven ad-
verse votes.  Even if the Administration managed to hold the votes of 
Brandeis, Stone, and Cardozo—as it had not always done—the Presi-
dent would need an additional five appointments in order to ensure 
a razor-thin 8-7 majority; and even that would be assured only if none 
of his other five appointments gave him an unwelcome surprise after 
being invested with life tenure.  Once Van Devanter had announced 
his retirement, this calculation changed, but only slightly.  Now Rob-
inson’s appointment meant only six likely hostile justices, which 
meant that only four additional new appointments would be neces-
sary to secure a 7-6 majority.  And so, when Roosevelt finally sum-
moned Robinson to the White House to assure him that Van Devant-
er’s seat would be his once a substitute bill had been enacted, he told 
the Senator that “if there was to be a bride there must also be 
bridesmaids—at least four of them.”28 
Roosevelt’s shabby treatment of Robinson outraged many of his 
colleagues in the Senate, contributing to what Arthur Krock called an 
“‘era of ill-feeling.’”  (p. 457).  “Had Roosevelt declared himself will-
ing to compromise right after the Van Devanter announcement,” Mr. 
Shesol maintains, “the Senate, grateful for the president’s good sense, 
might well have granted him a face-saving solution.  But the two-week 
period in which he had let Robinson dangle had cost FDR dearly.”  
(p. 463).  As Mr. Shesol reports, “Roosevelt’s relationship with Con-
gress was worse than it had ever been; his standing on Capitol Hill 
was at its lowest ebb.”  (p. 457).  Congressmen saw the President as 
“imperious,” refusing to listen, “‘laughingly’” dismissive of their coun-
sel. 
What had begun as a struggle between the president and the Court was 
now a struggle between the president and Congress.  Senators, in signifi-
cant numbers, were finally prepared to make a stand.  “We have retreated 
from one battle to the other during the last four years,” one told a re-
porter.  “But this is Gettysburg.” 
(pp. 457–58). 
It was at this point that Roosevelt invited all of the male Democrat-
ic members of Congress to a weekend “harmony meeting” of summer 
sun and fun at the party’s Chesapeake Bay retreat, the Jefferson Is-
land Club.  Most attended, and the social occasion “was a success” in 
mending fences and smoothing over differences with several fellow 
Democrats.  (p. 474).  The Jefferson Island retreat, Mr. Shesol main-
 
 28 2 THE SECRET DIARY OF HAROLD L. ICKES:  THE INSIDE STRUGGLE, 1936–1939, at 153 
(1954). 
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tains, earned FDR “the benefit of the doubt.  Animus no longer 
flowed so freely in his direction.  This was not merely a measure of his 
charm; it reflected the degree to which he had been chastened.”  (pp. 
477–78).  Roosevelt relinquished “control” over the contents of the 
bill to Robinson (p. 478), who along with “Democratic moderates on 
both sides of the contest began to cast about for another solution—
some way to settle the matter short of an ugly, intraparty brawl on the 
nation’s center stage.”  (p. 476).  “Not all of FDR’s opponents, after 
all, wanted him humiliated and permanently weakened; many sena-
tors were looking for a way to remain in his good graces.”  (p. 477). 
By late June the Washington Post was insisting that opposition voic-
es had been “‘entirely too optimistic in their assumption that the 
court-packing plan is dead.’  Newspapers reported that fifty-four sena-
tors had lined up behind” (p. 474) a compromise bill that left the 
President with half a loaf, and yet constituted a “retreat” on his part.  
The substitute bill would have allowed the President to appoint one 
additional justice for each sitting justice who had reached the age of 
seventy-five without retiring, with such additional appointments lim-
ited to one per calendar year.  (p. 477).  This estimate of support in 
the Senate “give or take two or three, matched the confidential tallies 
produced by each side.”  (p. 474).  The “substitute Court bill—galling 
as it would no doubt be to the intransigents—might be enough to 
end the long impasse.”  (p. 477). 
Robinson had done it—he had built a majority.  There was no guarantee 
that he could hold it; but for now, at least, he had the votes to win.  
Wheeler, accordingly, stopped boasting or bluffing that he could beat 
any compromise.  “You know what that means,” Hiram Johnson wrote his 
son.  It meant a filibuster. 
(p. 474). 
Earlier in the narrative, Mr. Shesol mentions briefly that on April 
1, Hugo Black had warned Roosevelt “that the bill’s opponents were 
planning to use parliamentary tricks to delay a vote as long as possi-
ble.”  (p. 417).  And the opposition clearly was employing tactics of 
delay in the quasi-filibuster they conducted, with Ashurst’s complicity, 
in the Judiciary Committee hearings.  In fact, however, plans for a fil-
ibuster of the Court bill had begun to take shape even before the 
hearings began, and long before the Jefferson Island retreat and the 
emergence of a compromise bill supported by the President.29  Sena-
 
 29 BAKER, supra note 3, at 68, 151–52, 233; JAMES T. PATTERSON, CONGRESSIONAL 
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tor William Borah of Idaho “made plans to filibuster the Court bill to 
death if enough Democrats did not defect from Roosevelt.  He would 
talk about constitutional law and history for a month if necessary.  
One of his associates declared many years later that Borah had 
planned to fight the Court bill with his voice until he fainted with ex-
haustion!”  Journalists encountered Borah at his Senate desk prepar-
ing a filibuster speech as early as March 4.30  On March 8, a promi-
nent Republican wrote to William Allen White, “‘unless there is a 
change of attitude caused by the tremendous propaganda of the Ad-
ministration, there are enough senators pledged to speak against the 
President’s proposal to prevent a vote upon it.’”31  Senator Arthur 
Capper confirmed this view when he wrote to White on February 26:  
“I think the Roosevelt program in its present form is blocked.  I feel 
quite certain we have enough votes to upset him.”32  Not even in their 
most optimistic moments did the plan’s proponents believe that they 
had the sixty-four votes then necessary under the Senate rules to in-
voke cloture.  It was against this backdrop that Roosevelt had elected 
to take his case to the public in early March. 
With the introduction of the compromise bill in the Senate in ear-
ly July, Mr. Shesol reports, a filibuster “now seemed inevitable.  Even 
before the island retreat, opposition leaders had begun drafting the 
interminable speeches with which senators held the floor during a fil-
ibuster.”  (p. 474).  “The opposition had also split its forces into 
‘quints,’ teams of five senators that were charged with talking for 
twenty-four hours—to be relieved, if necessary, by a ‘reserve squad’ of 
experienced filibusterers.  ‘I will stand in the Senate until I drop,’ 
announced Pat McCarran.”  (p. 475).  “There were other time-worn 
tactics to blockade a bill.  One Senate rule forbade members from 
speaking more than twice per day on a given piece of legislation; but 
a senator was free to offer as many amendments to the bill as he 
wished, and could then speak twice on each new amendment.  This 
created a nearly infinite range of possibilities for mischief.”  (p. 475).  
In early July, Senator Josiah Bailey coached a young team of Ameri-
can Bar Association lawyers in the preparation of amendments to be 
used in the filibuster.  Within a day they had produced 125 amend-
ments—“enough to permit 250 speeches.”  (p. 475). 
 
 30 RONALD FEINMAN, TWILIGHT OF PROGRESSIVISM:  THE WESTERN REPUBLICAN SENATORS 
AND THE NEW DEAL 128, 131 (1981). 
 31 John Callan O’Laughlin to William Allen White, March 8, 1937, “The Papers of William 
Allen White,” Library of Congress, Box 186, quoted in BAKER, supra note 3, at 151. 
 32 Senator Arthur Capper to William Allen White, February 26, 1937, “The Papers of Wil-
liam Allen White,” Library of Congress, Box 186, quoted in BAKER, supra note 3, at 192. 
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Robinson knew that he was not yet even close to having the votes 
necessary to impose cloture, and he expressed doubt over how long 
his support would hold in the face of a filibuster.  There were be-
tween forty-two and forty-four senators lined up to speak against the 
measure.  “At no time in the history of successful filibusters,” wrote 
William Leuchtenburg, “could the foes of a piece of legislation count 
so many Senators in their ranks as were aligned against the Court 
bill. . . .”33  About half of these senators had pledged to make two full-
dress speeches enduring for up to two days each, not only against the 
bill itself, but also twice again on each of Bailey’s 125 amendments.  
Had support for the bill not crumbled so quickly, observed Alsop and 
Catledge, “[t]he oratory might well have flowed on until the 1938 
election.”34 
Still, no one could be sure that the opposition’s filibuster lines 
would hold.  As Mr. Shesol relates:  “Before the Jefferson Island pic-
nic, most of Roosevelt’s Senate supporters had lacked the will to ride 
out a filibuster.  But after their return, infused with new resolve, they 
readied parliamentary maneuvers to break the rebellion.  Robinson 
and his deputies were confident that as the weeks dragged on and the 
heat of the Washington summer grew more and more oppressive, the 
opposition would suffer defections.” (p. 475).  “At the moment, ac-
cording to Gallup,” Mr. Shesol reports, “the American people were 
just about evenly divided on the question.”  (p. 476). 
It is important to understand here that the question on which the 
American people were nearly evenly divided was whether they sup-
ported a filibuster of the substitute bill.  The July 5 Gallup poll to 
which Mr. Shesol refers showed 49% of those with opinions favoring 
a filibuster, with 51% opposed.35  The American people were not, 
however, evenly divided on the question of whether they supported 
the bill.  An unpublished Gallup poll taken between June 9 and June 
14 asked:  “Would you favor a compromise on the plan (to enlarge 
the Supreme Court) which would permit the President to appoint 
two new judges instead of six?”  37% said yes, 47% said no, and 16% 
had no opinion.36  When asked substantively the same question in ear-
ly May, 62% of those with opinions had answered No, while 38% had 
 
 33 William E. Leuchtenburg, FDR’s Court-Packing Plan:  A Second Life, a Second Death, 1985 
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 34 ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 6, at 250, 246, 248; BAKER, supra note 3, at 233–35, 239, 
246–47. 
 35 PUBLIC OPINION, 1935–1946, at 150 (Hadley Cantril, ed., 1951). 
 36 Cushman, Mr. Dooley and Mr. Gallup, supra note 2, at 72 n. 342 (2002). 
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answered Yes.37  Between July 14 and July 19, Gallup asked respond-
ents:  “The Senate is now debating a plan which permits the President 
to enlarge the Supreme Court by adding one new judge each year.  
Do you favor this plan?”  Only 36% of those questioned answered Yes, 
while 50% answered No, and 14% expressed no opinion.38  All of the 
relevant polls showed strong opposition to any substitute measure 
that would permit Roosevelt to enlarge the membership of the Court 
with additional appointments.39 
Yet Mr. Shesol maintains that “most observers expected that once 
the blathering began, the balance would shift decisively against a fili-
buster.  Burt Wheeler and Tom Connally were already feeling heat 
back home for their apparent obsession with the Court issue, and be-
fore long, most opposition senators were sure to face popular pres-
sure to attend to other, urgent business.  Farmers, for example, were 
loudly demanding some form of a new AAA, and workers wanted pas-
sage of the wages and hours bill.  Their patience was not unlim-
ited. . . .  By July 3, union members in New York had collected 2,000 
signatures on a petition warning Senator Robert Wagner against join-
ing a filibuster.  Efforts like this, presumably, were just the begin-
ning.”  (pp. 476–77).  “Hiram Johnson, a veteran of many filibusters 
during his twenty years in the Senate, feared that Robinson was right.  
‘I know how men tire,’ Johnson wrote his son, ‘and though these 
men,—The Democrats, I mean—have . . . a pertinacity that is admi-
rable. . . , I imagine that one by one they will be broken down.’”  (pp. 
475–76). 
In the end, Johnson was happy to be proved wrong.  But even at 
the time it was clear that, even were the bill’s Senate proponents suc-
cessful in breaking the opposition’s filibuster, the bill would still have 
to negotiate the House.  This meant reckoning with the hostile 
House Judiciary Committee and its chairman, Hatton Sumners, who 
on July 13 took to the House floor to offer an ominous assessment of 
the bill’s probability of ultimate passage.  Sumners “denounced the 
Court bill as ‘a meat ax’ that would wreck ‘Anglo-Saxon institutions,’ 
and—to the wild applause of his colleagues—pledged that, as chair-
man of the Judiciary Committee, he would never let it pass the 
House.”  (p. 488).  “[I]f they bring that bill into this House for con-
sideration,” Sumners predicted, “I do not believe they will have 
 
 37 21% expressed no opinion.  GEORGE GALLUP & SAUL FORBES RAE, THE PULSE OF 
DEMOCRACY:  THE PUBLIC-OPINION POLL AND HOW IT WORKS 304 (1940). 
 38 Cushman, Mr. Dooley and Mr. Gallup, supra note 2, at 72. 
 39 Id. at 71–72. 
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enough hide left on it to bother about.”40  This confirmed Vice Presi-
dent Garner’s long-held view that the bill could not pass the House.  
“Sumners would bottle the bill up in his Judiciary Committee, and 
the House members did not appear very anxious to dislodge the bill 
from his grasp.”41  As Lionel Patenaude argued in 1970, “Sumners’ 
opposition was probably enough to insure [the bill’s] defeat.”42  James 
MacGregor Burns similarly concluded, 
   That the court bill probably never had a chance of passing seems 
now quite clear.  Roosevelt’s original proposal evidently never com-
manded a majority in the Senate.  In the House it would have run up 
against the unyielding Sumners, and then against a conservative Rules 
Committee capable of blocking the bill for weeks.  From the start Demo-
cratic leaders in the House were worried about the bill’s prospects in that 
chamber.  Robinson’s compromise plan might have gone through the 
Senate if he had lived.  More likely, though, it would have failed in the 
face of a dogged Senate filibuster, or later in the House.43 
As it would happen, the bill would never make it to the House.  
Robinson introduced the substitute bill in the Senate on July 2.  “The 
fight was his now,” in Mr. Shesol’s assessment, “and it was a fight that 
most expected him to win.”  (p. 478).  The floor debate began on July 
6.  Fully prepared for a filibuster, “Robinson dared his opponents to 
try to outlast him.”  (p. 482).  Wheeler responded that he was “‘in 
very good physical condition,’” because he had “‘been training for 
it.’”  Wheeler assured his colleagues that he was not threatening a fil-
ibuster, though he did think that it would take “‘considerable time to 
discuss’” the bill.  Robinson retorted that he did not intend to inter-
fere with the freedom of debate, “‘but I think I will know when you 
turn from a debater into a filibusterer, and then, as the old saying 
goes, it will be ‘dog eat dog.’’”  (p. 482). 
In fact, as Mr. Shesol observes, Robinson quickly fired a preemp-
tive strike against the anticipated filibuster.  The majority leader 
elected “to invoke a long-ignored rule preventing senators from yield-
ing the floor to one another for statements (as opposed to questions) 
and limiting each senator to two speeches a day on a given subject.”  
(p. 483).  But now Robinson “defined ‘day’ to mean not a calendar 
day—which of course lasted twenty-four hours—but a ‘legislative’ day, 
which could go on indefinitely.  During a tariff debate in 1922, one 
legislative day lasted 105 calendar days.  But that was the last time an-
 
 40 ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 6, at 264–65; BAKER, supra note 3, at 243. 
 41 BAKER, supra note 3, at 218. 
 42 Lionel V. Patenaude, Garner, Sumners, and Connally:  The Defeat of the Roosevelt Court Bill in 
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 43 BURNS, supra note 15, at 314. 
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yone could remember the rules being applied so strictly.”  This pro-
voked a “good deal of . . . bitterness” among Robinson’s Senate col-
leagues.  “Robinson, noted Time, was breaking ‘the great unwritten 
rule of the Senate:  that its written rules are not rigidly en-
forced. . . . This was far closer to steamroller tactics than the U.S. 
Senate usually sees.  Many of the elder members . . . fumed with an-
ger at the breach.’  Discussion of the bill nearly came to a stop as sen-
ators bickered about the rules. Order collapsed; confusion reigned; 
the line between a question and a statement was inherently blurry, 
and over those two days, Pittman had to rebuke his colleagues dozens 
of times for breaking the rules.”  (p. 483). 
Perhaps as a result of Robinson’s overreaching, it would not take 
long for the opposition to turn the tide.  “During the first few days of 
the debate,” Mr. Shesol reports, “the opposition did not send its own 
speakers to the floor.  Preserving their strength for the long siege, 
they contented themselves at first with mocking, harassing, and re-
lentlessly interrupting supporters of the bill.  Then, on Friday, July 9, 
Burt Wheeler rose—and spoke without cease for the next three 
hours.”  (p. 485).  Members of the opposition held the floor Friday, 
Saturday, and again on Monday.  (pp. 485–86).  And they “were gain-
ing ground.”  (p. 486).  Robinson left the floor during Senator Josiah 
Bailey’s speech and placed a phone call to Joseph Keenan of the 
White House strategy board.  “‘I tell you I’m worried,’ Robinson said.  
A headcount on July 10 showed some attrition:  Roosevelt’s 54-vote 
majority was now down to 51 or, at best, 52; two days later, it fell to 
50.”  As Arthur Krock observed, “‘all the morale seems to be on one 
side.’”  (p. 486).  On July 13, only a week into the debate, “Robinson 
ushered about thirty senators into his office.  The opposition, he 
complained, was ‘cutting to pieces the president’s bill.’”  (p. 488). 
Robinson would be found dead in his apartment the next morn-
ing.  It is sometimes thought that the substitute bill would have 
passed the Senate but for the majority leader’s untimely demise.  But 
Mr. Shesol’s astute account casts grave doubt on that assessment.  For 
he notes that it was on the preceding day, July 13, as Robinson was 
resting at home in bed, that “Key Pittman defied his direct orders and 
decreed, from the chair, that every new amendment constituted a 
new subject, allowing each senator to speak twice on it—thus permit-
ting opposition senators to speak without cease.”  (p. 488).  With 
Robinson temporarily absent from the chamber, Pittman thus re-
fused to play hardball, capitulated to the pressure to observe custom-
ary norms of senatorial civility, and thereby facilitated the conduct of 
the opposition filibuster.  Moreover, Mr. Shesol points out:  “Robin-
son was in bed as his lieutenants wrung their hands and worried that 
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if they failed to stop the debate, the party would be torn asunder, ir-
reparably so.  He was in bed as four senators—three of whom Robin-
son had counted as likely supporters of the bill—let it be known they 
would not only vote against it but would go to the White House and 
urge FDR to abandon the fight.”  (p. 488).  Support for the bill was 
already collapsing even before Robinson had passed from this life.44 
When the majority leader’s body was discovered the following 
morning, Tommy Corcoran warned FDR’s secretary Missy LeHand 
“to prepare the president for a battery of calls telling him to drop the 
Court bill.  Indeed, within fifteen minutes, Bernard Baruch, the well-
known financier and friend of Robinson, was on the line, urging 
Roosevelt to quit the fight and avoid killing any more senators.”  (p. 
489).  “[I]nevitably,” Mr. Shesol concludes, “most observers saw Rob-
inson’s death as a final, fitting, damning verdict on Roosevelt’s plan.  
‘Had it not been for the Court bill,’ Burt Wheeler charged, Robinson 
‘would be alive today.  I beseech the President to drop the fight lest 
he appear to fight against God.’”  (p. 490).  “Newspapers predicted 
that Roosevelt would abandon the fight and use this moment of 
shared grief as an opportunity to heal the breach in his party.”  But 
“FDR’s instinct was exactly the opposite.  He resolved to press ahead, 
harder than before. . . .  His entire presidency seemed to hang in the 
balance.”  (p. 490).  White House spokesmen “insisted that the presi-
dent was not backing down.”  (p. 491).  On the morning of July 15, 
when four freshman senators visited Roosevelt and “pleaded with him 
to stop tearing the party apart,” the President was unmoved.  “‘Mr. 
President,’ one of them mustered the courage to say, ‘it’s the hardest 
thing in the world to tell you something you don’t want to hear.’  
With that, the senators reiterated their intention to go against him on 
the bill, and returned to the Capitol.”  That same day, “opposition 
leaders announced that they had the votes to send back (or, in Sen-
ate parlance, ‘recommit’) the bill to the Judiciary Committee, a move 
that was the legislative equivalent of euthanasia . . . .”  (p. 491).  The 
rest was denouement.  “‘All that remains to be done,’ one senator 
said, ‘is to call the coroner.’”  (p. 496). 
Mr. Shesol’s skillful rendering of the political story thus lends 
support to the view that—though there was of course some uncer-
tainty—contemporary observers, including the justices of the Su-
 
 44 See SHOGAN, supra note 12, at 215 (“Even had [Robinson] lived, the chances of success for 
the truncated version of FDR’s play were dubious.  Opposition in the Senate showed no 
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ty, a hostile reception awaited the measure in the House, where Hatton Summers [sic] 
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preme Court, had good reason to doubt that the President’s bill ever 
would become law.  It was apparent throughout the fight that, due in 
part to his promise to Robinson, the President would cling stubbornly 
to his own bill rather than seizing on any of a number of possible 
compromise measures.  And it was doubtful that even a compromise 
measure could survive both a Senate filibuster and the House Judici-
ary and Rules Committees.  It was not unreasonable for the justices to 
doubt that their immediate, total, and unconditional surrender was 
necessary in order to avert the threat of Court-packing. 
Mr. Shesol attributes Roosevelt’s political miscalculations in the 
Court-packing debacle to “overconfidence” and “hubris.”  (p. 509).  
“Without question, Roosevelt acted imperiously, compounding his 
crucial, initial failure to consult congressional leaders by refusing to 
heed them for months thereafter, and treating them instead with a 
loose contempt.  ‘It took him an unconscionable time to discover his 
weakness,’ Tugwell reflected.  ‘This must be charged mostly to over-
confidence.’”  (p. 509).  This overconfidence was attributable in turn 
to the tremendous margin by which the President was returned to of-
fice by the voters the preceding November.  In 1937 FDR mistakenly 
persisted in the belief that “‘the voters are with us today just as they 
were last fall.’”  (p. 509).  “Before the landslide, his self-confidence 
had usually (if not always) been tempered by his eagerness for con-
sensus and conciliation; by his ability to remain a bit detached from 
his own decisions, in case he might need to alter or abandon them; 
and by his willingness to ‘force himself,’ as Frances Perkins had long 
observed, ‘to face the most dreary and discouraging facts.’  These 
strengths of Roosevelt’s—so badly needed in 1937—went into eclipse.  
Confidence gave way to overconfidence, boldness to recklessness, ur-
gency to impatience, tolerance to vengefulness, persuasion to coer-
cion.”  (p. 508). 
It often has been argued that the Supreme Court’s landmark con-
stitutional decisions handed down in the spring of 1937 were influ-
enced significantly by the results of the 1936 election.  Mr. Shesol’s 
rich account invites us to consider whether the deeper and more fate-
ful impact of that election may instead have been on the thought of 
the President himself. 
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II.  THE LEGAL STORY 
A.  The Historiographical Posture 
I now turn to the second and third questions that any account of 
the Court-packing struggle must address, namely, how does one best 
tell the legal story, and how does one best understand the relation-
ship between the political story and the legal story?  Scholars have of-
fered a variety of answers to these questions, but they can be roughly 
grouped into what I will call externalist and internalist accounts.  (I 
should confess here that I would be considered an internalist.)  Ex-
ternalists tend to see a rather sharp break in constitutional doctrine 
in the spring of 1937, and attribute that sudden change to the influ-
ence of exogenous factors such as the threat of the Court-packing 
Plan or the impression made on the justices by FDR’s landslide re-
election in 1936.  Internalists tend to see the change in constitutional 
doctrine as more gradual and spread out over a longer period of 
time, and to emphasize the importance of presidential appointments 
to the Court in pushing doctrinal development along or in new direc-
tions.  They attribute the greater success of later New Deal initiatives 
before the Court to legal factors such as improved constitutional con-
ceptualization at the stages of legislative drafting, test case selection, 
and briefing and argument.  Externalists tend to see the constitution-
al doctrine of the period as more open-textured, and to attribute the 
selection among available doctrines (and thus case outcomes) to the 
political, economic, and social preferences or ideological commit-
ments of the justices.  Internalists tend to see evidence and patterns 
of judicial performance that are incompatible with such an account, 
and instead to see the justices as experiencing constitutional doctrine 
as an independent constraint on their extra-legal preferences.  Ex-
ternalists tend to see the justices as the moving parts in the story—
that the relevant changes are those in their positions.  Internalists 
tend by contrast to emphasize adaptations by Congress and Admin-
istration lawyers—made in light of the Court’s decisions invalidating 
portions of the First New Deal—that enabled them to accommodate 
their regulatory objectives within the Court’s evolving body of doc-
trine.  I want to underscore that these are questions of emphasis.  Ex-
ternalists do not deny that legal ideas sometimes operated as con-
straints on judicial behavior; internalists do not deny that particular 
facts and developments in the broader world were sometimes rele-
vant to constitutional adjudication.  The disputed terrain is over 
which factors were relevant, how much constraint and how much in-
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fluence each of these factors brought to bear on the justices, and the 
relationships among those factors. 
Mr. Shesol’s account draws uneasily on both of these types of ac-
counts.  At several points he is attentive to the legal, or “internal” di-
mensions of the story.  For instance, he notes that the drafting of 
statutes with insufficient attention paid to questions of constitutional-
ity “was all too typical of the early New Deal.”  (p. 43).  In a chapter 
appropriately entitled “Shortcuts,” Mr. Shesol recognizes that:  “In 
shaping the recovery program, the Constitution was a concern—but 
not an overriding one.  Far more pressing was the question of how 
quickly a given bill could be drafted, passed, and made effective.  The 
first phase of the New Deal unfolded not in an orderly procession of 
new laws but in a rush—a scramble.”  (p. 42).  He reports that Attor-
ney General Homer Cummings admitted that he “‘went about with 
my pockets bulging with half-baked proclamations and undigested 
legislation, all requiring attention, study, and reformulation.’”  (p. 
43).  But the press of time required “immediate,” “rapid-fire opin-
ions,” with the result that “‘I probably made some mistakes.’”  (p. 43).  
The Agricultural Adjustment Act (“AAA”), which “stood on shaky 
constitutional ground,” (p. 174), was drafted “in haste, without any 
serious consideration of its constitutionality, despite its novel tax pro-
visions.”  (p. 43).  Similarly, the National Recovery Administration 
(“NRA”) was “in effect, a grand constitutional gamble.”  (p. 43).  NRA 
administrator Hugh Johnson doubted that the statute was constitu-
tional (pp. 55–56), as did some of the best legal minds in the Admin-
istration.  As Mr. Shesol points out, the NRA’s delegation of authority 
to the president “was unprecedented.  It was also unconstitutional—
at least in the view of Charles Wyzanski, a young Labor Department 
lawyer who had helped draft the bill.  Wyzanski wrote his mentor Fe-
lix Frankfurter that the president’s codemaking authority went ‘so far 
beyond the bounds of constitutionality that it would be useless’ to de-
fend it in court.  He further feared the Recovery Act exceeded the 
power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce.  Jerome Frank, 
another Frankfurter man in the administration, found it ‘shocking’ 
that not a single constitutional lawyer had been asked to review the 
codemaking apparatus. The bill, Frank said, could have been squared 
with well-established constitutional doctrine, but no one had both-
ered.”  (p. 44).  Frankfurter raised these concerns with FDR, but they 
were “brushed aside in the hurry to enact the bill.”  (p. 44).45 
 
 45 Similarly, when currency devaluation legislation was being prepared, “no one asked the 
Justice Department for an opinion.”  Cummings offered one anyway, suggesting some re-
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Similarly, Mr. Shesol notes that Homer Cummings wrote to FDR 
in June of 1935 that the Guffey Coal Act was “‘clearly unconstitution-
al,’” and that the amendments to the AAA “‘were not in good condi-
tion to meet the constitutional test,’” and “‘would have to be 
strengthened to give them any chance at all.’”  (p. 153).  Indeed, 
Cummings avoided giving Congress an opinion on the Guffey Coal 
bill because he believed it was unconstitutional, and FDR had to pry 
the bill out of subcommittee, asking its members to overcome their 
constitutional doubts and report the bill out.  (p. 166).  While la-
menting the “sloppiness” associated with the NRA, and the “slapdash 
affair of the Hundred Days,” Mr. Shesol praises the “increasing care 
in the drafting of legislation” that characterized the later New Deal.  
(p. 167). 
Mr. Shesol lays a good bit of the blame for this inattention to 
questions of constitutionality on the President himself, whom Mr. 
Shesol paints as less than a first-rate lawyer.  Roosevelt thought about 
things in terms of right and wrong rather than legal and illegal, and 
believed that if an idea were actuated by good motives then it could 
not be unconstitutional.  He was, Mr. Shesol reports, impatient with 
“legalistic reasoning.”  (p. 46).  But Mr. Shesol also highlights the 
weakness of the legal staff in the Justice Department, which became a 
haven of patronage.  (p. 54).  One of the principal ways in which that 
weakness was manifested was in the poor job the Department did in 
cultivating promising cases through which to test the constitutional 
validity of various New Deal measures.  (pp. 54–55).  The impulse to 
delay testing the NRA before the Supreme Court resulted in the Gov-
ernment’s request in March of 1935 that the appeal of United States v. 
Belcher—46a case involving the constitutionality of the NRA’s Lumber 
Code—be voluntarily dismissed.  Mr. Shesol recounts how this deci-
sion left the Administration stuck with defending the NRA in the 
context of the preposterous “Sick Chicken Case” of United States v. 
Schechter Poultry Corp.,47 (pp. 129–33) which NRA acting general coun-
sel Blackwell Smith regarded as “the weakest possible case.”48  “[A]s 
the Belcher debacle had shown, the government’s failure to seek the 
right sort of test cases meant that it had to choose from the cases at 
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FOR THE NEW DEAL:  AN INSIDER’S MEMOIR OF THE ROOSEVELT YEARS 25 (Joan P. Emerson 
ed., 1991). 
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hand.  Now there was really only one option left.  It was in this way 
that the fate of the NRA came to rest on a kosher poultry plant in 
Brooklyn.”  (p. 131).  Mr. Shesol is also critical of what he character-
izes as Stanley Reed’s rather weak performance in the argument over 
the constitutionality of the AAA in United States v. Butler.49  Reed 
“hedged, contradicted, and ultimately disowned the grander claims” 
made in the government’s brief.  (p. 178).  He “was no match for” his 
adversary, George Wharton Pepper.  (p. 178). 
Mr. Shesol is also alert to the fact that decisions in 1935 and 1936 
invalidating various early New Deal measures did not doom later stat-
utes prepared with greater care.  For instance, even after the Court 
invalidated the Railway Pension Act in Railroad Retirement Board v. Al-
ton50 in the spring of 1935, Roosevelt and others believed that the So-
cial Security Act was “safe because lawmakers, with the Court very 
much in mind, had rested the bill on the government’s taxing power 
rather than the commerce power.”  (p. 119).51  He astutely notes that 
Justice Sutherland’s holding in Carter v. Carter Coal Co.52 that the 
Guffey Coal Act’s price-fixing provisions were not severable from its 
unconstitutional labor provisions made it unnecessary to address the 
constitutionality of the price-fixing provisions directly.  “This nimble 
act of avoidance kept Roberts on board—for it was Roberts who, in 
Nebbia, had upheld the power of Congress to do exactly what it had 
done in the Guffey Act, that is, to regulate prices.”  (p. 213).53  It was 
for this reason that even after the decision Homer Cummings “was 
feeling fine, for he perceived ‘a small crack in the door’:  Suther-
land’s avoidance of the price-fixing issue.  To Cummings this suggest-
ed that not only Hughes but also Roberts might join the liberals in 
sustaining price controls in the future, should Congress revive that 
 
 49  297 U.S. 1 (1936). 
 50  295 U.S. 330 (1935). 
 51 It is not clear, however, that Mr. Shesol recognizes that Alton left open the possibility of a 
national railway pension system grounded in the taxing power.  See SHESOL, supra note 2, 
at 118 (“Ultimately, the act ran aground on the due process clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment.  Had Roberts left it at that—had he disposed of the case on the narrowest terms 
possible, in keeping with the Court’s unwritten rule of self-restraint—Congress might 
have been able to comply with the decision by revising the law.  Yet Roberts went further, 
rejecting the very idea of a relationship between retirement security and interstate com-
merce—in any industry.  He had issued, in effect, a preemptive veto of similar legisla-
tion.”).  In fact, the taxing power alternative was quickly recognized and enacted by Con-
gress.  See Barry Cushman, The Hughes Court and Constitutional Consultation, 1998 J. SUP. 
CT. HIST. 79, 88–91, 104–09 (1998). 
 52 298 U.S. 238 (1936). 
 53 The reference is to Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), in which Justice Roberts had 
written the opinion for a 5-4 majority upholding legislative regulation of milk prices. 
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half of the Guffey Act.”  (p. 214).  Indeed, Cummings disagreed with 
the suggestion of FDR aide Stanley High that “the New Deal had 
been so badly damaged by the Court that in the course of the [1936] 
campaign, FDR would have to say what he planned to do about it.”  
Cummings “took a more sanguine view.  The only real casualty . . . 
was the NRA.  The AAA was being reenacted by other means; Guffey 
could be, too; the [Tennessee Valley Authority (“TVA”)] and [the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”)] had, at least for now, 
survived; the administration had prevailed in the gold clause cases; 
and the government’s spending power, Cummings added, had gone 
essentially unchallenged.”  (pp. 214–15). 
Yet these instances of sensitivity to the internal point of view are 
diluted, if not negated, by a countervailing insistence on viewing the 
performance of the Court and its justices through the lenses of the 
Progressive paradigm and the attitudinal model.  Mr. Shesol repeat-
edly employs political taxonomy in characterizing the justices.  In his 
view the Court was comprised of “two wings,” a liberal one and a con-
servative one, with Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes and Justice 
Owen Roberts in the middle.  (pp. 31–32).  “[S]talwart conservatives 
such as George Sutherland,” Willis Van Devanter, James Clark 
McReynolds, and Pierce Butler “contended that the judge’s role was 
not to defer to the legislature but to stand ‘as a shield’ for ‘the indi-
vidual against the unjust demands of society,’ even if that meant ‘dis-
regard[ing] the wishes and sentiments of a majority of the people.’”  
(p. 31).  Oliver Wendell Holmes and Louis Brandeis, and later Har-
lan Fiske Stone and Benjamin Cardozo, by contrast, are depicted as 
the liberal heroes who stood up against the conservatives’ abuse of 
the Due Process Clause to prevent social experimentation by demo-
cratic majorities.54  On this account, majorities to sustain or invalidate 
legislation challenged before the Court were formed owing to the 
movement of Hughes and/or Roberts from left to right, from liberal-
ism to conservatism.  “Hughes found himself caught in the middle, 
tacking left and then shifting right, trying to achieve a balance be-
tween the Court’s liberals, who largely shared Roosevelt’s idea of a 
 
 54 Mr. Shesol appears to believe that Justice John Marshall Harlan was of the same mind as 
Holmes and Brandeis on these issues, based on Harlan’s dissent in Lochner, though he is 
apparently unaware of Harlan’s majority opinion in Adair v. United States invalidating the 
Erdman Act’s protection’s against anti-union discrimination on liberty of contract 
grounds.  SHESOL, supra note 2, at 31.  To his credit, Mr. Shesol does recognize that Stone 
didn’t like to be thought of as a New Dealer, and was uncomfortable with liberal praise of 
his Butler dissent.  Id. at 192. 
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‘living’ Constitution, and the Court’s conservatives, who staunchly, 
bitterly rejected it.”  (p. 5). 
The language of movement permeates Mr. Shesol’s account, and 
the moving parts are not increased attention to constitutional detail 
by legislative draftsmen or the cultivation of promising test cases by 
government lawyers.  The moving parts are the Justices themselves.  
Hughes and Roberts are repeatedly depicted as moving back and 
forth between the competing camps, tacking left and then 
“drift[ing]” or “return[ing] to the right.” (pp. 5, 125, 432, 519, 528).  
Hughes had been liberal in his days as an Associate Justice in the se-
cond decade of the twentieth century, but by the time he was nomi-
nated to serve as Chief Justice in 1930, “Hughes’ liberalism seemed 
consigned to the distant past.”  (p. 27).  In 1930 and 1931, “liberal-
ism” prevailed on the Court, and then in 1932 the “pendulum swung 
back” to “conservatism”—this because Hughes and Roberts had been 
liberal in 1930 and 1931, and then suddenly became conservative in 
1932.  (p. 32–33).  Those who have read Drew Pearson and Robert S. 
Allen’s 1936 bestseller, The Nine Old Men, will recognize this portrayal 
of Hughes.  In the chapter on the Chief Justice, Pearson and Allen 
charged Hughes with swinging back and forth between the liberal 
and conservative camps in an unpredictable and unprincipled fash-
ion.  The title of the chapter was, “The Man on the Flying Trapeze.”55 
Mr. Shesol’s assessment of  Roberts similarly echoes the charge 
that the Justice conducted “an ultimately unsuccessful search for a 
coherent judicial philosophy.”56  Roberts, we are told, “emitted 
enough mixed signals during his first years on the Court to keep par-
ties guessing which way he really leaned.  Then Nebbia, as far as most 
of the press were concerned, settled the matter:  Roberts, it was clear, 
was a liberal.”  (p. 125).  But with Roberts’ opinion in Alton the fol-
lowing year, it “now seemed beyond dispute” that he had “‘definitely 
aligned himself’ with the conservatives.”  (p. 125).  “Roberts, a former 
railroad lawyer, sounded at times as if he were arguing the case as 
counsel for the carriers, not deciding it as an impartial judge.”  (p. 
117).  “Owen Roberts, at long last, had revealed himself . . . . He had 
taken off his coat, put on his judicial robes, and was rooting for good, 
old-fashioned, Anglo-Saxon individualism.”  (pp. 125–26). 
 
 55 DREW PEARSON & ROBERT S. ALLEN, THE NINE OLD MEN 74–97 (1936). 
 56 MELVIN I. UROFSKY, DIVISION AND DISCORD:  THE SUPREME COURT UNDER STONE AND 
VINSON, 1941–1953, at 15 (1997); see also Laura Kalman, Law, Politics, and the New Deal(s), 
108 YALE L.J. 2165, 2188 (1999) (“In my heart, I still believe the Roberts of 1937 had un-
dergone a jurisprudential lobotomy . . . .”). 
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As this assessment of Roberts suggests, for Mr. Shesol, being a lib-
eral or a conservative justice boiled down to selecting between two 
competing theories of political economy in the service of two compet-
ing sets of interests.  The competing theories were those of “laissez-
faire and the emerging welfare state,” and the question was whether 
the Court would embrace “the idea that law could be a tool to reme-
dy, rather than perpetuate, the harshest realities of American life,” or 
instead show “suspicion” of “economic regulations.”  (p. 33).  The in-
terests were those of railroads and other large corporations versus 
everyone else.  Mr. Shesol’s account of the rise of substantive due 
process in the Supreme Court, for example, is a model of unrecon-
structed Progressive historiography.  In contrast with the views articu-
lated in nearly four decades of revisionist work on the topic,57 Mr. 
 
 57 See, e.g., OWEN M. FISS, TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888–1910, at 156, 
160 (1993) (discussing the Court’s efforts to limit legislative redistribution through the 
requirement that laws be “universal” or “neutral” in their application); WILLIAM FORBATH, 
LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 8–9 (1991) (exploring ways in 
which judicial review of labor regulation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries conditioned the strategies of labor movements, and the ways in which the strategies 
of labor movements, in turn, influenced the judiciary);  HOWARD GILLMAN, THE 
CONSTITUTION BESIEGED:  THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS 
JURISPRUDENCE 10 (1993) (examining the influence of the principle of neutrality on the 
Lochner Court’s Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960:  THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 19–
31 (1992) (analyzing Lochner and pre-Lochner police powers decisions in light of the nine-
teenth century liberal conception of “the neutral state”); David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era 
Revisionism, Revised:  Lochner and the Origins of Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 
GEO. L.J. 1 (2003); Barry Cushman, Some Varieties and Vicissitudes of Lochnerism, 85 B.U. L. 
REV. 881 (2005); William E. Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Labor:  Labor and the Law in the 
Gilded Age, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 767, 771–72 (1985) (arguing that the development of consti-
tutional labor regulation during the Gilded Age was the product of competing visions of 
republicanism); John Harrison, Substantive Due Process and the Constitutional Text, 83 VA. L. 
REV. 493 (1997); Michael Les Benedict, Laissez-Faire and Liberty:  A Re-Evaluation of the 
Meaning and Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 3 LAW & HIST. REV. 293, 298, 304–31 
(1985) (contending that the Supreme Court’s development of laissez-faire constitutional-
ism should be understood, in part, as an effort to protect traditional notions of liberty); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 878–89 (1987) (discussing the 
legacy of the Lochner Court’s view of “neutrality” as a condition set by the common law); 
Charles W. McCurdy, Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of Government-Business Relations:  Some 
Parameters of Laissez-faire Constitutionalism, 1863–1897, 61 J. AM. HIST. 970, 971–73 (1975) 
(discussing Justice Field’s attempts to formulate “immutable rules” to distinguish between 
regulation and confiscation when examining the limits of states’ police powers); Aviam 
Soifer, The Paradox of Paternalism and Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism:  United States Supreme 
Court, 1888–1921, 5 LAW & HIST. REV. 249, 252, 278 (1987) (examining the relationship 
between paternalism—“encouraging and applying some form of protection while excori-
ating and invalidating others”—and redistribution in the period’s constitutionalism); 
Stephen A. Siegel, Understanding the Lochner Era:  Lessons from the Controversy Over Railroad 
and Utility Rate Regulation, 70 VA. L. REV. 187, 189–92 (1984) (discussing the distinction 
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Shesol argues that at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was 
adopted in 1868, “the due process clause struck Congress and the 
Courts as unambiguous.  The word ‘process’ made plain its concern 
with the procedures by which a government acted:  how laws were 
enacted, how fairly they were enforced. . . . It was not long, however, 
before railroad lawyers, monopolists, and conservative thinkers like 
Thomas M. Cooley, a prominent Michigan judge and law professor, 
were arguing—before increasingly receptive state and federal judg-
es—that the guarantee of due process shielded individuals and cor-
porations against the legislative restrictions of property rights.  Re-
flecting this influence and the sympathies of the elites, which were 
solidly behind the railroads and other new and massive corporations, 
courts in the 1880s began to scrutinize the substance of legislation, 
especially in the economic realm.”  (p. 30).  By “the 1920s, and with 
increasing vehemence over the latter half of the decade, the Supreme 
Court had defended the interests of corporations, the rights of prop-
erty, and ‘liberty of contract’ against encroachments by govern-
ment . . . . Chief Justice William Howard Taft and his conservative 
brethren—imbued with a sense that they were saving civilization from 
Bolsheviks, collectivists, and other sundry radicals —voided state and 
federal legislation at a record rate.  In what the dean of the Harvard 
Law School called a ‘carnival of unconstitutionality,’ the Court erased 
more laws from the books between 1921 and 1930 than it had in the 
first hundred years of its existence.”  (p. 24). 
Consulting the sources on which Mr. Shesol relies for these claims 
about the rate of invalidation by the Taft Court reveals them to be 
potentially misleading.  One of those sources, the first edition of Da-
vid O’Brien’s Storm Center, shows that the Taft Court overturned 
twelve congressional statutes between 1921 and 1930.  The White 
Court had overturned twelve between 1910 and 1921; the Fuller 
Court had overturned fourteen between 1889 and 1910; the Waite 
Court had overturned nine between 1874 and 1888; the Chase Court 
had overturned ten between 1865 and 1873.  The Taft Court did 
overturn more state statutes than any of its predecessors, at 131; but 
the White Court had invalidated 107 and the Fuller Court had struck 
down 73.  In all the Taft Court invalidated 155 federal, state, and 
municipal laws; the White Court struck down 137; the Fuller Court 
struck down 102.  It is true that under Taft the Court “erased more 
 
between privilege and property in the context of reactions to the changing economic en-
vironment of the early twentieth century). 
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laws from the books between 1921 and 1930 than it had in the first 
hundred years of its existence”; but so had the White Court and 
Fuller Courts before them.58 
The valence of Mr. Shesol’s characterizations of these positions 
and the Justices who held them leaves no doubt which is to be pre-
ferred.  He repeatedly opines unfavorably on the “stridency” (p. 2) of 
“conservative” opinions invalidating economic regulations.  (The 
“liberal” justices, by contrast, are never “strident”—not even Stone in 
his biting Butler dissent.)  Roberts’ opinion in late 1935 invalidating a 
federal tax on liquor dealers, for example, was characterized by a 
“stridency” and “angry insistence” that were “startling.”  (p. 178).  But 
his opinion in Alton, where his voice was “heavy with sarcasm,” was 
“his most strident.”  (pp. 117–18).  His “wanton, almost defiant disre-
gard of the realities faced by railroad workers” was “extreme.”  (p. 
119)  Similarly “extreme,” even “noxious,” was the Court’s 1923 deci-
sion invalidating a minimum wage law for women in the District of 
Columbia.  (p. 219).  The Court’s “doctrinaire” (p. 432) “conserva-
tives” were so objectionable that even their approval of the gold 
clause policy and the TVA were only “grudging.”  (p. 221). 
But one is left wondering why the Justices would have upheld any 
act they did not really want to, grudgingly or otherwise.  For on this 
account, the Justices did not experience legal doctrine as a constraint 
on their range of action; instead, legal doctrine was a “tool” or a 
“weapon” serving ulterior ends.  The Due Process Clause was a 
“weapon” wielded in “internecine wars” among the Justices.  (pp. 29–
30).  “Judges had other tools to safeguard property rights, among 
them the contracts and commerce clauses of Article I of the Constitu-
tion and the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment. . . . The spear 
was the Constitution’s, but the battle was the Lord’s:  as radical and 
reform movements sprang up to combat the injustices of the indus-
trial era, conservative judges saw themselves as fighting a holy war 
against what the historian Charles Beard called the ‘oncoming hosts 
of communism and anarchy.’  The liberties they defended were, in 
the admiring words of the English jurist Henry Maine, a ‘bulwark of 
American individualism against democratic impatience and socialistic 
fantasy.’”  (pp. 30–31).  So, in the late nineteenth century legal “for-
malism” was revived, “conjoined with doctrines of more recent vin-
 
 58 DAVID M. O’BRIEN, STORM CENTER:  THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 43 (1st 
ed., 1986).  Felix Frankfurter’s 1930 claim that “[s]ince 1920, the Court has invalidated 
more legislation that in fifty years preceding,” cited in the other source relied upon by 
Mr. Shesol, namely, ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, THE SUPREME COURT FROM TAFT TO 
BURGER 70 (1979), therefore appears to be wildly inaccurate. 
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tage (such as substantive due process) and put to use in nullifying the 
income tax, overturning a ban on child labor, narrowing the scope of 
the antitrust laws, and more.  The defenders of the Constitution-as-
mechanism had, as a rule, a greater stake in the established economic 
order, and, not coincidentally, in judicial doctrines that perpetuated 
it.  One’s choice of metaphor said much about one’s politics.”  (p. 
47).  And in 1935 and 1936, “the majority’s solicitude for states’ rights 
had seemed to depend less on precedent than on which rights, in 
particular, a state tried to exercise.”  (p. 219). 
This conception of the judicial function suffuses Mr. Shesol’s por-
traits of two of the “conservative brethren,” Van Devanter and Suther-
land.  Van Devanter, we learn, “did little to curb” the impression that 
he “was beholden to the railroads.”  (p. 39).  “Van Devanter’s vote was 
rarely in doubt:  he ‘lined up always with the conservatives and voted 
almost always in favor of big business . . . .’”  (p. 39).  Similarly, Mr. 
Shesol maintains that Sutherland’s dissent in Blaisdell,59 in which a 5-4 
majority upheld Minnesota’s mortgage moratorium, was inspired by 
“the enduring influence of Herbert Spencer. . . .‘Survival of the fit-
test’ . . . served as a mission statement not only for laissez-faire capital-
ism and indifferent government, but also for the constitutional doc-
trines that made America safe for liberty, property, and ‘rugged’ 
individualism.”  (pp. 68–69).  Mr. Shesol continues, “Sutherland and 
the Court’s conservatives believed, throughout their long lives, in 
what Spencer called the ‘mercy of severity.’  As Spencer wrote in So-
cial Statics . . . :  ‘The forces at work exterminate such sections of 
mankind as stand in the way, with the same sternness that they ex-
terminate beasts of prey and herds of useless ruminants.’  This pro-
cess of ‘purification’ could not—and must not—be impeded by the 
state.  ‘The ultimate result of shielding men from the effects of folly, 
Spencer said, ‘is to fill the world with fools.’  Or, as he elaborated in 
Social Statics, 
Pervading all Nature we may see at work a stern discipline, which is a lit-
tle cruel that it may be very kind. . . . The poverty of the incapable, the 
distresses that come upon the imprudent, the starvation of the idle, and 
those shoulderings aside of the weak by the strong, which leave so many 
“in shallows and miseries,” are the decrees of a large, far-seeing benevo-
lence. . . . The process must be undergone, and the sufferings must be 
endured.  No power on Earth, no cunningly-devised laws of statesmen, 
no world-rectifying schemes of the humane, no communist panaceas, no 
reforms that men ever did broach or ever will broach, can diminish them 
one jot.  (p. 69). 
 
 59 Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 448–83 (1934). 
Oct. 2012] MAN ON THE FLYING TRAPEZE 221 
 
“George Sutherland, more than three quarters of a century later, saw 
the Depression . . . and, it was safe to assume, the entire New Deal—
through this same prism.”  (p. 69).60 
It will come as no surprise that, in constructing this grotesque car-
icature of Sutherland, Mr. Shesol relies heavily and selectively upon 
two monographs published more than sixty years ago, well before 
scholarly reassessments of the Lochner-Era Court began to revise the 
work of the Progressive historians:  Benjamin Twiss’s Lawyers and the 
Constitution:  How Laissez-Faire Came to the Supreme Court (1942) and Jo-
el Paschal’s Mr. Justice Sutherland:  A Man Against the State (1951).  The 
more recent, sympathetic, and accurate treatments of legal scholars 
such as Samuel Olken are overlooked.61  The reader of Mr. Shesol’s 
claims therefore would be shocked to learn that during Sutherland’s 
pre-judicial career as a state legislator and United States Senator he 
supported legislation mandating the eight-hour workday, the Em-
ployers’ Liability Act, the Pure Food and Drugs Act, the Hepburn 
Rate Bill, the Children’s Bureau, the Seaman’s Act of 1915, Postal 
Savings Banks, free coinage of silver, and the 1896 presidential can-
didacy of populist William Jennings Bryan.62  The reader would simi-
larly be surprised to learn of the literally hundreds of cases in which 
Van Devanter and Sutherland voted to uphold various forms of regu-
lation or taxation of a wide variety of businesses, large and small.  
Moreover, the reader would have no inkling that the reason that 
Cummings could report in 1936 that the government’s spending 
power had gone essentially unchallenged was that in 1923 George 
Sutherland, in an opinion joined by each of the Four Horsemen, had 
held that federal appropriations from general revenue were not sub-
ject to judicial review.63  Even though Mr. Shesol never comes to grips 
with this enormous body of decisional law, his account is embarrassed 
by New Deal cases that he does discuss.  The fact that Sutherland and 
 
 60 Here again, Mr. Shesol’s account of the wellsprings of judicial behavior is confused.  He 
later contends that Hughes “was less willing than some of his brethren to adhere blindly 
to legal precedent without regard to human welfare,” SHESOL, supra note 2, at 521, but 
his portrayals of the Court’s conservatives would suggest that their decisions were driven 
less by blind adherence to precedent than by their own attitudes regarding human wel-
fare. 
 61 See, e.g., Samuel R. Olken, Justice Sutherland Reconsidered,  62 VAND. L. REV. 639 (2009); 
Samuel R. Olken, Justice George Sutherland and Economic Liberty:  Constitutional Conservatism 
and the Problem of Factions, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1 (1997). 
 62 JOEL FRANCIS PASCHAL, MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND:  A MAN AGAINST THE STATE 36, 56, 63 
(1951). 
 63 See Barry Cushman, The Secret Lives of the Four Horsemen, 83 VA. L. REV. 559, 561–71, 586–
639 (1997).  The 1923 opinion referred to in the text is Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 
447 (1923). 
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Van Devanter (along with Butler) joined the majority rejecting a chal-
lenge to the Tennessee Valley Authority is a “surprise.”  (p. 210).  
Similarly embarrassing are the votes of Van Devanter and Sutherland 
to uphold the old-age pension provision of the Social Security Act in 
Helvering v. Davis.64  Mr. Shesol attempts to explain this by arguing 
that Justice Cardozo “rooted his pensions decision so deeply in the 
reasoning of [Justice Roberts’ opinion invalidating the AAA in Butler] 
that even Sutherland and Van Devanter felt compelled to come 
aboard.”  (p. 454).  Mr. Shesol cites no evidence in support of this 
explanation for why these two Justices voted as they did in Helvering, 
and so far as I am aware, there is none.  The claim is bare assertion.  
He does not attempt to explain why Justices McReynolds and Butler, 
who also joined Roberts’ opinion in Butler, did not similarly feel 
compelled to join Cardozo’s opinion in Helvering. But the claim that 
these Justices could feel “compelled” to vote in a particular way by a 
proposition (arguably obiter dictum) articulated in an earlier deci-
sion rests uneasily next to an account that frequently portrays Justices 
as agents freely wielding legal doctrines as “tools” and “weapons” in 
the service of their own ideological and class ends.65 
So despite his periodic attention to the internal, legal dimensions 
of the New Deal’s constitutional saga, Mr. Shesol seems ultimately to 
be impatient with them, thinking that they mattered rather little, and 
that a focus on them will hinder rather than aid true understanding.  
As he puts it in what appears to be an unguarded moment, with the 
Court’s decision invalidating New York’s minimum wage law in June 
of 1936, “the issue had finally transcended the New Deal.  The ques-
tion confronting the nation—whether government at any level had 
any power to address the most vicious inequities of modern life—
could no longer be clouded by nonsense about sick chickens . . . ; it 
could no longer be tangled up in the labyrinthine twists of the 
‘stream’ of commerce or obscured by legal language.”  (p. 222).  The 
question, on this view, was simply whether the Justices supported lais-
sez-faire or the emerging welfare state—whether the Court would 
embrace “the idea that law could be a tool to remedy, rather than 
 
 64 301 U.S. 619 (1937). 
 65 At the same time Mr. Shesol seems to think that Roberts’ vote to uphold the Social Secu-
rity Act was significantly influenced by the fact that Robert Jackson “‘stressed the argu-
ments that would appeal to conservatives,’” such as “that Social Security promoted thrift 
and benefited ‘the man who works.’”  SHESOL, supra note 2, at 453.  That argument may 
hold considerable appeal, but it is not a legal argument, and the claim that it played a 
significant role in securing Roberts’ approval suggests again that law actually had little to 
do with the case outcome. 
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perpetuate, the harshest realities of American life.”  (p. 33).66  But 
that was not at all the way that the Justices saw the matter. 
B.  Troubles With Doctrine 
It is perhaps because Mr. Shesol is ultimately uninterested in legal 
doctrine that he so frequently seems to misunderstand it.  These mis-
conceptions are displayed at various levels of generality throughout 
the book.  For example, early in his narrative Mr. Shesol treats the 
Court’s doctrine as monolithically antagonistic to humane considera-
tions, arguing that: 
By 1937, the Court’s majority had made amply clear that the very notion 
of the New Deal—its use of governmental power to relieve the suffering 
caused by the Great Depression and to create a new and more just social 
and economic order—was an affront to the Constitution, whether that 
power was exercised by the federal government or the states.  
(p. 3).67 
 Yet a mere seventeen pages later he reports that in the First Hun-
dred Days “an exhausted Congress had enacted emergency banking 
legislation; a national relief system; . . . securities regulation; a massive 
public works program; . . . the Civilian Conservation Corps (“CCC”); 
[and] abandoned the gold standard” (p. 20), never pausing to rec-
ognize that the Court never declared any of these programs unconsti-
tutional, and in fact—sometimes with the support of “conservative” 
justices—explicitly upheld several of them.68  The Civilian Conserva-
 
 66 I leave to one side here the question of whether initiatives such as the National Industrial 
Recovery Act and the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 actually improved human wel-
fare.  Mr. Shesol himself canvasses some of the reasons to doubt that they did.  See id., at 
127–29, 174–75.  For other reasons, see CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT, 
supra note 26, at 34–35. 
 67 Thus, “Social Security . . . seemed certain to fall, as did the National Labor Relations Act, 
as did just about everything of significance that Congress had passed or Roosevelt was 
likely to propose.”  SHESOL, supra note 2, at 3. 
 68 See Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240 (1935) (upholding abrogation of 
the gold clause in private contracts by a vote of 5-4); Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 
(1935) (denying damages in cases involving abrogation of the gold clause in government 
bonds by a vote of 5-4); Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464 (1938) (denying, in a 
Sutherland opinion joined by McReynolds and Butler, a power company standing to chal-
lenge grants and loans made by the Emergency Relief Administration of Public Works to 
assist in the construction of electrical distribution systems); Duke Power Co. v. Green-
wood Cnty., 302 U.S. 485 (1938) (same); Cal. Water Serv. Co. v. Redding, 304 U.S. 252 
(1938) (per curiam) (relying on Alabama Power Co.); see also City of Allegan, Mich. v. Con-
sumers’ Power Co., 71 F.2d 477, 480 (6th Cir., 1934), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 586 (1934) 
(holding that power company has no right as either a federal or state taxpayer to ques-
tion the constitutionality of the Public Works Administration); Elec. Bond & Share Co. v. 
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 303 U.S. 419 (1938) (upholding the registration provisions of the 
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 and, by implication, the Securities Act of 
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tion Corps was only one of many New Deal spending programs effec-
tively insulated from constitutional attack by Sutherland’s 1923 deci-
sion holding that appropriations from general revenue were not sub-
ject to judicial review.  Among the others were the Federal 
Emergency Relief Act,69 the Farm Credit Act,70 the Reconstruction Fi-
nance Corporation,71 the Rural Electrification Act,72 and the Emer-
gency Relief Appropriation Act.73  In addition, of course, the claim 
that the Court’s view of the Constitution left no room for “govern-
mental power to relieve the suffering caused by the Great Depres-
sion” and to create a “more just social and economic order” also over-
looks the Court’s decisions upholding commodity price regulation in 
Nebbia, the Minnesota mortgage moratorium in Home Building & 
Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell,74 and the Tennessee Valley Authority in 
Ashwander,75 not to mention unanimous Hughes Court decisions up-
holding the Railway Labor Act and its 1934 amendments76 and the re-
vised Frazier-Lemke Farm Debt Relief Act.77 
Just as Mr. Shesol is mistaken in his more general assessment of 
the Court’s constitutional jurisprudence, so is he misinformed con-
cerning various of its particular features.  For example, he argues that 
in Schechter: 
Hughes did not invent the doctrine of direct versus indirect effects.  Ra-
ther, he revived it after four decades of disuse and disrepute.  Since the 
turn of the century, the Court had taken a mostly permissive view of fed-
eral regulation of any economic activity that had the potential, however 
 
1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 in an opinion with Butler joining 
Hughes and Roberts).  The Court had refrained from invalidating the 1934 Act in Jones v. 
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 298 U.S. 1 (1936).   Both McReynolds and Butler also joined opin-
ions apparently assuming the constitutionality of the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation.  
See Pittman v. Home Owners’ Loan Corp., 308 U.S. 21, 28 (1939); Graves v. New York ex 
rel. O’Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 492 (1939) (Butler & McReynolds, J.J., dissenting); see also 
United States ex rel. Handler v. Hill, 90 F.2d 573 (3d Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 736, 
reh’g. denied, 302 U.S. 779 (1937) (upholding constitutionality of Home Owners’ Loan 
Corporation). 
 69 Federal Emergency Relief Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 55, 56 (1933). 
 70 Farm Credit Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 257, 258 (1933). 
 71 An Act to Extend the Functions of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation for Two 
Years, and for Other Purposes, S. 1175, 74th Cong. (1st Sess. 1935). 
 72 Rural Electrification Act of 1936, 49 Stat. 1363, 1364 (1936). 
 73 Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1936, 49 Stat. 1597, 1608 (1936). 
 74 290 U.S. 398 (1934). 
 75 Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288 (1936). 
 76 See Tex. & New Orleans R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930) and Vir-
ginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed’n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937). 
 77 See Wright v. Vinton Branch of the Mountain Trust Bank of Roanoke, 300 U.S. 440 
(1937). 
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indirectly, to impede the flow of interstate commerce.  That came to an 
abrupt, unforeseen, and seemingly decisive end in Schechter. 
(p. 135).78  There are at least four things wrong with this statement.  
First, the distinction between direct and indirect effects did not, after 
1895, fall into four decades of disuse and disrepute—at least not as 
far as the Court was concerned.  Over the course of those four dec-
ades the Court consistently employed the distinction between direct 
and indirect effects both in cases raising questions of federal power 
under the affirmative Commerce Clause and in cases arising under 
the dormant Commerce Clause.  The question in the latter class of 
cases was whether a particular state or local tax or regulation affected 
interstate commerce sufficiently “directly” to entrench on regulatory 
prerogatives the Constitution reserved to Congress.  If the effect was 
“direct,” the measure was invalid; if it was “indirect,” it passed consti-
tutional muster.  In the affirmative Commerce Clause context, the 
question was whether the activity in question affected interstate 
commerce sufficiently “directly” to fall within Congress’s regulatory 
jurisdiction.  If the effect was “direct,” it was subject to congressional 
regulation; if the effect was “indirect,” Congress could not reach it.79 
Second, in major decisions upholding federal regulation under 
the Commerce Clause between 1895 and 1935, the Court routinely 
held that the regulated activity affected interstate commerce “direct-
ly.”80  In not a single case did the Court hold that an effect on inter-
 
 78 Mr. Shesol also reports that Schechter repudiated “not just the program but its entire sys-
tem of minimum wages, maximum hours, and workers’ rights,” SHESOL, supra note 2, at 2, 
though the program’s system of minimum wages, maximum hours, and workers’ rights 
had no existence apart from the program, and so could not be separately repudiated.  To 
repudiate the program was to repudiate the system. 
 79 Barry Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1089, 1096–1126 (2000). 
 80 See, e.g., Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295, 310 (1925) (uphold-
ing Sherman Act jurisdiction over labor strife imposing a “direct” rather “indirect” ob-
struction to interstate commerce); Chicago Bd. of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1, 36–40 
(1923) (upholding Grain Futures Act of 1922 on the grounds that the activities regulated 
thereby have a “direct” effect on interstate commerce); Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 
521, 525 (1922) (upholding Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921 on grounds that the ac-
tivities regulated thereby have a “direct” effect on interstate commerce); Standard Oil Co. 
of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 66–67 (1911) (upholding Sherman Act jurisdiction on 
grounds that activities regulated had a “direct” rather than “indirect” effect on interstate 
commerce); Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396–98 (1905) (holding that activ-
ities of meatpackers fell within the reach of the Sherman Act because the effect on inter-
state commerce was “direct” rather than “indirect”); N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 
197, 329–31, 347, 349, 354, 357, 361–62 (1904) (upholding Sherman Act prosecution on 
grounds that activities regulated had a “direct” effect on interstate commerce); Addyston 
Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 226, 228–30, 234–35, 238–46 (1899) (up-
holding Sherman Act prosecution of pooling agreement on grounds that it affected in-
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state commerce that was “indirect” could underwrite congressional 
control of the activity.  Third, as it had in 1895, when the Court held 
that an activity did not fall within congressional jurisdiction under 
the Sherman Act, it did so because the effect on interstate commerce 
was “indirect.”81  Indeed, just two years before Schechter was decided, a 
unanimous bench joined Justice Sutherland’s opinion refusing to en-
join a union’s effort to obtain a closed shop through a strike and boy-
cott of a structural steel manufacturer who shipped his product across 
state lines.  The company contended that the effect of the union’s ac-
tions was to destroy its interstate traffic in steel, but Sutherland insist-
ed that this did not bring the union’s behavior within the ambit of 
the Sherman Act’s prohibitions.  Even if “the shipment of steel in in-
terstate commerce was curtailed” by the strike and boycott, Suther-
land concluded, “that result was incidental, indirect, and re-
mote . . . .”82 
Fourth, it’s hard to understand how Mr. Shesol could regard 
Schechter’s Commerce Clause holding as “unforeseen.”  As Ronen 
Shamir reports, even the NIRA’s “staunchest supporters did not be-
lieve that it could survive a constitutional test.  It was passed with the 
implicit understanding among the administration’s senior legal ad-
visers that since it would be in effect only two years, judicial review by 
the Supreme Court might be avoided.”83  Homer Cummings, Felix 
Frankfurter, Jerome Frank, Frances Perkins, and Hugh Johnson all 
doubted that the statute was constitutional.84  And with specific refer-
ence to Schechter, Justice Department lawyers doubted from the outset 
that the Government could prevail on the Commerce Clause issue.  A 
memorandum from Robert Stern outlining the weaknesses of the 
Government’s case remarked that the relationship between local 
 
terstate commerce “directly”); United States v. Joint-Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505, 560, 565, 
568–69, 577 (1898) (upholding Sherman Act prosecution on grounds that activities regu-
lated had a “direct” effect on interstate commerce); United States v. Trans-Missouri 
Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 313, 342, 371 (1897) (upholding Sherman Act prosecution 
on grounds that activities regulated had a “direct” effect on interstate commerce). 
 81 See, e.g., United Leather Workers Int’l Union v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co., 265 U.S. 457 
(1924); United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922). 
 82 Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103, 107 (1933). 
 83 RONEN SHAMIR, MANAGING LEGAL UNCERTAINTY:  ELITE LAWYERS IN THE NEW DEAL 15–16 
(1995). 
 84 See IRONS, supra note 48, at 23–24; JOSEPH P. LASH, DEALERS AND DREAMERS:  A NEW LOOK 
AT THE NEW DEAL 122–23 (1988); ROBERT F. HIMMELBERG, THE ORIGINS OF THE 
NATIONAL RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION 191 (1976); ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE 
COMING OF THE NEW DEAL, 1933–1935, at 108 (1958); 2 ICKES, supra note 25, at 101; 
NATHAN MILLER, FDR:  AN INTIMATE HISTORY 328–29 (1983); SHAMIR, supra note 83, at 
32–33. 
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wages and interstate commerce was so attenuated that the Court 
would probably consider it “indirect.”  Stern therefore recommended 
against expediting the appeal—as did Felix Frankfurter and Tommy 
Corcoran—but Donald Richberg persuaded FDR to press on.  Solici-
tor General Stanley Reed tried to prepare Roosevelt for an adverse 
decision, and the NRA’s acting general counsel Blackwell Smith re-
garded Schechter as “the weakest possible case.”85  Even Justice Brande-
is joined Hughes’s opinion holding that the effect of interstate com-
merce was “indirect.”86 
Continuing in this vein, Mr. Shesol reports that “Hughes’s resort 
to a largely discredited doctrine” prompted Cardozo to write a sepa-
rate, concurring opinion, in which Stone joined.  (pp. 135–36).  Yet 
Cardozo also found the effect in question to be indirect.  He could 
find “no authority” in the Commerce Clause “for the regulation of 
wages and hours of labor” in the Schechters’ business.  “As to this fea-
ture of the case,” he wrote, “little can be added to the opinion of the 
court.  There is a view of causation that would obliterate the distinc-
tion between what is national and what is local in the activities of 
commerce. . . . Activities local in their immediacy do not become in-
terstate and national because of distant repercussions.”  “To find im-
mediacy or directness here,” Cardozo concluded, “is to find it almost 
everywhere.”87  This invocation of the distinction between direct and 
indirect effects even by “liberal” members of the Court prompted an 
exasperated Edward Corwin to grouse that “the conceptualism, the 
determination to resist the inrush of fact with the besom of formula, 
 
 85 CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT, supra note 26, at 157. 
 86 Mr. Shesol complains that the Court’s holding on the Commerce Clause issue “was all the 
more surprising because the Court had not been required to address the question at all.  
Having overturned the NRA on the grounds of its excessive delegation of power . . . the 
justices could have left it at that, in keeping with the Court’s tradition of deciding cases 
on the narrowest ground possible.”  SHESOL, supra note 2, at 135.  This characterization 
makes the Court’s treatment of the Commerce Clause issue sound gratuitous; but so far 
as I am aware, there is no “tradition” under which the Court has declined to decide cases 
on more than one constitutional ground, and one can certainly see the value to legisla-
tors of the Court providing guidance with respect to the various issues presented in a par-
ticular controversy.  Compare, e.g., Louisville Joint Stock Bank Co. v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 
(1935) (identifying five constitutional defects in the Frazier-Lemke Farm Debt Relief Act 
of 1934 in Brandeis’s opinion) with Wright v. Vinton Branch of the Mountain Trust Bank 
of Roanoke, 300 U.S. 440 (1937) (unanimously upholding the 1935 version of the Act re-
vised in accordance with the guidance provided by Brandeis’s opinion in Radford).  Of 
what value would it have been to Congress to repair the nondelegation problem if the 
Commerce Clause problem was also fatal? 
 87 A. L. A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 554 (1935). 
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which pervades the Chief Justice’s opinion for the Court, is not alto-
gether absent from Justice Cardozo’s opinion . . . .”88 
Mr. Shesol’s uncertain command of doctrine also leads him to 
misapprehend the constitutional basis of the Guffey Coal Act.  He re-
ports that:  “Hoping to placate the Court,” Congress “rested the au-
thority of the new, National Bituminous Coal Commission on the tax-
ing power—seemingly more secure grounds than the commerce 
power . . . .” (p. 166).  It is true that, under the statute, coal operators 
who did not comply with the provisions of the Code would not re-
ceive a rebate of the excise tax the Act imposed upon all coal pro-
ducers.  And it is true that one-and-a-half pages of the House Ways 
and Means Committee’s Report on the bill did attempt to justify it as 
an exercise of the taxing power.89  But this portion of the report was 
preceded by a seven-page defense of the bill as an exercise of the 
commerce power.90  President Roosevelt’s famous letter to Repre-
sentative Samuel B. Hill urging his subcommittee of the Committee 
on Ways and Means to report the bill out notwithstanding the mem-
bers’ concerns about its constitutionality focused entirely on the 
Commerce Clause justification.91  The bill’s leading supporters in 
Congress defended it principally as an exercise of the commerce 
power.92  This was because it was widely understood that the “tax” im-
posed by the statute was not a true tax within the contemplation of 
the Court’s taxing power jurisprudence, but instead, as the Court 
held in the opening passages of its opinion invalidating the statute,93 
a “penalty” on noncompliance with the Code provisions.94  Its imposi-
tion therefore could not be sustained under the taxing power, but in-
stead would have to be defended under the commerce power.  After 
arguing at length that the bill was supported by Commerce Clause 
precedents,95 Chairman Hill concluded: 
 
 88 E.S. Corwin, The Schechter Case—Landmark, or What?, 13 N.Y.U. L. Q.  REV. 151, 170 (1936). 
 89 H.R. REP. NO. 74-1800, at 10–12 (1935). 
 90 Id. at 3–10.  Indeed, the Senate version of the bill, which also provided for a tax and re-
bate scheme, was referred to and reported out by the Committee on Interstate Com-
merce.  S. REP. 74-470 (1935). 
 91 FDR to Samuel B. Hill, July 5, 1935, reprinted in 79 CONG. REC. 13449 (1935). 
 92 See R. ALTON LEE, A HISTORY OF REGULATORY TAXATION 155–56 (1973); 79 CONG. REC. 
13448–54 (remarks of Mr. Vinson) (1935). 
 93 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 288–29 (1936). 
 94 See Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922); H.R. REP. 74-1800, at 46 (1935) 
(Views of the Minority); id. at 52–54 (Views of Mr. Cooper of Tennessee); 79 CONG. REC. 
13436, 13484–85 (remarks of Mr. Treadway); id. at 13462–63 (remarks of Mr. Cooper of 
Tennessee); id. at 13467 (remarks of Mr. Church). 
 95 79 CONG. REC. 13442–66. 
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If Congress has the right to regulate this industry, then it has the right to 
regulate by taxation.  Even if the tax should be held to be a penalty, yet if 
Congress has jurisdiction over the subject matter, if it has the power to 
regulate the industry, it makes no difference whether the tax is for reve-
nue or for penalty or regulation, because in either event it would come 
under the regulatory power of Congress.  That is what we are relying on 
[with] this bill, that it directly affects and burdens interstate commerce.96 
When Assistant Attorney General Dickinson was defending the 
statute before the Court, he admitted at the outset of his argument 
that:  “There is general agreement that the statute rests upon the 
commerce power.  The tax provision stands or falls with the validity of 
the scheme of regulation under the commerce power.”97  The statute 
did not really, as Mr. Shesol claims, seek to “placate the Court” by 
resting the authority of the Commission on the “more secure 
grounds” of the taxing power. 
1.  The Minimum Wage Cases 
These unsuccessful encounters with constitutional doctrine do not 
inspire confidence in Mr. Shesol’s capacity to evaluate the scope and 
extent of the constitutional change wrought during Hughes’s tenure 
as Chief Justice.  One’s concerns are to some extent borne out in his 
treatment of the Court’s decisions in 1937.  Consider first his treat-
ment of the minimum wage cases:  Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipal-
do, where in 1936, a 5-4 majority invalidated New York’s statute,98 and 
West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 99 in which a 5-4 majority upheld Washing-
ton State’s statute in 1937. Mr. Shesol does not do too badly in his 
analysis of Tipaldo, but he does make the occasional misstep.  He rec-
ognizes, for example, that in 1934 Nebbia “gave states more room to 
regulate economic activity in the public interest.”  (pp. 218–19).  He 
accurately reports that “New York argued that its minimum-wage law 
could be distinguished from D.C.’s, and was therefore not controlled 
by Adkins,” the 1923 decision in which the Court had invalidated the 
District’s statute.100  But he then goes on to maintain that New York 
“also called for ‘a reconsideration’ of Adkins—a polite way of asking 
the justices to overrule it.”  (pp. 219–20).  He later contends that the 
lawyers for New York had “expressly challenged Adkins.  While New 
York had undeniably staked its case primarily on the grounds of dis-
 
 96 79 CONG. REC. 13446. 
 97 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 255 (1936). 
 98 298 U.S. 587 (1936). 
 99 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
100 Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923). 
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tinguishing the statutes, it also hedged its bets.  The state’s petition 
called for ‘reconsideration of the Adkins decision in the light of the 
New York act and conditions aimed to be remedied thereby.’  New 
York, it seems clear, was suggesting that Adkins be cast aside.  The 
state’s attorneys had marked out dual paths to the same result.”  (p. 
414). 
It is true that the state called for “reconsideration” of Adkins.  But 
the contention that this was a request that the Court overrule Adkins 
rests, in my view, on a misreading of the documents.  The petition 
filed by the state of New York did not explicitly request that Adkins be 
overruled.  The overwhelming bulk of the petition was devoted to 
identifying material legal and factual distinctions between the New 
York statute and the measure invalidated in Adkins.  Of all of the 
“Questions Presented,” “Reasons for Allowing this Writ,” and “As-
signments of Error” raised in the petition, only one might plausibly 
have been construed to request that Adkins be overruled.  The sixth 
of the “Reasons for Allowing this Writ” stated:  “the circumstances 
prevailing under which the New York law was enacted call for a re-
consideration of the Adkins case in light of the New York act and 
conditions aimed to be remedied thereby.”101  This was by no means 
an unequivocal call for a repudiation of Adkins.  It might more readily 
have been understood as a restatement of New York’s central argu-
ment:  that material distinctions between the language of the two 
statutes and the intervention of an economic depression made the 
New York statute a reasonable exercise of the police power where the 
District of Columbia statute had not been.  Insofar as Adkins was the 
controlling precedent regarding the validity of minimum wage regu-
lation, any case concerning the constitutionality of a minimum wage 
statute would necessarily involve the construction and consideration 
of that precedent to determine its scope and meaning. 
This appears to have been the way that Chief Justice Hughes con-
strued this language in the petition.  In his dissent, in which he con-
tended that Tipaldo was not controlled by Adkins due to material dif-
ferences in the two statutes involved and the social conditions to 
which each was addressed, he wrote that the close divisions of the 
Court in Stettler v. O’Hara102 and Adkins “point to the desirability of 
fresh consideration when there are material differences in the cases 
 
101 Petition for Writ of Certiorari and Motion to Advance at 4–5, 8–9, 12–24; Tipaldo, 298 
U.S. at 636 (Stone, J., dissenting). 
102 243 U.S. 629 (1917) (affirming by an equally divided court the judgment of the Oregon 
Supreme Court upholding that state’s minimum wage law for women, with Justice 
Brandeis not participating). 
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presented.”103  Though he purported to undertake such “fresh con-
sideration,” nowhere in his opinion did he consider whether Adkins 
ought to be overruled. 
The petition certainly was sufficiently ambiguous that it was not 
unreasonable for the justices to construe it in light of the arguments 
advanced in the brief and at oral argument.  And neither in the brief 
nor at the argument did attorneys for the state request or suggest that 
Adkins be overruled.  The brief instead offered a detailed explanation 
of why the New York statute was consistent with and indeed support-
ed by Adkins.  Similarly, briefs of amici curiae contended that “[t]he 
New York statute differs radically from that considered by this Court 
in the Adkins case,” and “[t]he New York Minimum Wage Law, passed 
in the light of the decision in Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 
525, is supported as to constitutionality by the opinion in that case.”104  
Nowhere was it requested that Adkins be overruled.105 
This reading of the documents is supported by Roberts’ later ac-
count of the conference following the oral argument in Tipaldo. Rob-
erts reported that: 
Both in the petition for certiorari, in the brief on the merits, and in oral 
argument, counsel for the State of New York took the position that it was 
unnecessary to overrule the Adkins case in order to sustain the position of 
the State of New York.  It was urged that further data and experience and 
additional facts distinguished the case at bar from the Adkins case . . . .  
The State had not asked that the Adkins case be overruled but that it be 
distinguished.  I said I was unwilling to put a decision on any such 
ground.106 
Justice Butler’s majority opinion similarly maintained that: 
The petition for the writ sought review upon the ground that this case is 
distinguishable from [Adkins].  No application has been made for recon-
sideration of the constitutional question there decided.  The validity of 
the principles upon which that decision rests is not challenged.  This 
court confines itself to the ground upon which the writ was asked or 
granted.  [citations omitted]  Here the review granted was no broader 
than that sought by the petitioner.  [citations omitted]  He is not entitled 
and does not ask to be heard upon the question whether the Adkins case 
 
103 Tipaldo, 298 U.S. at 624 (Hughes, C.J., dissenting). 
104 Appellant’s Brief on the Law, Tipaldo, 298 U.S. at 16–49; Brief on Behalf of States of Con-
necticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and Rhode Island, as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Appellant, Tipaldo, 298 U.S. at 15; Motion for Leave to File Brief as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant, filed by John W. Bricker, Attorney General of Ohio, 
Tipaldo, 298 U.S. at 39. 
105 Accord Erwin N. Griswold, Owen J. Roberts As A Judge, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 332, 341 (1955). 
106 Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Roberts, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 311, 314 (1955). 
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should be overruled.  He maintains that it may be distinguished on the 
ground that the statutes are vitally dissimilar.107 
Hughes’s dissenting opinion did not challenge the majority’s 
claim that the petition confined the justices to consideration of 
whether the case was distinguishable from Adkins.  Indeed, Mr. Shesol 
himself later concedes that on Hughes’s view, Adkins “was not at issue 
in Tipaldo, had not been challenged by New York’s lawyers, and 
should therefore remain standing.” (p. 405).  And though Justice 
Stone’s dissent briefly called attention to the petition’s request for a 
“reconsideration” of Adkins, he did not deem it necessary to interpret 
this as a demand that the decision be overruled.  Instead, he insisted 
that it did not matter.  “I know of no rule or practice by which the ar-
guments advance in support of an application for certiorari restrict 
our choice between conflicting precedents in deciding a question of 
constitutional law which the petition, if granted, requires us to an-
swer,” he wrote: 
Here the question which the petition specifically presents is whether the 
New York statute contravenes that Fourteenth Amendment . . . .  Unless 
we are now to construe and apply the Fourteenth Amendment without 
regard to our decisions since the Adkins case, we could not rightly avoid 
its reconsideration even if it were not asked.  We should follow our deci-
sion in the Nebbia case . . . .108 
Accordingly, as Mr. Shesol correctly reports, Stone wrote an opin-
ion, joined by Brandeis and Cardozo, calling for Adkins to be over-
ruled.  But as Mr. Shesol points out, Chief Justice Hughes was not 
prepared to overrule Adkins.  “He was prepared to dissent, but only 
on narrow grounds.  More practiced than the others in the art of fine 
shadings, more inclined to inch away—by often imperceptible de-
grees—from a troublesome precedent than to overrule it, Hughes 
was prepared to differentiate and uphold New York’s statute . . . and 
leave Adkins standing—irrelevant, apparently unloved, but still stand-
ing.” (pp. 219–20).  Butler had originally circulated a draft opinion 
confined to the holding that Adkins had not been challenged by New 
York and was therefore controlling authority, but Stone’s dissent 
prompted Butler to enlarge his opinion with “brusque” obiter dicta 
defending Adkins “angrily, and in sweeping terms.” (pp. 220).  This 
perplexed Roberts,109 who later wrote that his “proper course would 
have been to concur specially on the narrow ground I had taken.”110  
 
107 Tipaldo, 298 U.S. at 604–05. 
108 Id. at 636 (Stone, J., dissenting). 
109 PUSEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, supra note 17, at 701 (reporting that the “reactionary 
tone” of Butler’s enlarged opinion “was very distasteful to Roberts”). 
110 Frankfurter, supra note 106, at 315. 
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In the margin of Felix Frankfurter’s copy of Merlo Pusey’s 1951 biog-
raphy of Hughes, one finds next to the discussion of Roberts’ con-
duct in Tipaldo the notation, “He shouldn’t have suppressed his own 
views by silence.”111 
The contention that New York requested that Adkins be overruled 
in Tipaldo is therefore at the very least deeply problematic.  But so is 
the opposing contention that New York’s failure to make such a re-
quest itself adequately explains Roberts’ behavior in the minimum 
wage cases.  It is true that in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish the Washington 
Supreme Court, unlike the New York Court of Appeals in Tipaldo, 
had effectively declared that Adkins already had been overruled.  As 
Chief Justice Hughes put it:  “The state court has refused to regard 
the decision in the Adkins case as determinative and has pointed to 
our decisions both before and since that case as justifying its posi-
tion.”112  It is also true that counsel for the Appellant observed that 
“the issue before this Court is simply whether the Adkins case is to be 
reconsidered and reversed or whether its authority is to be sus-
tained.”113  And because the Washington statute, unlike the New York 
measure, was virtually identical to the law struck down in Adkins, it is 
difficult to see how the Court could have upheld the Washington 
statute without overruling Adkins.  But it is not clear that it followed 
that the “ruling of the state court demands on our part a reexamina-
tion of the Adkins case,” as Hughes concluded.114  For starters, the par-
ty defending the statute in Parrish was the appellee rather than the 
appellant, and therefore, unlike the New York attorney general in Ti-
paldo, did not frame the question to be considered on appeal.  More-
over, the briefs and arguments of the attorneys for the state of Wash-
ington did not request that Adkins be overruled.  Roberts’ later 
recollection that in Parrish “the authority of Adkins was definitely as-
sailed and the Court was asked to reconsider and overrule it” was not 
fully accurate.  Even though the state court had refused to apply Ad-
kins, the justices were certainly at liberty to strike down the Washing-
ton statute on the grounds that its controlling authority had not been 
specifically challenged by the litigants. 
 
111 PUSEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, supra note 17, at 701; Frankfurter’s personal copy, mi-
croformed on Harvard Frankfurter Papers, at Part II, Reel 39.  See also BARRY CUSHMAN, 
RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT:  THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 
265 n.7 (1998). 
112 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 389 (1937). 
113 Appellant’s Answer to Brief of Amicus Curiae at 18, West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 379. 
114 West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 389–90. 
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What, then, explains Roberts’ change, which, in a chapter entitled 
“The Yielding,” Mr. Shesol characterizes as a “remarkabl[e]” (p. 406) 
“surprise” (p. 404)?  Mr. Shesol concedes that it could not have been 
the Court-packing plan, a closely-guarded secret that was announced 
publicly more than six weeks after Roberts had cast his decisive vote 
in conference.  “[T]he facts, as Roberts later insisted, would seem to 
establish ‘that no action taken by the President . . . had any causal re-
lation to my action in the Parrish case.’”  (p. 415).  Instead, Mr. Shesol 
flirts with a handful of alternative possibilities.  One is “the scale of 
Roosevelt’s reelection” in November of 1936.  (p. 415).  But it is diffi-
cult to understand how this could have been a factor.  For in 1936 the 
Republican platform explicitly endorsed minimum wages for women 
and children, as did the party’s nominee, former Progressive Bull 
Moose crusader Alf Landon.  Even assuming that the justices followed 
the election returns—which seems doubtful in view of the string of 
invalidations they handed down in the wake of the Democrats’ stun-
ning success in the 1934 midterm elections—the 1936 election could 
provide them with no additional information concerning popular at-
titudes toward the minimum wage.  It was already abundantly clear 
that both parties and both candidates were for it.115  And as Mr. 
Shesol reports:  “Roosevelt did not suppose that his triumph at the 
polls had in any way chastened the Court; the old maxim that ‘the 
Court follows the election returns’ could not possibly apply to an in-
stitution that had been flouting, so consistently and flagrantly, the 
popular will.”  (p. 3).116 
A second possible causal factor, Mr. Shesol suggests, was “through 
1936, the mounting threat—or certainty—that either FDR or Con-
gress was about to take serious action to curb the Court.”  (p. 415).  
 
115 CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT, supra note 26, at 25–28. 
116 At one point Mr. Shesol appears to suggest that the Court more generally responded to 
the election returns.  “Starting in November,” he observes, “the Court had issued a series 
of opinions that indicated it might be yielding to the popular will.”  Yet in each of the 
three cases he cites, the vote was either unanimous or near-unanimous.  SHESOL, supra 
note 2, at 264–65.  The Four Horsemen, who already had voted to dissent in Parrish, and 
would later dissent in cases upholding the National Labor Relations Act and the Social 
Security Act, surely were not moved by the election returns to join these earlier opinions.  
If following the election “conservative justices” now seemed to treat “government lawyers 
with greater respect—or at least with less overt hostility,” perhaps that was because the 
cases they were arguing presented far less contentious issues.  Id. at 243.  Ultimately, Mr. 
Shesol does not press this claim, remarking instead that “the peace that prevailed in the 
winter of 1936–37 was not a permanent one . . . . The election results, so resounding that 
they had seemed to answer every question, now appeared, on reflection, to have settled 
very little.  At the most basic level, it was unclear whether voters wanted to press ahead 
with further reforms, or simply improve existing New Deal programs.”  Id. at 265–66. 
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This also is doubtful.  After all, if it was virtually certain by December 
19, 1936, when Roberts voted to uphold the Washington minimum 
wage statute, that Roosevelt would introduce a serious Court-curbing 
proposal, one has to wonder why it came as such a great surprise to 
Democratic leaders on the Hill and to other observers around the 
country when he did so more than six weeks later.  (pp. 292–306).  As 
Mr. Shesol points out, Roosevelt had deliberately steered clear of any 
discussion of the Court during the campaign.  In 1936 the economy 
was improving, the opposition was weak, and there was no political 
upside and considerable political downside to taking on the Court 
before the election.  Indeed, the Court’s decisions in Schechter and 
Butler had removed two millstones from around his neck, and his 
polling numbers were improving as a result.  (p. 215).  So instead of 
making the Court a campaign issue, FDR’s platform had pledged the 
administration to address the nation’s economic and social problems 
“through legislation within the Constitution” or, if that should prove 
impracticable, through “a clarifying amendment.”  Moreover, hun-
dreds of similar court-curbing proposals had been introduced in 
Congress in the preceding two sessions, without producing any dis-
cernible effect on the Court’s performance.117 
A third suggestion offered by Mr. Shesol is that the general out-
pouring of criticism following the announcement of the Court’s deci-
sion in Tipaldo might have affected Roberts’ performance in Parrish.  
As Mr. Shesol puts it, “a credible case can be made that Roberts and 
Hughes were influenced by the criticism of Tipaldo; or by rising popu-
lar exasperation with the Court; or the indignation of the legal jour-
nals . . . .” (p. 415).  “If any justice could have shrugged off the criti-
cism,” Mr. Shesol maintains, “that justice was not Owen Roberts.  He 
cared greatly—too greatly, some of his friends believed—about his 
reputation.”  (p. 413).  “[I]n the view of a reporter who knew him so-
cially, Roberts was ‘too anxious for worldly approval.’  And when, in 
1936, he and the rest of the conservative majority became objects of 
widespread scorn and ridicule—when even Republicans began to 
hold them at arm’s length—the public lashing may have hurt Roberts 
more deeply than the others.”  (p. 231).118 
 
117 CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT, supra note 26, at 12–14, 27. 
118 Mr. Shesol’s discussion of the relationship between Tipaldo and the possibility that either 
Stone or Roberts might receive the Republican nomination for president in 1936 is par-
ticularly curious.  On the same page he manages to write first that Stone’s dissent in Ti-
paldo put an end to talk of the possibility of his being nominated, and then in the next 
paragraph to write that Roberts’ vote with the majority in Tipaldo put an end to rumors 
that he might be nominated.  SHESOL, supra note 2, at 231.  This contrast leaves it unclear 
how any justice participating in Tipaldo could have satisfied Republicans in 1936. 
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Perhaps.  Roosevelt suggested such a sensitivity to criticism when 
he remarked in the wake of the 1936 decision upholding the TVA by 
a vote of 8-1 that:  “‘It did those babies good to criticize them a bit.’”  
(p. 210).  But Mr. Shesol reports that Justice Stone “saw no sign that 
his conservative colleagues had yielded to external pressure,” and 
“fretted, privately, that this was ‘the popular impression.’”  (pp. 210–
11).  As Mr. Shesol himself maintains, “the four or five most conserva-
tive justices, with every opinion they wrote against the New Deal, 
seemed almost to invite public outrage, to welcome it.”  (p. 3).  Inso-
far as the suggestion would be that Roberts changed his substantive 
views on the question of the constitutionality of the minimum wage in 
response to this criticism, one has to wonder why Roberts would have 
joined or written so many heavily criticized decisions in the first 
place.119  For example, as Mr. Shesol points out, in the press reaction 
to Butler commentators generally concluded that Stone’s dissent had 
the better of the argument.  (p. 232).  And yet despite this, Roberts 
continued after Butler to vote to invalidate the Guffey Coal Act in 
Carter Coal and the minimum wage in Tipaldo.  Where, one wonders, 
was his concern for “worldly approval” then?  This would suggest that 
the justice generally retired to “‘a soundproof room’” (p. 523) to 
consider his decisions, but that on this particular occasion the cham-
ber’s noise-reduction technology malfunctioned. 
In fairness, Mr. Shesol suggests that the noise generated in the 
wake of Tipaldo was simply of a different order than anything that had 
come before.  He reports that “out of 344 editorials on the Tipaldo 
ruling, only 10 supported it.  Not only that:  dozens of the most con-
servative papers went a step (perhaps several steps) further and said 
that if the states lacked any power to fight sweatshop conditions, then 
the Constitution might have to be amended after all.”  (p. 222).  
“Here, at last, was the wave of national revulsion that had been ex-
pected for years and had failed, until now, to materialize.  When the 
Court had overturned the NRA, the AAA, and the Guffey Coal Act, 
when it chiseled away at states’ rights in other decisions, there had 
been protests, clamor, but nothing like this.”  (p. 222).  This was be-
cause the minimum wage, unlike the New Deal, had quietly achieved 
“overwhelming popularity.  More than a third of the states had such 
laws on the books, in some cases for decades.  The minimum wage 
served an obvious and desperate human need.  And though the poli-
 
119 In what impresses me as a strained reading of Justice Sutherland’s Parrish dissent, Mr. 
Shesol characterizes it as a “scolding” of Roberts “for bowing to public opinion or the 
pressure of his peers,” reporting that during its delivery “Roberts, with reason, looked an-
noyed” and “glanced coldly at his accuser.” Id. at 407–08. 
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cy did reflect a certain paternalism, it was no weird concoction of the 
Brain Trust, it had put down deep roots, and even the Liberty League 
could hardly be roused to condemn it.”  (p. 222). 
One must wonder, of course, whether Roberts could have been so 
ignorant of the broad and deep public support for the minimum 
wage before the fact that the reaction to Tipaldo would have greatly 
surprised him.  Yet perhaps in light of Roberts’ apparent general lack 
of responsiveness to “clamor” over the Court’s decisions, and taking 
into account Roberts’ earlier decision in Nebbia, Mr. Shesol ultimately 
stops short of asserting this stronger relationship between the reac-
tion to Tipaldo and Roberts’ vote in Parrish.  Instead, he is more cir-
cumspect, affirming that “[i]f any of this had an effect on the deci-
sion, it can never be measured; nor would it suggest that either justice 
changed his basic beliefs in the face of events.”  He modestly main-
tains that the question of Roberts’ motivation “ha[s] never really 
been answered,” and is a matter about which “one could only specu-
late.”  (p. 415). 
Mr. Shesol is prepared to offer a speculation, however, and in do-
ing so he follows the thoughtfully-considered judgments reached by 
Merlo Pusey, Richard Friedman, and Edward Purcell that the public 
outcry following the Tipaldo decision might have prompted Roberts 
to face squarely the question of Adkins’ continued vitality.120  That re-
action, Mr. Shesol argues, may have made Hughes and Roberts “more 
likely to examine his beliefs and then act on them—to take a bold 
step, to confront a tough choice and no longer avoid it.”  (p. 415). 
[O]ne need not speculate wildly to posit that some of these events, to 
some degree, weighed on the minds of Roberts and Hughes and placed a 
finger on their internal scales.  This would explain their relief when the 
minimum-wage issue came back before the Court so soon after Tipal-
do . . . . Their later protestations aside, it is hard to escape the conclusion 
that they shed their self-imposed restraints and faced the fundamental is-
sue because events had led them to see Parrish as precisely what they 
wished it to be:  a second chance, a shot at redemption. 
(p. 415). 
This is a plausible conjecture that has been embraced by the emi-
nent scholars to whom I have referred, and they may well be correct.  
I certainly cannot prove that they are not.  But I do not believe that 
Mr. Shesol’s conclusion is as difficult to escape as he makes it out to 
 
120 MERLO J. PUSEY, THE SUPREME COURT CRISIS 51 (1937); Merlo J. Pusey, Justice Roberts’ 1937 
Turnaround, 1983 Y.B. SUP. CT. HIST. SOC. 102, 106; Richard Friedman, Switching Time and 
Other Thought Experiments:  The Hughes Court and Constitutional Transformation, 142 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1893, 1952 (1994); Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Rethinking Constitutional Change, 80 VA. L. 
REV. 277, 289–90 (1994). 
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be.  Instead, I believe that the performances of Hughes and Roberts 
in the minimum wage cases can be explained adequately without ref-
erence to the public reaction to Tipaldo.  Let us take Hughes first.  
The Chief Justice had a strong preference for distinguishing rather 
than overruling precedents where possible, a preference that has 
been noted by many121 and, as Mr. Shesol notes, was lamented by 
Stone in the wake of Tipaldo.122  In Tipaldo, Hughes believed that a 
relevant distinction could be drawn, and he sought to sustain the 
statute on that basis.  No such distinction was available in Parrish, and 
Hughes therefore was squarely confronted with the option of either 
invalidating the statute on the authority of Adkins or sustaining the 
minimum wage law by overruling the 1923 precedent. 
As for Roberts, the memorandum he prepared is not without its 
difficulties, but some of his recollections point toward the under-
standing ultimately articulated by his later confidante, Felix Frankfur-
ter.  Roberts reported that at the conference at which certiorari was 
granted in Tipaldo, he told his colleagues that he “saw no reason to 
grant the writ unless the Court were prepared to re-examine and 
overrule the Adkins case.”123  This would suggest that Roberts was not 
saying that he would not reach the issue of Adkins’ continuing author-
ity unless New York asked him to; he was instead saying that he was 
 
121 Paul A. Freund, Charles Evans Hughes as Chief Justice, 81 HARV. L. REV. 4, 35 (1967) (re-
marking on Hughes’s “talent for making nice distinctions in the interest of creative con-
tinuity.  He thoroughly disliked the overruling of a precedent, but his gift for differentia-
tion fostered the controlled evolution of doctrine”); SAMUEL HENDEL, CHARLES EVANS 
HUGHES AND THE SUPREME COURT 279 (1951) (“He sought, virtually above all else, to 
maintain the dignity and prestige of the Court and this he thought in no small measure 
depended upon the stability of its decisions.  This attitude was reflected . . . in the great 
lengths to which he sometimes went . . . in attempting to find distinctions to avoid over-
ruling precedent. . . . [He] sedulously sought to protect the precedents of the Court, 
sometimes at the risk of offending logic.”).  See also MASON, supra note 58, at 796 (remark-
ing on Hughes’s capacity “to invent meaningless distinctions”); F.D.G. Ribble, The Consti-
tutional Doctrines of Chief Justice Hughes, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 1190, 1210 (1941) (claiming 
that Hughes possessed “a consummate skill in distinguishing adverse or apparently ad-
verse cases”). Justice Roberts himself later commented on this quality. See OWEN J. 
ROBERTS, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 18 (1951) (describing one of Hughes’s 
opinions as having “labored valiantly, and, as I think, unsuccessfully, to distinguish the 
earlier cases”).  Paul Freund once characterized a distinction drawn by Hughes as one 
that “could be remembered just long enough to be stated once.”  Freund, supra note 121, 
at 35. 
122 Alpheus Thomas Mason reports that Stone, who joined Hughes’s dissent, thought it “‘a 
sad business to stand only on differences of the two statutes,’” and “could not understand 
why ‘the Chief Justice felt it necessary to so limit his opinion.’”  MASON, supra note 58, at 
423 (quoting Stone to Frankfurter, June 3, 1936).  See also SHESOL, supra note 2, at 219–
20. 
123 Frankfurter, supra note 106, at 314. 
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prepared to consider the issue of whether Adkins should be over-
ruled, but that he would not join an opinion upholding the New York 
statute on the ground that it was distinguishable from the measure 
invalidated in Adkins.  At the conference following the argument 
Roberts reports that he stated that he was “unwilling to put a deci-
sion” on the ground for which New York had argued, namely, that 
the two statutes could be meaningfully distinguished.124  It is unclear 
whether Brandeis, Stone, and Cardozo had yet expressed their view 
that a decision upholding the statute should be based on a rejection 
of Adkins’ authority, but it was almost certainly clear, as was ultimately 
the case, that Hughes would not join such an opinion.  Roberts did 
not believe that the Court could legitimately sustain the statute unless 
there were a majority to overrule Adkins.  Because there was not, he 
acquiesced in an opinion invalidating the statute on the authority of 
Adkins—just as Holmes and Stone had in the 1920s, even when state 
attorneys had specifically requested that the Court overrule Adkins.125  
As Frankfurter put it in 1955, “when the Tipaldo case was before the 
Court in the spring of 1936,” Roberts “was prepared to overrule the 
Adkins decision.  Since a majority could not be had for overrruling it, 
he silently agreed with the Court in finding the New York statute un-
der attack in the Tipaldo case not distinguishable from the statute 
which had been declared unconstitutional in the Adkins case.”126  Two 
years earlier Frankfurter had written to Paul Freund:  “The fact is that 
Roberts did not switch.  He was prepared in Tipaldo to make a majori-
ty overruling Adkins.  He was not prepared to distinguish Adkins.  Be-
cause there was no majority for overrruling Adkins he was in the ma-
jority in the Morehead case. . . .”127 
 
124 Id. 
125 See Donham v. West-Nelson Mfg. Co., 273 U.S. 657 (1927) (including Taft, Holmes, San-
ford, and Stone all concurring silently in affirming per curiam a decision invalidating Ar-
kansas minimum wage statute on authority of Adkins); Murphy v. Sardell, 269 U.S. 530 
(1925) (including Brandeis alone dissenting from per curiam decision striking down Ari-
zona’s minimum wage statute, with Taft, Sanford, and Stone concurring silently and 
Holmes concurring only because he regarded himself as bound by the authority of Ad-
kins).  As Charles Curtis noted:  “Roberts had done no more by joining with the ex-
majority [in Tipaldo] than to follow [Adkins] as a precedent that was binding on him.  No 
more, indeed, than Holmes himself had done, when he accepted Adkins in the two cases 
that had come up from Arizona and Arkansas shortly afterwards.”  CHARLES CURTIS, 
LIONS UNDER THE THRONE:  A STUDY OF THE SUPREME COURT 163–64 (1947). 
126 Frankfurter, supra note 106, at 314.  Paul Freund apparently concurred in this interpreta-
tion.  See Freund, supra note 121, at 29–30. 
127 Felix Frankfurter to Paul Freund, microformed on Felix Frankfurter Papers, Harvard Law 
School Library, at Part III, Reel 15, quoted in Michael Ariens, A Thrice-Told Tale, or Felix the 
Cat, 107 HARV. L. REV. 620, 633 n.78 (1994).  See also ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE 
POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL 479 (“Prepared to reverse Adkins but not to distinguish it, Roberts 
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Interestingly, Frankfurter’s understanding may help to resolve a 
difficulty with the account that attempts to shift the blame to the New 
York attorney general for failing to request that the Court overrule 
Adkins.  Several commentators who question that account have rightly 
observed that in 1938 Roberts voted in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins128 to 
overrule the nearly century-old precedent of Swift v. Tyson129 even 
though neither of the parties had challenged the vitality of that deci-
sion.130  Edward Purcell has plausibly and charitably suggested that 
Roberts may have felt so badly burned by the Tipaldo fiasco that he 
thereafter revised his approach to such issues.131  That may be true, 
but if Frankfurter’s understanding is correct, then Erie may support 
rather than impeach the claim that Roberts was consistent in these 
matters.  For when Hughes presented Erie to the conference, he an-
nounced that:  “If we wish to overrule Swift v. Tyson, here is our op-
portunity.”132  Perhaps in part as a result of Hughes’s leadership—
which may have been prompted by the Tipaldo experience—a majori-
ty to overrule Swift was assembled.  In Tipaldo, by contrast, Hughes 
was not prepared to overrule Adkins, and as a consequence, no major-
ity to do so could be formed.  If this account of the minimum wages 
cases is correct, then it is hard to see Parrish as representing any kind 
of “yielding.”133 
Indeed, if this account is correct, then it lends support to a possi-
bility that Mr. Shesol entertains but is ultimately reluctant to em-
brace.  One reason that Roberts may have been persuaded to uphold 
the minimum wage statute in Parrish, Mr. Shesol suggests, was the ex-
tensive reliance Hughes’s majority opinion placed on Roberts’ opin-
ion in Nebbia:  “Following Roberts’s own reasoning, Hughes marched 
to the finish.  Nebbia had crippled the doctrine of substantive due 
process, and now Parrish finished it off.”  (pp. 406–07).  Had this “af-
 
felt that existing alternatives left him no choice but to vote with those who would strike 
down the New York law”); THOMAS REED POWELL, VAGARIES AND VARIETIES IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 81 n.89 (1956) (“Mr. Justice Roberts’s position in the 
two cases can be harmonized as the view of one who was unable to distinguish the Adkins 
case but who would accept an opportunity to overrule it.”). 
128 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
129 41 U.S. 1 (1842). 
130 See John W. Chambers, The Big Switch:  Justice Roberts and the Minimum-Wage Cases, 10 LAB. 
HIST. 44, 66–67 (1969); HENDEL, supra note 121, at 130; Michael E. Parrish, The Hughes 
Court, the Great Depression, and the Historians, 40 HIST. 286, 296 (1978); Purcell, supra note 
120, at 289–90. 
131 Purcell, supra note 120, at 289–90. 
132 MASON, supra note 58, at 478. 
133 I elaborate portions of this account in greater detail in CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW 
DEAL COURT, supra note 26, at 92–104. 
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firmation of Nebbia brought Roberts on board?”  “Perhaps,” Mr. 
Shesol concedes, but he then adds that “Hughes had cited Nebbia in 
his Tipaldo dissent as well—to no discernible effect.”  (p. 407).  It is 
true that Hughes cited Nebbia in Tipaldo, but there he had not been 
prepared to say of it what he would in Parrish, namely, that he found 
it “impossible to reconcile” Adkins with the “well-considered declara-
tions” of the Nebbia opinion.134  Perhaps it was not a mere citation to 
Nebbia that made the difference to Roberts, but rather a frank recog-
nition of its implications for Adkins, implications that so many com-
mentators had perceived in the wake of Nebbia’s announcement.135 
2.  The Labor Board Cases 
Mr. Shesol’s account of the cases challenging the constitutionality 
of the National Labor Relations Act is similarly plagued by doctrinal 
misunderstandings, and again uneasily juxtaposes internal and exter-
nal explanatory factors.  He observes that the drafters of the statute 
“wrote a preamble to the act that read like a legal brief.  It took pains 
to establish that labor issues were not—as many, perhaps most, of the 
justices believed—a local concern . . . .” (p. 422).  It is true that the 
act’s preamble took such pains, but the notion that many or most of 
the justices believed that “labor issues” were “a local concern” rests 
upon yet another deficiency in Mr. Shesol’s grasp of doctrine.  It is 
true that under some circumstances the Court had regarded em-
ployment relations as a local matter over which the states alone had 
jurisdiction.136  But the Court had made clear in numerous decisions 
that there were circumstances under which such relations fell under 
congressional jurisdiction.  In several cases the justices had held that 
industrial disputes might be reached under the Sherman Act where 
there was proof of intent to restrain interstate commerce.137  And in 
the domain of interstate transportation, the Court had upheld the 
federal Hours of Service Act;138 the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 
which abrogated employers’ common law tort defenses;139 the Federal 
 
134 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 397–98 (1937). 
135 See CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT, supra note 26, at 81–83. 
136 Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103, 107 (1933); United Leather Workers 
Int’l Union v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co., 265 U.S. 457 (1924); United Mine Workers v. 
Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). 
137 Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Stone Cutters’ Ass’n, 274 U.S. 37 (1927); Coronado Coal Co. v. 
United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295 (1925); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 
U.S. 443 (1921); Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908). 
138 Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 221 U.S. 612 (1911). 
139 Second Employers’ Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (1912). 
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Safety Appliance Act;140 and the Adamson Act, which regulated both 
wages and hours of railroad employees during World War I.141  In 
1930, the justices unanimously upheld the self-organization provi-
sions of the Railway Labor Act of 1926 as applied to railway clerks.142  
Seven years later another unanimous bench would uphold the collec-
tive bargaining provisions of the 1934 amendments to the Act and 
their application to back-shop employees.143 
In view of these many well-established precedents, it is simply ex-
traordinary for Mr. Shesol to claim that Roberts’ 1935 opinion invali-
dating the Railway Pension Act of 1934 “had not only questioned but 
ridiculed the idea that labor relations had anything to do with inter-
state commerce.”  (p. 432).  His opinion in Alton did nothing of the 
sort.  The majority’s view was not that “labor relations” had nothing 
to do with interstate commerce, but instead that the relationship be-
tween interstate commerce and a specific type of labor regulation—
retirement pensions for workers—was too attenuated to support fed-
eral regulation.  What makes this extravagant accusation all the more 
astonishing is the fact that Mr. Shesol implicitly concedes its inaccu-
racy a mere two pages earlier.  The Court’s unanimous opinion up-
holding the application of the NLRA to an interstate bus company, 
he writes, could not be considered a “breakthrough,” “since interstate 
bus companies were in the business of carrying people across state 
lines . . . .” (pp. 429–30). 
The fact that this decision upholding the NLRA was regarded as 
unsurprising underscores the exaggerated nature of Mr. Shesol’s 
claim that “almost no one believed the act was constitutional.”  (p. 
421).  It would be more accurate to say that many harbored doubts 
concerning the constitutionality of certain of its potential applica-
tions.144  Chief among these were labor disputes at manufacturing es-
 
140 S. Ry. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911). 
141 Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332 (1917). 
142 Tex. & New Orleans R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930) (McReyn-
olds did not participate). 
143 Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed’n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937). 
144 Consider, for example, the comparative margins by which the NLRA and the Guffey Coal 
Act were passed in Congress.  The NLRA passed the Senate by a vote of 63-12.  79 CONG. 
REC. 7681, at 2415 (1935).  It was passed in the House by a voice vote.  79 CONG. REC. 
9731, at 3228 (1935).  By contrast, the Guffey Coal Act, which Homer Cummings had told 
FDR was “clearly unconstitutional,”  SHESOL, supra note 26, at 153, had been pried out of 
Committee only by the extraordinary intervention of the president, who urged the mem-
bers not to “permit doubts as to constitutionality, however reasonable, to block the sug-
gested legislation.”  Franklin D. Roosevelt to Samuel B. Hill, July 5, 1935, reprinted in 79 
CONG. REC. 13449 (1935).  Because of such constitutional doubts, the Guffey Coal Act was 
passed in the Senate by the much narrower margin of 45-37.  79 CONG. REC. 14084 
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tablishments.  With this concern in mind, as Mr. Shesol reports, the 
Act’s “Findings and Policy” maintained that labor disputes “burden-
ing or obstructing” the free flow of commerce145 might be “part of a 
current of commerce that stretched, unbroken, across the nation.”  
In such cases “strikes and other standoffs over wages, hours, pensions, 
and working conditions” could have “a direct effect on interstate 
commerce.  When workers walked out or sat down, plants were shut-
tered; when plants were shuttered, goods could not flow.”  (p. 422).  
In accordance with this legal theory, “the lawyers of the Labor Board 
developed a master plan for testing the Wagner Act’s constitutionali-
ty.  They scoured the dockets of appellate courts across the country 
for labor cases that combined the most abusive practices, the most 
sympathetic victims, and the most auspicious set of legal issues.  The 
government’s lawyers carefully selected cases concerning large com-
panies and small ones, major industries and lesser ones, businesses 
that manufactured goods, and businesses that provided services—all 
with direct bearing (the board’s lawyers believed) on interstate com-
merce.”  (p. 423). 
Those charged with administering the statute and defending it in 
Court certainly shared Senator Wagner’s faith in its constitutionali-
ty.146  Charles Fahy, general counsel to the National Labor Relations 
Board, felt that his job in preparing test cases for the Wagner Act “was 
immeasurably assisted by the careful draftsmanship of this beautifully 
drafted statute.”  Despite the Court’s recent decision in Carter Coal, he 
was confident that the NLRA would survive constitutional challenge 
before the Court.147  Fahy maintained that “the Wagner Act should 
have been sustained on the basis of precedents,” and was “not in-
clined to attribute the fact that it was sustained to anything but that it 
was believed to be constitutional.”  “In fact,” he confessed, “I thought 
 
(1935).  It passed in the House by a vote of 194-68.  79 CONG. REC. 13666–67 (1935). In 
the Senate, twenty-four Democrats joined twelve Democrats and one Farmer-Laborite in 
voting against the Guffey bill; in the House, ninety-three Democrats joined seventy-three 
Republicans and two Progressives in opposition.  See Thomas C. Longin, Coal, Congress, 
and the Courts:  The Bituminous Coal Industry and the New Deal, 35 WEST VIRGINIA HIST. 101, 
110–111 (1974).  For more detail, see, e.g.,  CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL 
COURT, supra note 26, at 159–61 (describing the origins of the Guffey Coal Act and the 
results of the final vote). 
145 H.R. REP. NO. 1147 (1935), reprinted in UNITED STATES NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS 
BOARD, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935, at 3032–33, 
3035 (1985). 
146 See IRONS, supra note 48, at 231–32 (outlining the due process and commerce clause ar-
guments that Senator Wagner used to argue that the Act was constitutional). 
147 Id. at 252–53 (quoting from author interview with Charles Fahy, June 22, 1978). 
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it might be sustained by a vote other than Roberts’.”148  Fahy was utter-
ly confident that Hughes and Roberts would vote to uphold the Act, 
and “encouraged his staff to prepare their arguments on the assump-
tion that an unfavorable decision in Carter would not invalidate the 
Wagner Act . . . .”149 
After Carter was handed down, NLRB Chairman Warren Madden 
similarly exuded confidence.  Madden insisted that “‘It is obvious that 
decisions which relate to work on a commodity before the commodity 
has begun to move on an interstate journey, or after it has reached 
the end of an interstate journey, do not justify a prediction that the 
court will apply the same rule to work on a commodity which is at a 
mid-point in a long interstate journey.’”  The Court’s stream of com-
merce precedents established that “local” activities, such as those tak-
ing place in the Chicago stockyards, were subject to federal control if 
they were located in a current of interstate commerce.  Those prece-
dents made it “obvious,” Madden asserted, that the Wagner Act could 
be applied to “employees in the Chicago stockyards” and to “the 
workers in a great meatpacking plant.”  The same was true of other 
manufacturing concerns located in a current of interstate commerce.  
“The same reasoning applies to the employees in a great steel mill or 
to a truck factory to which materials are sent from other states to be 
assembled and shipped on again,” Madden concluded.  “The Consti-
tution and the state give the Labor Board jurisdiction over these situ-
ations. . . .”150 
In contrast to the level of detail in which he covers some of the 
political history of the Court-packing plan, Mr. Shesol’s discussion of 
the doctrinal issues facing the government lawyers defending the 
Wagner Act is rather terse and perfunctory—as if it were a discussion 
almost not worth having. He observes that:  “According to commerce 
clause doctrine . . . some activities had an immediate, direct, or prox-
imate effect on interstate commerce; others, arguably, did not.”  (p. 
422).  “Some companies were located amid the ‘current’ of com-
merce, others at its beginning or end.”  “Some industries were ‘af-
fected with a public interest,’ others were not.”  (p. 422).  What Mr. 
Shesol does not seem to understand is that the category of “business 
affected with a public interest” was actually a due process concept ra-
ther than a Commerce Clause concept.  That concept would play an 
important role in determining whether the statute’s collective bar-
 
148 CHARLES LEONARD, A SEARCH FOR A JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY:  MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS AND THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION OF 1937, at 109–10 (1971). 
149 IRONS, supra note 48, at 252–53, 268. 
150 3 U.S. L. WEEK 1041, 1041–42 (1936). 
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gaining provisions could survive a due process challenge.151  Moreo-
ver, this due process concept played an important role in the current 
of commerce doctrine, under which the Court had held that the only 
local businesses that could be located in a stream of interstate com-
merce and thereby affect that commerce directly were businesses af-
fected with a public interest.152  But Mr. Shesol does not appear to 
understand this relationship.  Instead, he concludes this brief discus-
sion with the vague assertion that “[a]ll these considerations would 
have some bearing on the Supreme Court’s verdict on the Wagner 
Act.”  (p. 422).  One is left with the impression that this complicated, 
“inexact and inconsistent” body of legal doctrine would have “some 
bearing” on the Court’s decision; but what kind of bearing that might 
be, and the extent of its influence, are left unstated and unexplored.  
Yet even the suggestion that these niceties of constitutional doctrine 
might have anything to do with the Court’s disposition again rests 
uneasily next to Mr. Shesol’s earlier intimations that the justices were 
motivated by ideology and class interests and unconstrained by legal 
ideas. 
Mr. Shesol argues that on the journey to joining the majority in 
the Labor Board decisions, Hughes and Roberts “had traveled differ-
ent roads, and Roberts had the more difficult passage.  Hughes had 
taken an expansive view of the commerce power for many years,” da-
ting back to his decision in the Shreveport Rate Case153 upholding feder-
al regulation of intrastate rates for rail carriage during his term as an 
Associate Justice.  (p. 431).  “His concurrence in Carter twenty years 
later was an aberration, born less of conviction than a desire to avoid 
the embarrassment of another 5-4 split.”  (p. 432).  With his “return 
to form” in the Labor Board Cases, Mr. Shesol suggests, Hughes was 
atoning for his “failure to stand up to the conservatives in Carter . . . .” 
“Roberts, by contrast, had tended to take an orthodox view of the 
commerce power.  He had signed the majority opinion in Carter” and, 
as mentioned previously, in Alton “had not only questioned but ridi-
culed the idea that labor relations had anything to do with interstate 
commerce.”  (p. 432). 
 
151 See CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT, supra note 26, at 109–38 (detailing how 
the due process concept of a business affected with a public interest shaped the analysis 
of various labor laws). 
152 Id. at 141–55 (discussing the evolving current of commerce doctrine in connection with 
business affected with the public interest). 
153 234 U.S. 342 (1914) (upholding regulation of intrastate railroad rates under the federal 
government’s commerce power). 
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The last of these charges we have disposed of earlier.  But there 
are many other critical things to be said about this set of claims.  First, 
so far as I am aware, there is absolutely no evidence that Hughes con-
curred in Carter not out of conviction but in order to avoid the em-
barrassment of a 5-4 split.  The sources to which Mr. Shesol cites do 
not support the claim, which appears to be sheer speculation asserted 
as fact.  Second, if the Chief Justice was trying to avoid a 5-4 split, he 
failed to do so:  the Court did in fact split 5-4 on the issue of whether 
the price regulation provisions of the statute were severable from the 
labor regulation provisions.  This division led Hughes, Brandeis, 
Stone, and Cardozo to affirm the constitutionality of the price regula-
tion provisions—something the majority declined to do on the 
grounds that the price regulations were inseverable from the offend-
ing labor regulations and therefore must fall along with them.  In this 
respect Hughes did “stand up to the conservatives in Carter.”  (p. 
432). 
Third, with respect to the issue presented in the Labor Board Cas-
es—whether congressional power under the Commerce Clause 
reached labor relations in activities of production—Hughes reached 
the same conclusion in Carter as had the majority.  Hughes differed 
with the majority over the severability of the price regulation provi-
sions, but not over the constitutionality of the labor regulation provi-
sions.  He stated categorically:  “I agree . . . that production—in this 
case mining—which precedes commerce, is not itself commerce; and 
that the power to regulate commerce among the several States is not 
a power to regulate industry within the State.”154  He went on to add 
that a particular provision of the labor title of the Guffey Act was inva-
lid not only on nondelegation and due process grounds, but also be-
cause it “goes beyond any proper measure of protection of interstate 
commerce and attempts a broad regulation of industry within the 
State.”155  “Congress may not use this protective authority as a pretext 
for the exertion of power to regulate activities and relations within 
the States which affect interstate commerce only indirectly,” Hughes 
insisted.  “Otherwise, in view of the multitude of indirect effects, 
Congress in its discretion could assume control of virtually all the ac-
tivities of the people to the subversion of the fundamental principle 
of the Constitution.”156  In short, Hughes’s position on the Commerce 
Clause issue was no less orthodox than that of Roberts.  The fact that 
 
154 Carter v. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. 238, 317 (1936) (Hughes, C.J., separate opinion). 
155 Id. at 318–19. 
156 Id. at 317–18. 
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Roberts joined the majority opinion and Hughes concurred does not 
differentiate their positions on that issue. 
Fourth, the difference of opinion between Hughes and Roberts 
on the Commerce Clause issue in Alton was irrelevant to the issue 
presented in the Labor Board Cases.  All of the justices agreed that the 
employment relations of interstate railroads could be regulated by 
Congress in some respects, including the protection of self-
organization and the requirement of collective bargaining.  This 
much the Railway Labor Act cases, the Federal Hours of Service Act 
cases, the Federal Employers’ Liability Act cases, and the Federal 
Safety Appliance Act cases made clear.  The question in Alton was 
whether the Commerce Clause authorized Congress to mandate the 
creation of an employer-funded pension system for workers who were 
admitted by all to be engaged in interstate commerce.  The question 
in the Labor Board Cases, by contrast, was whether the effects of the ac-
tivities of employees engaged in manufacturing could support con-
gressional jurisdiction.  The Labor Board Cases concerned the depth of 
the commerce power’s penetration into areas of conventional state 
authority, such as production; Alton concerned the scope of that 
power’s lateral reach with respect to employees admittedly engaged 
in interstate commerce. 
The irrelevance of Alton to the disposition of the commerce power 
issue in the Labor Board Cases becomes apparent when one investi-
gates the manner in which the precedent was treated in that litiga-
tion.  The Jones & Laughlin Corporation did tersely invoke Alton in 
its brief,157 but everyone else treated the case as inapposite.  The brief 
for the NLRB felt no need to engage it;158 the lower federal court de-
cisions invalidating the application of the Act to the various manufac-
turing concerns did not invoke it;159 Chief Justice Hughes felt no need 
 
157 See 33 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:  
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 333, 354, 371, 385, 414 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 
1975) (providing examples of how the Jones & Laughlin Court cited Alton in its brief; for 
instance, at 333 as the last case in string-cite; at 354 and 371 as “see also” cites; at 385, re-
iterating point made at 354; and at 414 within a due process argument). 
158 There was only one inconsequential citation of Alton in the NLRB’s brief.  See id. at 250 
(“The comment of the Court in Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330, is 
apt here (p. 373):  ‘The meaning of the commerce and due process clauses of the Consti-
tution is not so easily enlarged by the voluntary acts of individuals or corporations.’”). 
The brief did not treat it as a precedent the Government needed to distinguish. 
159 See the reproduction of the circuit court opinions in Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & 
Laughlin Steel Corp, 301 U.S. 1, 79–84 (1937) (McReynolds, J., dissenting) (describing in 
detail three lower court cases without mentioning Alton). 
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to grapple with it in his majority opinion;160 and the Four Horsemen 
in dissent did not so much as mention it.161  This strongly suggests 
that the Government lawyers arguing the cases, and the judges and 
justices adjudicating them, did not view the Commerce Clause hold-
ing in Alton as having any bearing on the issues raised in the Labor 
Board Cases. 
With respect to the Commerce Clause issue presented in the Labor 
Board Cases—whether the Commerce Clause empowered Congress to 
regulate the labor relations of employers engaged in production—
the records of Hughes and Roberts revealed no meaningful differ-
ences.  Roberts had joined Hughes’s majority opinion in Schechter.  As 
mentioned previously, they had reached the same conclusions in 
Carter Coal with respect to the power of Congress to regulate labor re-
lations at the mine.  In 1933 both Hughes and Roberts had joined 
Sutherland’s opinion holding that, because the effect on interstate 
commerce of a union’s attempt to secure a closed shop through a 
strike and boycott of a structural steel manufacturer was “indirect,” it 
was beyond the reach of the commerce power under the Sherman 
Act.162  With respect to the question of federal power to regulate pro-
duction, Hughes had joined Roberts’s opinion in Butler restricting 
the power of Congress to do so through conditional spending.  In-
deed, Justice Stone reported that when Hughes presented the Butler 
case to the conference, he denounced the AAA as “a regulation of ag-
riculture within the states and an invasion of the reserved powers of 
the states.”163  In the month preceding Butler Hughes had joined Rob-
erts’ opinion invalidating a regulatory federal excise tax on liquor 
dealers on the ground that it constituted “a clear invasion of the po-
lice power, inherent in the States . . . .”164  So far as I am aware, there 
was not a single case in which Hughes and Roberts had reached di-
vergent conclusions on the power of the federal government to regu-
late local activities of production under the Commerce Clause. 
It is true that as an Associate Justice, Hughes had written in the 
Minnesota Rate Cases that “the execution by Congress of its constitu-
 
160 See id. at 30–43 (citing and discussing many contemporary commerce clause cases but not 
mentioning Alton). 
161 See id. at 76–103 (McReynolds, J., dissenting) (neglecting to mention Alton even in dis-
senting opinion). 
162 Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103, 107 (1933) (“If thereby the shipment 
of steel in interstate commerce was curtailed, that result was incidental, indirect and re-
mote, and, therefore, not within the anti-trust acts . . . .”). 
163 Memorandum Re: n. 401, United States v. Butler (Feb. 4, 1936) (Harlan Fiske Stone MSS, 
Box 62, on file with Manuscript Division, Library of Congress). 
164 United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 295 (1935). 
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tional power to regulate interstate commerce is not limited by the 
fact that intrastate transactions may have become so interwoven 
therewith that the effective government of the former incidentally 
controls the latter,”165 and that this premise formed the basis of his 
opinion in the Shreveport Rate Cases holding that Congress could regu-
late the intrastate rates charged by interstate rail carriers where it was 
necessary to prevent discrimination against interstate commerce.  But 
one must exercise care in attributing too much significance to these 
statements and decisions.  For a short time before Hughes wrote the-
se opinions, he joined a unanimous decision in which it was stated 
that Congress may protect interstate commerce “no matter what may 
be the source of the dangers which threaten it.”166  The author of that 
opinion upholding the Federal Safety Appliance Act was Willis Van 
Devanter, whose views of the commerce power were quite orthodox.  
In fact, Van Devanter joined Hughes’s opinions in both the Minnesota 
Rate Cases and in Shreveport.  So did Justice Day, who four years later 
would write the majority opinion in Hammer v. Dagenhart.167  The ma-
jor opinions applying and extending the Shreveport doctrine168 were 
typically unanimous,169 and indeed Justices Sutherland and Van De-
vanter each authored one of them.170  And Justice Roberts apparently 
felt no difficulty in joining opinions applying the Shreveport doc-
 
165 Simpson v. Shepard (Minnesota Rate Cases), 230 U.S. 352, 399 (1913). 
166 S. Ry. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20, 27 (1911). 
167 247 U.S. 251 (1918). 
168 See Florida v. United States, 292 U.S. 1, 12 (1934) (citing Shreveport for the proposition 
that Congress has the power to require that intrastate rates may not be used to hinder in-
terstate commerce); United States v. Louisiana, 290 U.S. 70, 74 (1933) (applying the 
Shreveport rule that Congress has the power to protect interstate shippers from discrimina-
tory intrastate rates); Colorado v. United States, 271 U.S. 153, 164 (1926) (“The jurisdic-
tion exercised by the Commission in these cases is in essence that which was invoked in 
The Shreveport Case, 234 U.S. 342, a power to prevent unjust preference to particular intra-
state shippers or localities at the demonstrated expense of interstate commerce.”); Day-
ton-Goose Creek Ry. Co. v. United States, 263 U.S. 456, 485 (1924) (citing Shreveport for 
the proposition that federal control of intrastate commerce is appropriate when neces-
sary for the maintenance of adequate interstate commerce); R.R. Comm’n of Chicago v. 
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R., Co. 257 U.S. 563 (1922) (applying generally the 
Shreveport discrimination rule). 
169 At least the opinions were unanimous as to the constitutional issue.  See United States v. 
Village of Hubbard, 266 U.S. 474, 480–81 (1925) (McReynolds, J., dissenting) (writing 
separately to call the Court to address the limits of the Interstate Commerce Act).  In 
American Express Co. v. South Dakota ex rel. Caldwell, 244 U.S. 617, 629 (1917), Justice 
McKenna dissented without opinion.  McKenna had joined the majority in Shreveport, so it 
is unlikely that his dissent was based on the Commerce Clause issue. 
170 See Alabama v. United States, 279 U.S. 229, 230 (1929); Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. State Pub. 
Utils. Comm’n, 245 U.S. 493, 502 (1918). 
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trine.171  Perhaps this may be attributed to the fact that the Shreveport 
doctrine was widely understood to be confined to the domain of rail 
transportation.  No federal court relied on the Shreveport doctrine to 
support federal regulatory power outside the railroad context until 
1934, and the Supreme Court did not do so until 1937.172  A quick re-
view of the United States Reports similarly discloses no reliance on the 
precedent by counsel in the major commerce power cases decided in 
the two decades following its announcement.173  When Justice 
Cardozo wrote in his Carter Coal dissent that federal regulation of the 
price at which coal was sold in intrastate commerce could be upheld 
“[w]ithin rulings the most orthodox,” he relied upon the Shreveport 
Case and its progeny as the authority for this assertion.174  There was 
nothing “unorthodox” about Hughes’s Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence. 
In short, there appears to be no warrant for Mr. Shesol’s claim 
that the Labor Board Cases marked a “return to form” for Hughes, but 
not for Roberts.  Insofar as the questions of federal power raised in 
those cases were concerned, the antecedent views of the two Justices 
were substantially identical.  Yet Mr. Shesol contends that “[t]he same 
pressures—doctrinal, political, personal” (we are left to guess about 
the comparative significance of each of these)—“that had nudged 
Roberts into the liberal camp”—note again the language of attitudi-
nalism—“on the minimum wage had also, it now appeared, changed 
his mind about the commerce clause.”  (p. 432).  Yet there is an im-
portant difference in Mr. Shesol’s analysis of the role played by these 
pressures in Parrish and the Labor Board Cases, respectively.  With re-
 
171 See, e.g., Florida, 292 U.S. at 12 (citing Shreveport for the proposition that Congress may 
require that intrastate agencies to operate in a way that does not cripple interstate com-
merce); Louisiana, 290 U.S. at 70 (applying the Shreveport rule that the federal govern-
ment can prohibit intrastate economic practices that are prejudicial to interstate com-
merce). 
172 Cushman, supra note 79, at 1130–31 (2000) (“For if you Shepardize Shreveport, you will 
find that every case following it from its announcement in 1914 up to the mid-1930s in-
volved regulation of a business affected with a public interest:  railroads.”). 
173 For examples of major commerce power cases that do not cite Shreveport, see, e.g., United 
Leather Workers Int’l Union v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co., 265 U.S. 457, 458–61 (1924).  See 
also United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 350–81 (1922); Stafford v. 
Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 503–12 (1922).  Shreveport was invoked at argument in Bd. of Trade 
of the City of Chicago v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1, 16–31 (1923), but by the party arguing that the 
Grain Futures Act was unconstitutional.  Id. at 24.  It was not referred to in the decision 
upholding the Act. 
174 Carter v. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. 238, 328–29 (1936) (Cardozo, J., dissenting) (citing 
Shreveport for the proposition that Congress has the power to protect the business of inter-
state rail carriers when local rates are so low that they divert business from interstate 
competitors). 
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spect to Parrish, recall that Mr. Shesol merely argues that such pres-
sures prompted Hughes and Roberts to face the constitutional issue 
squarely and to express their actual views on the merits.  In that case, 
Mr. Shesol was not prepared to “suggest that either justice changed 
his basic beliefs in the face of events.”  (p. 415).  In the Labor Board 
Cases, by contrast, Mr. Shesol asserts that these pressures compelled 
Roberts—but not Hughes—to change his mind on a matter of doc-
trine.  But in view of the substantial identity of their views of the 
scope of federal power to regulate production, if the Labor Board Cas-
es marked a change of mind rather than a return to form for Roberts, 
then they did so for Hughes as well. 
It is my view that the Labor Board Cases marked a significant doc-
trinal departure for neither justice, and there were many contempo-
raries who took the same view.  Numerous commentators writing in 
the pages of the law journals perceived no significant discontinuity in 
Commerce Clause doctrine, and many lower federal court judges, 
both Democratic and Republican appointees, believed that Carter 
Coal remained good law.175  As Solicitor General Stanley Reed wrote to 
Homer Cummings:  “I do not see any clear inconsistency between 
Wagner on the one hand and the Guffey or N.R.A. decision on the 
other.  The Wagner decision is based on the right to remedy situa-
tions which obstruct or tend to obstruct interstate commerce.  The 
Guffey and the Poultry Code were aimed directly at wages, hours, and 
labor conditions.”176  These observers believed that the craftsmanlike 
labors of the draftsmen who prepared the statute and the efforts of 
the government lawyers who selected, cultivated, briefed, and argued 
the test cases had not been superfluous, but in fact had played a vital 
role in reconciling the Administration’s regulatory ambitions with the 
governing constitutional authorities.  Surely it is an overstatement to 
assert, as Mr. Shesol does, that the Labor Board Cases recognized “a 
federal government with all the authority it needed, unencumbered 
by the doctrine of state sovereignty” and “opened the door to a dra-
matic expansion of federal power.”  (p. 434).  As Hughes wrote in the 
Jones & Laughlin opinion:  “Undoubtedly the scope of this power 
must be considered in the light of our dual system of government 
and may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate 
commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace them, in view of 
 
175 See CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT, supra note 26, at 177–80 (recounting 
the political and academic reaction to the Labor Board Cases). 
176 Stanley Reed, Memorandum for the Attorney General, April 22, 1937, National Archives, 
Washington, D.C., Dept. of Justice 114-115-2, quoted in LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 33, at 
318–19. 
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our complex society, would effectually obliterate the distinction be-
tween what is national and what is local and create a completely cen-
tralized government.  The question is necessarily one of degree.”177 
Mr. Shesol maintains that “virtually everyone on both sides of the 
fight believed:  that the Supreme Court, seeking to save itself from 
being packed, had simply surrendered.  The Court had bent so as not 
to break.”  (p. 434).  But this assessment of the doctrinal significance 
of the opinions and their intended effect on the Court-packing plan 
is belied by the Administration’s own reactions to the decisions.  In-
deed, part of the reason that Roosevelt continued to resist compro-
mise on the Court-packing bill even after the decisions in the Labor 
Board Cases was that he, unlike Mr. Shesol, did not see the Court’s de-
cisions as dramatically expanding the scope of congressional power 
under the Commerce Clause.  As Mr. Shesol himself reports: 
Analyses by Justice Department lawyers concluded that “the new defini-
tion of interstate commerce rests on a precarious foundation” and that 
the Court still “may not sustain any of” the wages and hours bill that Co-
hen and Corcoran were drafting.  Federal regulation of that nature 
might still be out of bounds.  The Jones & Laughlin decision, as some (in-
cluding Hughes) pointed out, was not wholly out of keeping with existing 
doctrine; it modified existing paradigms (the “direct-indirect” test; 
“stream of commerce” theory) rather than upending them.  And because 
the opinion had not overruled Carter or Schechter but merely dismissed 
them as “not controlling here,” they could still be cited as precedent. 
(p. 438). 
So, when asked by a reporter about the effect of the Wagner Act 
opinions on the Court bill, FDR replied that those decisions were lim-
ited to collective bargaining.  He said he had asked his advisers 
whether the decisions applied to child labor, or minimum wages, or 
maximum hours; their reply, he said, was ‘the Lord only knows!’”  (p. 
437).  And Mr. Shesol stresses that: 
Roosevelt’s skepticism was not just for show.  It reflected a consensus 
among his advisers that while the administration had reclaimed a bit of 
lost ground, two thirds of all workers—those in service jobs and in indus-
tries that were clearly intrastate in character—had nothing to gain from 
the decisions.  Also, as Robert Jackson recalled, Roosevelt and his aides 
felt that as great as the victory appeared, the justices were “now going to 
whittle it down by decision of individual cases until it won’t mean any-
thing.”  . . .  So Roosevelt saw no choice but to keep on fighting . . . .  
(p. 438). 
 
177 Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (internal 
citations omitted). 
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This leaves one wondering why, if the Court “had simply surren-
dered” in the Labor Board Cases, it did not do so clearly enough to 
achieve the putative objective of getting the Administration off of its 
back.  If the aim was to assure New Dealers that the Court had capitu-
lated to their constitutional vision, one wonders, then why did 
Hughes write an opinion leaving so many of them doubtful that the 
Court had in fact done so? 
Mr. Shesol is prepared to concede that the matter may have been 
more complicated.  “‘Actual experience,’” he recognizes, “—in the 
form of the sit-down strikes—may too have had an effect” on Roberts’ 
votes in the Labor Board Cases.  (p. 432).  This impresses me as the 
more plausible claim—with respect to both Roberts and Hughes—
but it must be analyzed with care.  First, as Melvyn Dubofsky has ob-
served, the scale of industrial unrest in 1937 was not historically sin-
gular.  “[O]nly 7.2 per cent of employed workers were involved in 
walkouts . . . and their absence from work represented only 0.0043 
per cent of all time worked.”178  These percentages were approximate-
ly the same as those experienced during the strike wave of 1934, 
which Commissioner of Labor Statistics Isadore Lubin had concluded 
“could not match 1919 in intensity, duration, or number of workers 
involved.”  Second, it appears that the United Auto Workers, who 
waged the largest and most serious set of sit-down strikes, did so be-
cause they doubted (quite reasonably, it appears) that they had suffi-
cient votes to win recognition elections under the provisions of the 
Wagner Act.179  It is therefore not clear that upholding the Act offered 
any meaningful prospect of ameliorating those particular labor dis-
turbances.  Moreover, the largest of those strikes—the one at the 
General Motors plant in Flint, Michigan—was actually settled on Feb-
ruary 11, 1937, the day that the Labor Board Cases were being argued, 
and more than two months before the Court rendered its decisions.180 
The “actual experience” of the sit-down strikes may, however, have 
persuaded the justices of the accuracy of the Government’s theory of 
the cases:  that a labor disturbance at a manufacturing plant could 
cause a blockage in a flow of interstate commerce, and that the fed-
 
178 Melvyn Dubofsky, Not So “‘Turbulent Years”’:  Another Look at the American 1930’s, 24 Ameri-
kastudien 5, 12–-13 (1979). 
179 See id. at 16 (“[T]he sit-down technique was chosen consciously to compensate for the 
union’s lack of a mass membership base.”); SIDNEY FINE, SIT-DOWN:  THE GENERAL 
MOTORS STRIKE OF 1936–1937, at 111, 118–19, 144, 181–82, 185–88, 255–56 (1969) (de-
scribing the history of the strike and the social and political forces that shaped it); J. 
WOODFORD HOWARD, JR., MR. JUSTICE MURPHY:  A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY 124–26, 137 
(1968) (“The UAW was then too weak to risk elections.”). 
180 FINE, supra note 179, at 303–12 (describing the settlement of the GM strike). 
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eral government was empowered to employ reasonable means to pre-
vent such blockages from occurring, and to dislodge them once they 
had formed.  In the peroration of his argument before the Court, 
Labor Department solicitor Charles Wyzanski alluded to the sit-down 
strikes in Michigan immediately before concluding that:  “where two 
colossal forces are standing astride the stream of commerce threaten-
ing to disrupt it, it cannot be that this Government is without power 
to provide for the orderly procedure by which the dispute may be ad-
justed without interruption to the stream of commerce.”181  Here we 
see an instance in which emphasis on the significance of an external 
factor—a social fact that was not part of the formal record before the 
Court—if properly understood, is congruent with an internal ac-
count. 
III.  THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL STORIES 
Mr. Shesol’s final analysis of the relationship between the political 
story and the legal story reproduces the tensions manifest in his rela-
tion of the legal story.  Here again, internal and external factors lie 
together uneasily.  To his credit, he recognizes that the constitutional 
revolution that culminated in the affirmation of the New Deal order 
was spread out over a longer period of time than the familiar refer-
ence to the “Constitutional Revolution of 1937” would suggest.  He 
rejects Edward Corwin’s assertion that American constitutional law 
 
181 Arguments in Cases Arising Under Labor Acts Before the Supreme Court, Sen. Doc. 52 
(75-1), 173–74 (1935).  Mr. Shesol makes fewer mistakes in his briefer discussion of the 
Social Security Cases, though he does make the occasional curious claim.  For instance, he 
notes that Cardozo voted in conference with Stone, Brandeis, and Roberts “to dismiss the 
challenge to the pensions provision on the grounds that the plaintiff lacked standing to 
sue.  Hughes, however, had insisted on hearing the case, possibly with an eye to ending 
the term emphatically with another landmark liberal decision.”  Why Brandeis, Stone, 
and Cardozo would have been opposed to ending the term in this manner is not clear.  
Mr. Shesol adds that at the conference Hughes “joined the four conservatives (whose mo-
tives, surely, were different than his) in voting to consider the act on the merits.”  SHESOL, 
supra note 2, at 435.  The inference to be drawn here is that the conservatives voted to 
decide the case on the merits because they wanted to invalidate those provisions of the 
statute.  This might make sense had the vote on the merits been 5-4 in favor of upholding 
the statute.  But the tally was 7-2.  Van Devanter and Sutherland voted with Hughes in the 
majority.  Mr. Shesol also maintains that Cardozo “did affirm the portion of the AAA rul-
ing that concerned the general welfare clause, but effectively reversed the part that con-
strained the taxing and spending power.”  Id. at 454.  Mr. Shesol does not explain this 
claim, so it is not clear on what he bases it.  But it is worth pointing out that justices such 
as Hughes, Roberts, Van Devanter, and Sutherland may very well have thought that there 
was an important distinction to be drawn between using the fiscal powers to regulate ag-
ricultural production in the states and using those powers to finance retirement pensions 
and unemployment benefits. 
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had never undergone a revolution “‘so radical, so swift, so altogether 
dramatic’ as the one the Supreme Court completed during those few 
months of 1937” as “premature—but only slightly.”  (p. 519).  “Just as 
the revolution took some time to set in motion—the first shots, with 
hindsight, appear to have been cases like Nebbia and Blaisdell (both in 
1934), or even their antecedents,” he observes, “it took some time to 
complete.” (p. 519).  Perhaps thinking of such Commerce Clause 
landmarks as United States v. Darby (1941) and Wickard v. Filburn 
(1942), Mr. Shesol agrees that “several years would pass before Jones 
& Laughlin and other liberal triumphs had the ring of finality.”  (p. 
519). 
Mr. Shesol also recognizes the importance of transformative Court 
appointments to the advancement and consolidation of the constitu-
tional revolution.  “It is unlikely,” he writes, “that the transformation 
in the Court’s outlook would have been either sweeping or enduring 
without a concurrent transformation in its personnel.”  (p. 519).  Mr. 
Shesol continues: 
By 1942, Roosevelt—who had completed his entire first term as president 
without naming a single justice—had appointed all the justices of the Su-
preme Court but two:  Stone, whom FDR elevated to chief justice when 
Hughes retired in 1941, and Roberts.  This new Court, which included 
Felix Frankfurter and Robert Jackson, effectively settled the argument 
that had dominated Roosevelt’s first term as well as the preceding three 
decades—the judicial and political debate over the constitutionality of 
economic reform.  Congressional power to regulate commerce, the ma-
jority now ruled, was virtually without limit.  The increasingly nebulous 
distinction between “direct” and “indirect” commerce [effects] was finally 
discarded. 
(pp. 519–20). 
Mr. Shesol further reports that “[d]ecisions grounded in . . . the 
due process clause [and] the contracts clause”—which he persists in 
characterizing as “the unloved doctrinal legacies of laissez-faire”—
“were overturned in short succession, leaving no major area of consti-
tutional law unaltered.182  The Court, at long last, had reconciled itself 
to the twentieth century.”  (p. 520). 
Roosevelt thought that this process had taken “too long,” but Mr. 
Shesol quite judiciously sees some value in gradual, deliberate 
change.  He finds appealing “another way of looking at the lag be-
tween his signing of New Deal laws and the Court’s endorsement of 
them.  ‘In a democracy,’” [Roosevelt’s] former aide Stanley High 
wrote, “‘people have time to catch their breath.’  And the Constitu-
 
182 For an exploration of potential limits on the commerce power that lingered into the early 
1940s, see CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT, supra note 26, at 212–19. 
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tion, as James Bryce observed years earlier, ‘secures time for delibera-
tion.  It forces the people to think seriously before they alter it or 
pardon a transgression of it.’”  So 
whatever the motives of Roosevelt’s critics, it must be acknowledged that 
they provoked a debate about the constitutional principles of the New 
Deal—a debate that arguably needed to take place and that the congres-
sional opposition was too enfeebled to lead.  The belief in strict limita-
tions of governmental power, having held sway in courtrooms for dec-
ades, deserved to be heard one more time by the bench, the public, and 
the president himself.  Not to be heeded, necessarily, but at least to be 
heard.  Beginning with the first New Deal cases, the Court required FDR 
to answer a serious and sustained constitutional critique.  In the end, his 
position prevailed; and his reforms, most people agreed, stood on more 
solid ground.  
(pp. 520–21).  
As Hughes declared before a joint session of Congress in January 
of 1939:  “‘If our checks and balances sometimes prevent the speedy 
action which is thought desirable . . . they also assure in the long run 
a more deliberate judgment.  And what the people really want they 
generally get.’”  (p. 528). 
Yet even here Mr. Shesol reverts to characterizing Hughes and 
Roberts as the moving parts in the story.  Roosevelt’s transformative 
appointments were necessary, Mr. Shesol explains, because “Hughes 
and Roberts soon parted company with the Court’s true liberals, 
though not in every case and not quite to the degree that Roosevelt 
had feared.  After 1937, the two swing justices were more inclined 
than before to sustain economic regulations but were less deferential 
toward the other branches than their newer brethren were.”  (p. 519)  
The suggestion again is that Hughes and Roberts became more liber-
al in 1937, then became more conservative thereafter, though not as 
conservative as they had been in 1935 and 1936.  Left unexplored is 
the possibility that they voted more frequently (though not invaria-
bly) to uphold economic regulations in 1937 and thereafter because 
the statutes that came before the Court in those years in their view 
typically rested on a surer constitutional foundation—owing in no 
small part to the lessons that legislative draftsmen and government 
lawyers had learned from the legal failures of the early New Deal.183 
Indeed, Mr. Shesol’s final analysis of the crisis strongly reasserts 
the language of movement that has suffused his account, and his ver-
dict on the justices in motion is not altogether kind.  He regards it as 
“an abiding irony that so much of this constitutional revolu-
 
183 See id. at 182–207; Cushman, supra note 51 (explaining how congressional draftsmen re-
worked legislation to respond to the constitutional concerns of Supreme Court justices). 
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tion . . . occurred during the tenure of Charles Evans Hughes,” the 
Man on the Flying Trapeze.  (p. 521).  As New York’s governor, 
Hughes “had been known as a reformer, but never a revolutionary.”  
Hughes “placed his faith” in “rational, gradual process, the slow un-
folding and maturing of ideas.”  (p. 521).  “Through the 1935–36 
term this left him uncomfortably—and untenably—caught between 
the Court’s two camps.”  “At the height of the constitutional crisis,” 
Mr. Shesol reports in what he regards as a telling episode, “a dance 
company performed an interpretation of the Supreme Court.  The 
three liberals danced on one side, the five conservatives (including 
Roberts) on the other, and Hughes flitted back and forth between 
them.  This once godlike man had become a tragic, or tragicomic, 
figure.”  (p. 521).  In 1936, Pearson and Allen charged that Hughes 
“became a weak-kneed oscillator between the two wings of the Court, 
until he fell, discredited and exhausted, in the middle.”184  Appropri-
ating their vocabulary, Mr. Shesol asserts that “like Roberts, Hughes 
swung back and forth as if he believed that the mere fact of his oscil-
lation, his refusal to alight for long in either camp, established some 
kind of balance.”  (p. 521).  But if this was his strategy, Mr. Shesol 
concludes, it did not succeed.  “If a middle ground existed on that 
bitterly divided Court, the Chief Justice never found it.”  (p. 521).  In-
stead, as he writes of Tipaldo, while “Hughes still clung to the center, 
it was an illusion, a vacuum, a vanishing point.”185  (p. 220). 
Mr. Shesol insists that it was “unfair” for the Chief Justice’s critics 
to cast him as “King Canute, foolishly trying to reverse the tide.”  (p. 
521).  “Hughes was not trying to hold the law or the nation back; ra-
ther, he seemed to believe that he could advance the interpretation 
of the Constitution by minute degrees, by fine shadings, by cleverly 
distinguishing away precedents instead of boldly overruling them.”  
True, “the judicial process is most often an incremental one.”  (p. 
521).  But Hughes, we are told, wasn’t always mindful of what Mr. 
Shesol understands:  that “there are times when progress—in law and 
policy—must be made by bold strokes and clean breaks, if the gov-
ernment is not to fall dangerously out of step with social and eco-
nomic realities.  The 1930s was one of those times.”  (pp. 521–22). 
 
184 PEARSON & ALLEN, supra note 55, at 97. 
185 This rather sharp judgment is particularly curious in view of the fact that Brandeis, Stone, 
and Cardozo each explicitly joined Hughes’s Tipaldo dissent, 298 U.S. 587, 631 (1936), 
and that Stone began his separate dissent, which was joined by Brandeis and Cardozo, 
with the affirmation:  “I agree with all that the Chief Justice has said.”  Id.  When four jus-
tices of the caliber of Hughes, Brandeis, Stone, and Cardozo all have agreed with a par-
ticular legal conclusion, one might reflect long and hard before pronouncing it illusory 
or vacuous. 
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Mr. Shesol grants that:  “Whether the Chief Justice saw himself as 
responding to the dictates of the cases at hand, or was acting to save 
the Court or country” in 1937 “can never be known . . . .”  (p. 522).  
But he does not appear to take seriously the possibility that Hughes 
might have been voting his conscience in the cases that came before 
the Court all along, and that whether he ended up voting with the 
“liberals” or the “conservatives” turned on the particular issues pre-
sented in particular cases.  Instead he credits Hughes with having 
“‘the acumen to recognize the inevitable.’”  (p. 522).  He recognized 
that the Court could not continue to resist “‘the popular urge . . . for 
what in effect was a unified economy.’”  He came to this realization 
“too late to prevent some of the worst excesses of the 1935–36 term, 
but soon enough to undermine the Court bill and then to lead a 
steady, purposeful march toward a more flexible interpretation of the 
Constitution.”  (p. 522).  In the end, Hughes “kept faith” with the 
man he had been in 1910, when he had “advised a group of Yale stu-
dents that ‘whether you like it or not, the majority will rule. . . .  I be-
lieve you will come to put your trust, as I do, in the common sense of 
the people of this country, and in the verdicts they give.’”  (p. 522). 
But this portrayal of Hughes as a re-converted simple majoritarian 
cannot account for the fact that he continued in 1937 and thereafter 
to vote to invalidate economic regulations that he thought violated 
the Constitution.186  Nor can it explain his hesitation to uphold the 
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act regulating wages and 
hours of all employees engaged in “production for commerce” under 
the commerce power in United States v. Darby.187  To the end of his ju-
dicial career, Hughes continued to maintain that the Constitution 
placed significant limits on the power of the people’s democratically-
elected representatives in the domain of political economy. 
At the end of his account, Mr. Shesol frankly engages the debate 
between internalists and externalists, and he has some critical things 
 
186 See Thompson v. Consol. Gas Utils. Corp., 300 U.S. 55 (1937) (invalidating a gas prora-
tion order issued by the Rail Road Commission of Texas); Hartford Steam Boiler Inspec-
tion & Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 301 U.S. 459 (1937) (holding that an economic regulation 
that discriminated between mutual companies and stock companies violated the equal 
protection clause); R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573, 584–
85 (1940) (Roberts, J., McReynolds, J., and Hughes, C.J., dissenting) (disagreeing with 
opinion upholding a commission’s oil proration order); United States v. Rock-Royal Co-
op., 307 U.S. 533, 583–87 (1939) (Roberts, J., and Hughes, C.J., dissenting) (dissenting 
because the order in question deprived the appellees of their property without due pro-
cess of law in violation of the Fifth Amendment). 
187 See CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT, supra note 26, at 208–09 (“At the Darby 
conference, Hughes expressed substantial reservations about the power of Congress to 
regulate all ‘production for commerce.’”). 
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to say to each camp.  In the course of his discussion he reveals that he 
does not understand the debate very well, and he attributes to at least 
some of the participants anxieties about adjudication, and aspirations 
to resolve global questions about judicial behavior, that I do not be-
lieve they harbor.  In addition, he contradicts his own dominant his-
toriographical premises, and he fails to provide any useful framework 
for evaluating the questions of causation that have so engaged aca-
demic historians. 
Mr. Shesol notes that:  “Hughes objected violently to the idea that 
any decision of the period was ‘influenced in the slightest degree by 
the President’s attitude, or his proposal to reorganize the Court.’  
The claim, he insisted, was ‘utterly baseless.’”  (p. 523).  He correctly 
reports that, though many contemporaries subscribed to the switch-
in-time thesis, “[d]ecades later . . . a number of historians, legal 
scholars, and others would question the claim.  Some, like Chief Jus-
tice William Rehnquist, agreed that Roosevelt won the war, but be-
lieve that ‘he won it the way the Constitution envisions such wars be-
ing won—by the gradual process of changing the federal judiciary 
through the appointment process.’  Others place greater weight on 
the doctrinal changes that preceded the Court fight and doubt that 
the events of 1936 and 1937 had much (or anything) to do with the 
shift in doctrine.”  (pp. 522–23). 
Mr. Shesol maintains that this debate rests on “a false dichotomy.”  
This may be true, but if it is, it is certainly not the dichotomy that Mr. 
Shesol describes.  He poses the dichotomy as one between “the idea 
that the Court is either a purely legal institution or a political body,” 
between the claims “that justices are either impervious to social, polit-
ical, and cultural influences or utterly at their mercy.”188  The inter-
nalist position is, on this account, particularly laughable.  Such peo-
ple apparently believe that the Court is “a vacuum,” that the Court 
building “‘has a soundproof room.’”  They subscribe to “the myth of 
the Court as “a ‘vehicle of revealed truth’ (as one scholar put it, sar-
donically), incapable of doing that which the law and the facts did 
not require . . . .”  (p. 523). 
It is hard to know about which participants in the current debate 
Mr. Shesol is writing here—the sardonic quotation is from the title of 
 
188 Among the other “many unhelpful antitheses that prevailed at the time and persist to this 
day” that Mr. Shesol indicts in this passage are the ideas “that the framers’ intentions are 
either easily discernible or always ambiguous (or even irrelevant)” and “that legal doc-
trines are either preordained by the Constitution or are artificial constructs . . . .”  
SHESOL, supra note 2, at 523. 
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a book published by Alpheus Thomas Mason in 1953189—but the views 
outlined by Mr. Shesol do not correspond to those of any constitu-
tional historian of the period with whose work I am familiar.  These 
antitheses are built on a misunderstanding of the debate.  The partic-
ipants have not sought to determine what “the Court is” or how “jus-
tices are.”  They have been interested in understanding the best ex-
planation of certain events and their causes.  Various participants see 
various internal and external factors as having greater or lesser ex-
planatory power with respect to those events.  But so far as I am 
aware, no one takes the extreme positions with which Mr. Shesol 
takes issue.  It is no revelation that the “reality . . . is more complex” 
(p. 523) than the caricatured options Mr. Shesol has presented.  Eve-
ryone understands that. 
Mr. Shesol then goes on to assert that:  “At its core, this is not a 
debate about the timing of the transformation.  It is an argument 
about the nature of the judicial process, and what makes judges de-
cide as they do.”  (p. 523).  I won’t presume to speak for others, but I 
will hazard the assumption that I am not alone in thinking that the 
debate is in fact about the timing of and the reasons for the trans-
formation.  It is not about an attempt to understand the nature of the 
judicial process, nor about what makes judges decide as they do.  It is 
instead an effort to understand particular historical actions of partic-
ular historical actors, to achieve the best understanding of a discrete 
historical phenomenon, rather than to derive covering laws that 
might apply across person, place, and time.  I would consider it irre-
sponsible to infer from the resolution of that discrete issue any uni-
versal proposition about whether we live under the rule of law or the 
rule of men, and I assume that my colleagues on both sides of the 
debate generally would agree. 
Because he misunderstands the nature of the enterprise in which 
constitutional historians have been engaged, Mr. Shesol misdiagnoses 
the motivations of those who find the internalist account more per-
suasive.  “To acknowledge that external events play a role in decisions 
is frightening to many,” Mr. Shesol explains, “for it suggests that the 
judicial system is, in the end, not one of laws but of men—and thus 
vulnerable to the prejudices and whims and base instincts of men.”  
(p. 523).  This is a substantial sociological claim, and yet Mr. Shesol 
presents no evidence to support it.  Such a speculative claim to psy-
cho-historiographical insight reminds one of Justice Cardozo’s fa-
mous dissent in United States v. Constantine, where he ridiculed the 
 
189 MASON, supra note 58. 
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Court’s invalidation of a federal tax on liquor dealers.  Notwithstand-
ing the “professed” purpose of the statute to raise revenue, Cardozo 
observed, the majority held that another, illegitimate purpose “not 
professed, may be read beneath the surface,” and on the basis of that 
imputed purpose the statute was declared invalid.  “Thus,” Cardozo 
concluded, “the process of psychoanalysis has spread to unaccus-
tomed fields.”190 
In venturing his own recipe for analysis, Mr. Shesol makes some 
statements that many readers may find hard to take.  “Too often,” he 
tells us, “the Hughes Court’s internal conflict has been portrayed as 
one between liberal justices who were responsive to the national 
emergency and conservative justices who were indifferent to it.”  (p. 
524).191  This might be seen as a little much coming from someone 
who has argued that Sutherland and his fellow conservatives’ re-
sponse to the New Deal and their defense of “indifferent govern-
ment” was driven by a devotion to the “stern discipline” of a Spencer-
ian “severity” that would “exterminate” the “incapable,” the 
“imprudent,” the “idle,” and the “weak.”  (p. 69).  Mr. Shesol then 
tells us that:  “Like all judges, the Nine Old Men were imbued with an 
ethic of impartiality.”  (p. 523).  Again, this contention rests uneasily 
next to his earlier claims that the Four Horsemen were driven by a 
fanatical devotion to Social Darwinism and laissez-faire.  “They were 
constrained by precedent, procedure, doctrine”—how doctrine dif-
fers from precedent in Mr. Shesol’s view is not entirely clear—“and 
the particular cases in front of them, all of which limited their range 
of maneuver.”  (p. 523).  But  recall that much of Mr. Shesol’s ac-
count is written as if these internal legal factors did not in fact oper-
ate as meaningful constraints on judicial action, which was instead 
determined by extra-legal factors.  Moreover, if their “range of ma-
neuver” was limited by these internal legal factors, then how were the 
justices to make the “bold strokes and clean breaks” that Mr. Shesol 
calls for? 
Mr. Shesol asserts more plausibly—if uncontroversially—that the 
justices “were not merely judges; they were men—politically minded 
and socially aware men.  All, to varying degrees, were attuned to 
 
190 United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 298–99 (1935) (Cardozo, J., dissenting). 
191 See SHESOL, supra note 2, at 524 (“In truth, both sides responded to the emergency as they 
themselves defined it:  the liberals by giving the other branches of government greater 
room to relieve human suffering through new experiments; the conservatives by waging a 
last stand for ‘individual initiative, self-reliance, and other cardinal virtues which I was al-
ways taught were necessary to develop a real democracy,’ as George Sutherland wrote a 
friend in 1937.”). 
262 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 15:1 
 
changes in the climate of opinion and mindful of the level of public 
esteem for their institution and themselves as individuals.”  (pp. 523–
24).  This may be so, but note that it does not do a great deal to help 
explain the continued resistance of the Four Horsemen.  Those jus-
tices do not seem to have had much interest in making sure that they 
got on the right side of history. 
Mr. Shesol concludes that the justices “were neither oblivious to 
life outside their chambers nor immune to feelings of pride, shame, 
vanity, rage, regret . . . .”  (p. 524).  “They were capable of change:  
growth, regression, and inconsistency.  They were, again to different 
degrees, open to  influence by legal briefs, oral arguments, pressure 
from their peers, and, not least, national events.”  (p. 524). 
All of this is perfectly plausible, but with the possible exception of 
the minimum wage cases, Mr. Shesol offers no sustained effort to 
identify the salient causal elements and to demonstrate the causal re-
lationships in any individual instance.  Instead, this passage again 
calls attention to the lack of a sense of historiographical coherence in 
Mr. Shesol’s account.  He has tried to place what he sees as all of the 
potentially relevant factors on the table, but he never does so in a way 
that helps the reader to make sense of the Court’s pattern of behav-
ior.  The challenge, as I see it, is to integrate the various factors that 
one believes help to explain the Court’s behavior into an account 
that helps the reader to understand how these factors were related—
not just that they are possible explanatory variables.  In Mr. Shesol’s 
case, the challenge is heightened due to the fact that some portions 
of his interpretive account conflict with or are at least in considerable 
tension with other portions. 
This may in part account for the fact that Mr. Shesol ultimately 
does not confront that challenge.  Instead, on the crucial issue, he 
punts.  “It is, in the end, impossible to know what sways a judge,” he 
concludes.  (p. 524).  “Even the judges themselves do not always know 
whether their decisions are driven, in the main, by doctrine or emo-
tion, by the dictates of law or politics or conscience.”  (p. 524).  And 
so Mr. Shesol leaves us with the rather unsatisfying thought that the 
truth lies somewhere between two utterly implausible alternatives that 
no serious constitutional historian embraces, and that we cannot ex-
pect to do much better than that.  Just as he complains of Hughes’s 
judicial performance, Mr. Shesol’s account vacillates between internal 
and external explanations, but ultimately he never finds a firm “mid-
dle ground” on which to stand.  Perhaps it is Mr. Shesol, rather than 
Chief Justice Hughes, who is The Man on the Flying Trapeze. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Shesol’s rendering of the political story in Supreme Power is 
very nicely done.  But his account of the legal story is far more prob-
lematic, and must be consumed with great caution.  Moreover, the 
interpretive ambivalence that permeates his recounting of the legal 
story hampers his efforts to specify the relationship between the legal 
and political stories.  These shortcomings will limit the book’s value 
to scholars. 
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